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iSummary:
This thesis examines the consequences and causes of offer 
rationing in labour markets characterised by job search. Offer rationing 
is incorporated by allowing for a probability that search is unsuccessful 
this being referred to as the 'Null Offer' probability. In the 
first instance the consequences of offer constraint for the job 
search decisions of individuals are examined. Results existing in 
the literature are reviewed and then extended to the case where 
individuals are allowed to learn about the degree of rationing that 
they face. Secondly the ways in which offer rationing may arise out 
of the profit maximising decisions of firms are considered. In the 
absence of an appropriate literature the first task is to specify 
an appropriate framework for analysis which is subsequently used 
to examine the factors that might affect the null offer probability. 
Finally the consequences for market equilibrium of the existence of 
offer rationing is examined. It is shown that the existence of null 
offers opens up the possibility of multiple equilibria entailing 
different unemployment rates and levels of social welfare.
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21.1. Preliminaries
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis of the 
consequences and causes of offer rationing in labour markets 
characterised by search. The notion that search activity might be 
an important feature of labour markets was first discussed in a 
seminal paper by Stigler (1962). Subsequently a vast literature has 
developed examining for the most part individual job search decisions 
(see Lippman and McCall (1976) or Chalkley (1982) for a survey) but 
also suggesting the consequences of search for market (equilibrium) 
outcomes. In some of this literature explicit allowance is made 
for the fact that individuals may face the possibility of unsuccessful 
search via a probability of failure.
This notion of offer 'rationing' in search is used throughout 
this thesis in an attempt to subject to greater analysis than thus 
far attained the causes and consequences of quantity constraint on 
agents' behaviour and market outcomes. We henceforth refer to the 
probability of failure in a search context as the probability of a 
null offer. Searching for a job and being unsuccessful can usefully 
be thought analagous to soliciting a zero offer. Similarly for a 
firm, turning away a potential employee who has contacted the firm 
is analogous to making an unacceptable or null offer.
The following chapters can be divided into three parts. In 
chapters 2 and 3 the consequences of the existence of null offers 
for individual decision making in a search context are examined. 
Chapter 2 essentially reviews the literature on an individual's 
job search decisions as it relates to the consequences of null 
offers, whilst chapter 3 extends existing analysis by considering the 
effects of learning in a 'rationed' setting.
In chapters 4 and 5 the object of analysis is a consistent model 
of a firm's behaviour. With this aim in mind we concentrate on a 
firm's wage and vacancy decisions in a market characterised by 
search and examine ways in which null offers may arise. The existing 
literature on firm's decisions is very sparse and hence both chapters 
4 and 5 represent original contributions. Chapter A sets the stage 
by considering the appropriate framework for analysis whilst 
chapter 5 presents a model where null offers by firms are a realistic 
outcome.
In chapter 6 we draw together the analysis of the previous 
four chapters to examine an equilibrium model of search, unemployment 
and null offers. The aim here is to examine ways in which the 
existence of imperfect information and job search might change the 
usual notion of an efficient equilibrium in a competitive market.
In the remainder of this chapter, each of the above three 
sections of the thesis is considered in more detail. The methods 
and objectives of analysis are of particular concern.
1.2. Models of Individual Search Behaviour
It is now some 20 years since Stigler (1962) first considered 
the problem of job choice in a market characterised by imperfect 
information. Although Stigler (1962) considered many elements of a 
job to be associated with uncertainty ("stability of employment, 
conditions of employment") he concentrated attention on uncertainty 
regarding the location and value of available wages. Subsequent 
writers (e.g. McCall (1965,1970) extended this lead and cons idered the 
correct mathematical specification of a model allowing for search
by individuals. Since then considerable research activity has been 
devoted in generalising models of individual search behaviour and 
it is these generalisations as applied to a model of search that 
allow for offer rationing that chapter 2 will review.
Throughout the process of formulating and then generalising a 
model of individual job search decisions interest has centred around 
unemployment. It is assumed throughout that the activity of searching 
for a job can be most effectively conducted whilst unemployed. The 
attraction of a model that in part explains the role of unemployment 
in a labour market is obvious. It has long been noted that turnover 
is an important feature of labour markets and it was towards an 
explanation of labour market flows that the model of individual 
job search was first applied. It is a considerable step to go from 
accepting that job search activity is an element explaining the 
economic role of unemployment spells of individuals to a model of the 
economy that allows for no other cause of unemployment. Many of 
these early attempts at 'explaining' unemployment via simple models 
of individual job search (see Phelps et al (1970)) have subsequently 
been seen to be misconceived (see Lippman and McCall (1976a)). In 
any case a model that deals only with one side of the market is 
subject to the criticism that its predictions may not be valid when 
the operation of the whole market is considered. The difficulties 
are most acutely observed in Rothschild (1973), but are also 
realised in many early contributions (see Alchian (1970, Gronau (1973)).
It is the contention here that models of individual search 
decisions should not be applied to make general inferences about the 
operation of markets characterised by job search. Rather they serve 
essentially two roles.
5First they provide an input into market equilibrium models of 
search. This role will be seen in later chapters of this thesis 
(see chapter 6). Such are the complexities of market models that 
only the simplest specifications of individual job search behaviour 
will be used.
Secondly, models of individual decision making are useful 
precisely because they cast light on the determinants of individual 
decisions. In this role search theory can be seen as an extension to 
the basic labour supply literature where the extension involves 
allowing for uncertainty. Clearly some allowance for the fact that 
individuals may face constraints as regards to the offers that it is 
possible to obtain is an important ingredient of such a model.
Offer rationing has indeed been an essential ingredient of attempts 
to empirically estimate models of individual job search behaviour (see 
Nickell (1979)). The uncertainty involved in locating wage opportunities 
is interesting because it invokes an active response from individuals.
It is this element of active response to lack of information that 
we feel makes models of individual decision making interesting in 
their own right and particularly rich in explaining many aspects 
of individual behaviour. One particular kind of active response 
to uncertainty, namely information acquisition, is singled out for 
attention in chapter 3 where a model of search incorporating rationing 
is generalised to allow for learning about the extent of rationing.
Chapter 2 starts by considering the simplest possible search 
problem involving offer rationing. In such a setting it is only 
the location and not the value of vacancies that is unknown to 
individuals. The next step is to build up the 'stylised' model of 
job search that has been the main concern of the job search literature.
6The central results of this literature are then explained in relation 
to the null offer model of job search. Throughout the exposition 
attention will be drawn to the way in which refinements of the basic 
model add to an understanding of aspects of labour market behaviour 
and affect the predictions of the basic job search model.
This leads naturally to chapter 3 where the null offer model 
of job search is extended in a way not previously considered. The 
rationing of offers that an individual faces is assumed to be 
learnt over the course of search. Whilst general 'learning' has 
been considered an important aspect of search activity by individuals, 
it is not generally possible to solve analytically the optimal search 
strategy. Indeed, often the nature of the decision problem is so 
complex that even numerical methods can only be employed at considerable 
cost (for examples see Hey (1981)). However, learning about 
rationing of offers turns out to be a considerable simplification over 
general learning processes. Whilst an analytic expression cannot be 
found for the reservation wage (the single choice variable determining 
search strategy) it is relatively easy to solve the model numerically 
and examine the optimal strategy under a variety of circumstances.
The learning model of chapter 3 serves a number of purposes.
First it is is shown that the predictions from a static (no learning) 
search model are in many ways quite robust to such a generalisation. 
Secondly, and more interestingly, the model can be used to examine 
the effect of 'subjective' uncertainty on search behaviour. It is 
shown that a generally held result that greater subjective uncertainty 
leads to lengthier search does not hold (and in fact the reverse 
is true) if previously examined offers cannot be returned to. Thirdly 
the richer nature of a more general search model is illustrated
by suggesting possible applications of the learning model to labour 
market phenomena such as worker discouragement.
Having identified in chapters 2 and 3 the basic ingredients 
of what has become a large literature on individual search decisions, 
attention is next centred on models of firms behaviour consistent 
with job search and in particular offer rationing.
1.3. Models of Firms Decisions, Wage Determination and Offer Rationing
By comparison with the vast literature on individual search 
decisions, the literature relating to consistent ’demand side' 
explanations of search markets is scant indeed. Only recently has 
any attempt to model firms behaviour been made (see Eaton and
Watts (1977) and McKenna (1980)). This relative neglect seems in 
retrospect rather strange, particularly given the tendency of the 
early search literature (cf Phelps (1970)) to model unemployment as 
an equilibrium search phenomena. The issues raised by the existence 
of job searchers in the labour market as regard to their consequences 
for firms decisions are many and interesting in their own right. As 
with models of individual decision making, it is possible to identify 
two roles for models of firm behaviour.
First, any model of market equilibrium must consider explicitly 
decisions made by agents on both sides of the market. Again it 
might be expected that the complexities involved in considering a 
market equilibrium lead to only the simplest models of a firm's 
behaviour being considered.
Secondly, models of a firm's behaviour provide valuable insights 
into the nature of the determinants of wages and vacancy creation in
8markets characterised by search. It is particularly interesting 
to ask in this context what sort of model is consistent with the 
notion of offer rationing that forms the basis of the models of 
individual decision making in chapters 2 and 3.
There are at least two aspects of the job search process that 
give rise to important consequences for an analysis of firms decisions.
First imperfect information on the part of individuals gives a 
firm operating in the labour market monopsony power. A small decrease 
in the offered wage will no longer result in an immediate and 
permanent reduction in employment to zero. A particular question of 
interest here is whether for homogenous labour and identical firms, 
this monopsony power leads to a non-degenerate distribution of wage 
offers as an equilibrium outcome (see Braverman (1980) for a discussion 
of this same question in a price search setting). The answer to 
this question, however, requires analysis of an equilibrium market 
model of search. Our analysis therefore attempts to explain how 
various parameters of the search process (such as the frequency with 
which individuals contact the firm) affect the monopsony wage decision.
Secondly, the fact that workers search (and are subject to 
uncertainty regarding the actual location of different wage offers) means 
that a firm's employment level follows a stochastic process (i.e. a 
probabilistic process evolving over time). It is this second feature 
of the search process that leads to the greatest difficulty in 
modelling firms' decisions and in our view has been largely responsible 
for the comparative neglect of this area. The problem of modelling 
decisions in the face of a stochastic labour supply is particularly 
acute because in a job search context it is the probabilities of 
various outcomes that a firm in part determines.
9Consider by way of example a firm operating in a labour market 
in which individuals search randomly for jobs. Decisions of the firm 
regarding vacancy creation, wage offers, job advertising and 
recruitment screening standards may all affect the probabilities of 
one or more individuals leaving or joining the workforce. Attempts 
to model problems such as this in full detail are almost certainly 
doomed given current techniques. Indeed, even fairly restricted 
attempts to model certain aspects of this kind of problem have met 
with only limited success in generating an economic model that is 
acceptably easy to analyse (see Eaton and Watts (1977)}.
We therefore concentrate in chapters 4 and 5 on just two 
aspects of firms decisions - those regarding wages and employment.
If wages are viewed as being determined by firms rather than by 
market forces it becomes relevant to ask what factors influence 
a film's wage decision and in which direction.
In chapter 4, therefore, an approach to modelling such problems 
is suggested and applied to several simple wage determination problems. 
The novelty of the approach lies in considering the process of 
arrivals to and departures from a firm occuring continuously through 
time. This naturally leads to consideration of stochastic processes 
for a firm's employment level that can adjust only by 'unit' changes 
instantaneously. Such stochastic processes are considerably easier to 
analyse than more general Markov processes and this fact is reflected 
in the literature on such processes (see Cox and Miller (1970)). The 
important point to note about the analysis of chapter 4 is that the 
existence of job search renders the assumption of wage taking behaviour 
implausible. Given this, the determinants of a firm's profit maximising
wage offer are examined. It is shown that the existence of a 
distribution of reservation wages across searching individuals poses 
serious problems for analysis. It becomes very difficult to sign the 
effects of parameter changes even for highly simplified models.
It is expecting too much to imagine that the simple models outlined 
in Chapter 4 will provide a rigorous and usable explanation of, 
for example, wage dispersion. Indeed it is shown in chapter 4 
that the influences on wage determination even within a very simple 
search setting are sufficiently complex as to render unambiguous 
comparative statics results impossible. Instead therefore the 
following general conclusions are drawn from the analysis. If 
firms do indeed unilaterally set wages in a market characterised 
by search the following factors will be priori important;
1. The rate at which individual searchers contact the firm
2. The extent of natural turnover and quitting
3. The distribution of characteristics over applicants.
All of these factors will in turn be influenced by labour market 
conditions.
The models of firms' behaviour discussed in chapter 4 either 
consider a firm to create an infinite number of vacancies or, at the 
other extreme, only a single vacancy. However, the method of modelling 
of firms' decisions outlined in that chapter can be applied to a more 
general model where the actual number of vacancies created by a 
firm which faces some vacancy cost function is a decision variable.
The exposition and analysis of such a model is the concern of chapter 5. 
A model which is general enough to allow for a finite number of 
vacancies to be created and which can demonstrate the phenomenon of 
a firm giving a null offer is clearly an important part of any
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consideration of the causes of quantity constrained search. In previous 
work in this area the generation of 'null' offers has either been 
ignored (by effectively assuming that firms always have vacancies) 
or assumed (by positing single vacancy firms). The existence of a 
finite bound on vacancy creation that is a decision variable of the 
firm complicates the analysis of firm's decisions. This being the 
case, numerical analysis is used in chapter 5 to suggest some 
comparative statics results where such effects cannot be signed 
analytically. Of particular interest is the way in which a firm's 
decisions determine the probability that the firm is found in a 
state of 'no vacancies' and it is on this particular aspect of the 
model that attention is focused. Exogenous changes that lead to 
either an increase or decrease in the above probability are 
discussed. An issue of interest in the analysis of chapter 5 is 
the possibility of a feedback loop between individuals' and firms' 
decisions. It can be shown, for example, that increased search 
activity may generate more vacancies and less rationing, which in 
turn is consistent with more search activity.
In both chapters 4 and 5 firms are generally assumed to 
monopsonistically determine wages given an upward sloping expected 
employment function. In the final section of chapter 4 the ways 
in which the general approach to modelling of firms' employment state 
can be adapted to allow for wage bargaining between worker and firm are 
discussed. The bargaining solution to wage determination in job 
search settings has found favour in the analysis of Diamond (1982) and 
Pissarides (1984) and can be successfully integrated into the 
continuous time stochastic employment model of a firm that is 
developed in these two chapters.
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It should be clear that chapters 2, 3 and 4, 5 respectively 
discuss the supply and demand sides of markets characterised by 
search and offer rationing. It remains to consider the operation 
of such markets as a whole.
1.4. Equilibrium Models of Search with Offer Rationing
It has long been realised that inferences made from partial 
equilibrium models may prove completely wrong at a general equilibrium 
level. This is as true for a single market as it is for a system 
of markets. The dangers of treating an analysis of one set of 
agents' decisions as a theory of market outcomes are succinctly 
outlined in Rothschild (1973). Rothschild refers to much of the 
search literature as "partial-partial equilibrium" analysis, since 
in general only one side of one market is considered.
The problem of making incorrect inferences from partially 
specified models is of course a problem of simultaneity. Where one 
set of agents' decisions depend on market outcomes and where all 
agents' decisions affect those outcomes, the interdependencies of 
such decisions must be explicitly accounted for. It is the exploration 
of this interdependency of decisions towards which market equilibrium 
models of search are directed. It should not be surprising therefore 
that generalising our model of search in one direction frequently 
requires simplification in another. Only the simplest formulations 
of individual and firm decision problems can be assumed in an equilibrium 
setting.
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The existing literature on market equilibrium models of search 
is sparse, the earliest paper being that of Lucas and Prescott (1974). 
More recently, several writers have considered equilibrium models that 
contain features of the search problem that are of central concern 
here (Diamond (1982), Pissarides (1979),(1984), Diamond and 
Maskin (1979).
There are essentially two types of questions to which answers 
can be attempted in an equilibrium setting, those concerned with 
a description of the outcome and those concerning its desirability.
First, how equilibrium outcomes change with changes in the 
environment (as represented by changes in the exogenous parameters 
of the model) and in particular what inferences can be drawn about 
the effect of government action on the operation of markets characterised 
by search. In a model with offer rationing it seems appropriate to 
ask in this context what affects the extent of rationing.
The idea that a given set of parameter values is consistent 
with only one (unique) equilibrium configuration need no longer 
hold in an imperfect information environment. Where multiple 
equilibria are possible a further area of interest is with regard 
to a comparison of the different equilibria.
Secondly, because the interdependency of agents' decisions is 
explicitly modelled it is possible to ask whether or not the market 
outcome is 'efficient' or 'optimal'. The usual definition of 
efficiency is that of an outcome, where no agent can be made better off 
without simultaneously making some other agent worse off. The 
notion of 'optimality' allows (given some weighting function for agents' 
welfare) the distributional effects as well as allocative effects 
of market outcomes to be evaluated.
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Chapter 6 is directly concerned with answering both these 
types of questions. As noted earlier, the complexities involved 
in modelling a market equilibrium suggest that only the simplest 
formulation of decision problem for the various agents be employed.
Chapter 6 starts by outlining the components of an equilibrium 
model of search. Underlying such a model are models of firms and 
individual decision making. The purpose of chapter 6 is to 
explicitly determine the role of offer rationing in a search 
framework, therefore two specifications are suggested, one where 
vacancies are always created (no rationing) and one where all firms 
are limited to a single vacancy (null offers). It is shown that 
when offers are rationed, non unique equilibria are possible and the 
qualitative features of these equilibria are examined. Different 
equilibria will exhibit different levels of wages, unemployment and 
offer rationing. This is contrasted with the unrationed world where 
a unique natural rate of unemployment is shown to exist.
Finally, chapter 6 also discusses the welfare implications of 
search equilibria. Here the analysis of Diamond (1982) suggests a 
general inefficiency of search equilibria brought about by private 
wage bargains that fail to reflect the value of entering agents 
in a matching process.
15
1.5 . Methods
The method and tools of analysis used throughout this thesis 
are those common to economic theory. A mathematical model of 
economic behaviour is derived and the consequences for behaviour of 
changes in parameters analysed by conventional calculus, dynamic 
progranming or other appropriate techniques. Where analytic 
results are not possible, numerical simulation is used in order to 
generate results. Numerical methods and computational techniques are 
detailed in the Appendix.
Throughout this work there is an assumption that agents maximise 
their objective functions. The 'costs' of computing optima 
(either in time or resources) are ignored, but this is a feature of 
the vast majority of the economics literature.
16
Chapter 2
Null Offers and the Individual's
Job Search Decisions
17
2.1. Introduction
It is usual in models of individual search decisions to start 
by assuming a distribution of wage offers existing in the labour 
market. The optimal search strategy with respect to this distribution 
is then derived and typically the implications of such a strategy 
for observable behaviour discussed. Discussion of the problem of 
search was initiated by Stigler's (1962) pioneering work. The 
realisation that the optimal strategy frequently assumed a sequential 
form (i.e. involved the observation of and decision about a 
sequence of wage offers) followed the work of McCall (1970).
In this chapter we take a somewhat different approach as the 
object is to review the results of the literature as they pertain 
in particular to the search problem of an individual facing offer 
constraint.
In the next section a simple model of 'vacancy' search is 
outlined in which a single valued wage offer is available to the 
individual at unknown locations (firms). The only feature of 
the market that affects an individual's behaviour is the possiblity 
that no offer (i.e. a 'zero' or 'null' offer) is obtained at any 
stage. Since the only 'gain' to search is the possibility of 
obtaining a job and the only 'costs' the expenditure on acquiring offers 
and the waiting cost of unemployment, the search strategy for the 
individual involves simply a decision as to whether search is at 
all worthwhile.
In the following sections the above model is generalised to 
allow for a distribution of wage offers (known or unknown), the 
effects of finite wealth or a finite planning horizon, the effects
18
of differing attitudes to risk, alternative uses of time and finally 
the possibility that jobs may vary in characteristics other than 
simply the wage. These generalisations effectively review the 
literature on individual job search decisions by application to the 
problem of search given offer rationing. At each stage the consequences 
of search decisions for the observable behaviour of the individual 
are discussed.
In the concluding section of this chapter the central results 
of search theory are again briefly repeated and some suggestions 
made as to the ways in which the issue of offer rationing can be 
further explored within models of individual search decisions. One 
such extension, namely an allowance for learning about offer 
rationing is the concern of Chapter 3.
2.2. Search for a Vacancy
It is useful to have in mind a base model to which more complicated 
formulations can be related. The essential feature that is the 
focus of attention in the present work is the notion of job offer 
rationing so we start with a model that has this as its only 
feature.
Consider an individual who is currently unemployed and receiving 
some level of income b per period. b may be in the form of central 
government unemployment benefits or income from past savings, etc.
We assume throughout that from a state of unemployment an individual 
can search for a job. For present purposes it suffices to assume that 
all jobs are identical and pay a wage of w per period. Let the cost 
of searching out a single firm be c and let at the most one such
19
search take place per period.^ Since not all firms contacted
will have a vacancy we assume a probability q of contacting a firm
which will actually make a job offer. If the individual is completely 
2uninformed as to the location of vacancies, we might expect random 
search over firms and that q represents the proportion of firms 
with a vacancy. (1-q) is the probability of unsuccessful search and 
is the probability that the individual receives a 'null' or zero 
offer. Within the constraints of the current setting the individual 
only has a choice as to whether to search or not and we start by 
examining the determinants of this decision. We make three further 
simplifying assumptions in the first instance, i) that a job once 
obtained is never lost ii) that the individual lives for ever 
and iii) that wealth is infinite so that payments of c can continue 
forever (search can be conducted indefinitely).
The most useful and general approach to the analysis of job 
search decisions is via the methods of Dynamic Programming (see 
Bellman (1957)). Assuming that the individual maximises his/her 
discounted lifetime earnings and has discount factor p (p “ 1/(1+;)• 
where C is the individual's rate of time preference), the value of 
search can be written as
(2.1) Vg - b - c + [qV£ + (l-q)Vg]p
where Vg is the expected discounted lifetime income of a searching
1. Throughout this and the next chapter a 'discrete' time approach is 
considered; this is purely a matter of convention in the literature 
and convenience. Subsequently when a continuous time formulation 
appears more useful (in Pt. 3) we shall reconsider the vacancy 
search model in continuous time.
2. As will be seen in chapters A & 5, this idea becomes most plausible 
when the location of vacancies is constantly changing because of 
probabilistic influences.
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individual and V is the value of employment. Clearly under the 
simplifying assumptions made so far
(2.2) VE - w/(l-p)
The value of search must be compared with the only alternative 
available to the individual, namely permanent unemployment. Again 
under the present assumptions this can simply be written as
(2.3) Vu - b/(l-P)
The individual will choose that strategy that maximises expected
income, i.e. will choose max(V , V ).u s
The infinite horizon assumption means that essentially nothing
changes with the passing of time and in particular the 'value' of
search or unemployment is constant. We can therefore solve for V ass
(2.4) V - - (b~c)---  +  £aYE-
8 (l-(l-q)p) (l-(l-q)p)
which must be compared with V . The individual will choose either 
to search or remain permanently unemployed as (V - V ) is positive 
or negative. We can therefore solve for a wage w* that makes the 
individual indifferent between search for employment and permanent 
unemployment.
(2.5) w* - isrXHi-p.) ♦ f1 - a-«i)p]b - b ♦ (1_p)
pq pq Pq
21
w* has a natural interpretation as the participation wage. It 
is that wage which if available to the individual will just ensure 
his participation in the labour market.
Notice that since (2.A) is increasing in q that w* must be 
decreasing in q. Better employment prospects lead to 'greater' 
participation.
w* is clearly also increasing in c and decreasing in b.
Greater costs of search lead to less participation. As unemployment 
benefits rise the value of 'search' increases less quickly than 
the value of permanent employment and hence participation declines.
In the absence of unemployment benefits the participation wage 
simplifies considerably. The value of permanent unemployment 
becomes zero and hence
(2.6) w* - ^  P^C w*q « Cc
pq
Notice here the role of discounting, the greater is discounting 
of future returns (the smaller is p) the less worthwhile search 
becomes. The true cost of search therefore has two components, the 
money cost c and the cost of time.
This highly simplified framework helps to make clear what 
are the central insights of search theory. The assumption that 
has been invoked which makes the above analysis distinguishable 
from the usual analysis of participation decisions is that of 
imperfect information regarding the location of employment opportunities.
22
Such imperfect information together with a cost of becoming informed 
suggests that there is a genuine economic decision to be analysed. 
Are the benefits of becoming informed, which in this simple model 
are easily defined as the value of employment itself V_, sufficient 
to compensate for the expected costs of acquiring information?
The answer of course depends on the magnitude of benefits (namely 
the wage ») the cost of each observation (i.e. C) , the nunfcer of 
observations on average required in order to find a job (governed 
by » flnd if time itself is costly the degree of impatience 
(given by p).
Within the framework suggested here it is easy to relax the 
three assumptions made earlier. (For simplicity b is set equal to 
zero.)
Rather than assume an infinite duration job we could allow for
a constant risk per period p of job loss. In this case the value of
search is as before [[(2.4) with b - oj but the value of employment 
must be written as
(2.7) V£ - w + p[pVg + (l-y)VE]
We therefore have a pair of simultaneous equations in VE and Vg 
to solve for the participation wage. From inspection, however, it 
is clear that (since V£ > Vg) w* will be increasin0in p. An 
increased risk of job loss results in a lower participation rate 
through the increase implied in the costs of search.
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The imposition of a finite planning horizon either through
myopia or finite wealth considerations means that we can no longer
analyse 'stationary' value functions, indeed we now need to 'date'
both V_ and V • 
h j s
Denoting by Vg(t) the value of search when t periods remain,
(2.8) Vg(t) - -c + [qVE(t-l) + <l-q)Vg(t-l)]p
VE (t) » w + pV£ (t-1) - — -—  since VE (t) « V£ (t-1)
(1-p)
In this case the value of search must be calculated recursively 
fro»" th® horizon (T) backwards, using the fact that Vg (0) » 0.
By simple recursion it follows that Vg(t) > Vg(t-1) Vt and hence 
that if an individual finds it worthwhile to make the last search 
(s)he will find it worthwhile to search whenever possible.
This simple model also allows for the possibility that an 
individual becomes discouraged during the course of search. If 
vg(t) declines to zero before the horizon is reached (where Vu(t) - OVt) 
then the individual will permanently abandon search or drop out of 
the labour market.
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Various other simple extensions to the model of 'vacancy' search 
outlined here are of course possible. The opportunity of obtaining 
more than one vacancy and therefore of searching more 'intensively' 
can easily be incorporated into this model, as can the possibility 
of searching selectively from markets with 'different' q's. In the 
latter case an obvious result is that those markets with the best 
prospects (highest q's) will be searched first. Both of these 
extensions to the simple model will again be considered when wage 
dispersion is allowed for in the next section.
A more interesting possibility is to allow for the probability q 
to be unknown by the individual and learnt during the course of 
search. This sort of adaptive search model and generalisations of 
it to the case where a distribution of wage offers is available is 
the concern of the next chapter.
It is useful, however, to pause to consider the implications 
of the above simple model for individuals' behaviour in a labour 
market context. We have outlined a model in which the individual 
chooses the 'state' to be occupied given a choice between non­
participation and active search for a vacancy. Considerable insight 
is gained from formal analysis of the problem even in as simple 
a setting as the one above. In particular the expected returns and 
costs of actions determine behaviour and in a stationary world 
actions once determined will not evolve over time. Where a unique wage 
offer is available the returns from search take the form of the 
expected income (suitably discounted) when a job is found, that is
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the discounted wage weighted by the probability in each period of 
actually finding a vacancy or soliciting a non-zero offer. These 
returns must be balanced against the costs of search which come in a 
direct money form (c), and in the form of impatience. In particular 
if the individual has the opportunity of some income now (b) of 
which some may be foregone in order to increase income in the future, 
impatience or 'discounting' is an important consideration.
Even within this simple framework we therefore have a model 
that suggests an explanation of an individual's (labour market) state 
occupancy decisions. Whilst empirically it may be very difficult 
to distinguish individuals by the two states examined (which may 
both appear as unemployment), economic theory has furnished us 
with a set of variables which might be relevant in explaining any 
observations. The particular variable of interest in this analysis 
is the probability q which has played a central role in the model 
to date. It is worth repeating the significance of this variable.
The probability of obtaining an offer (or equivalently the probability 
of failure (1-q)) dictates the expected waiting time to a job offer. 
Since waiting is costly both in time (foregoing income now for 
returns in the future) and in direct costs (c) the offer probability 
'q' affects the individual's search decision trade-off.
The model of vacancy search developed here has not received such 
a comprehensive treatment in the job search literature which instead, 
following the lead of Stigler (1962), has concentrated on the 
consequences of wage dispersion. Assuming a distribution of wages
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can be seen as a generalisation of the vacancy search model developed 
here and it is a generalisation that will be discussed in detail in 
the next section. The consideration of wage dispersion concentrates 
attention on an individual's decisions whilst in the 'state' of 
searching. In particular an important question becomes how to 
characterise the optimal search strategy. Of course a complete 
treatment of the search problem involves both elements, which state 
to occupy and how to search given that it is desirable.
What such an approach suggests is that job search theory at 
the individual level should provide an explanation of individual 
behaviour with respect to three states, Non Participation, Search 
Unemployment and Employment and, in particular, the determinants 
of the transitions between these states. Again it should be noted 
that in this work we are particularly concerned with an examination 
of the effects of offer rationing in the labour market as reflected 
in q. So far we have examined the choice between the occupation 
of the first two of these states with respect to the role of q.
It is now time to expand our analysis.
2.3 Wage Dispersion
Assume now that the wage offers available to the individual are 
given by a continuous distribution of wage offers f(w) (the following 
arguments apply equally to cases of discrete distributions) and that 
the three assumptions of the last section hold. We can now view 
the individual's decision problem as viewed from a state of unemployment 
as a two stage one. Firstly, whether it is worthwhile to search 
at all which depends on whether the 'value' of search is greater 
than the value of non-participation (zero in the case of b - 0).
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Secondly, how much to search given that search is desirable, which 
decision we might expect to depend upon the marginal valuation of 
costs and benefits of search.
We have already examined the first decision in some detail and 
will henceforth concentrate mainly on the second. The approach taken 
to this second decision by Stigler (1962) was that of determining 
the optimal sample size, i.e. number of searches to be made.
This, however, is a sub-optimal way for the individual to behave 
since it ignores the essential sequential nature of the problem 
analysed by McCall (1970) and subsequent writers.
Consider, then, the value of job search for an individual faced 
by a distribution of offers and having just received a draw on that 
distribution of w. We assume here that offers once rejected cannot
3be returned to so that the value of search may be written (b“0)
•u
(2.9) Vg(w) “ max{__w_ , -c + [q Vg(w)f(w)dw + (l-q)Vg(0)]p}
(1-P)
The value of search must be the maximum of two alternatives, 
to stop now and quit search (which yields w/(l-p)) or to search 
again, u is the upper bound of f(w).
Looking at these two alternatives as a function of w we notice 
that the value of the first increases monotonically with w whilst 
the second is a constant. This immediately suggests that there 
will be a unique value of w that equates the two expressions and that
3. This is the ’no recall' assumption which seems quite plausible in 
many labour market situations. In the present case the ability 
to return to past offers does not affect decisions-.where it does 
both this and the case of perfect 'recall' will be allowed.
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this value divides the set of all possible offers into those which 
are worth more than further search (w > r) and those that are worth 
less (w < r). r is thus sufficient to entirely capture the individual's 
search decisions in this setting. It is this remarkable feature 
that has led to a great deal of research effort in determining under 
what generality of assumptions such a property will continue to hold, 
r has a natural interpretation as a 'reservation' wage that is the 
wage that makes an individual indifferent between accepting it or 
continuing search. The optimality of a reservation wage strategy in 
a search problem gives it the so-called reservation property. The 
literature that fully discusses this property is immense, the most 
general treatments being in the literature on statistical decisions 
DeGroot (1970), Chow et al (l97l), Brieman (1964). Proofs of the 
existence of the reservation property in job search settings are 
to be found in Lippman and McCall (1976a), Kohn and Shavell (1974), 
Landsberger and Peled (1977).
The reservation wage for the problem under consideration here 
can be implicitly defined by noting that
(2.10) — ----- - + p[qE[v (w)] + (l-q)V (0)]( 1 - p )  6 ®
Following a reservation wage strategy implies therefore an 
expected value of search given by e £v (w )J « E max [— ——  , — -— ]8 ( 1 - p )  ( 1 - p )
where E denotes the mathematical expectation.
The value of search when no offer has been obtained Vg(0) is 
clearly therefore — -—  .
(1-P)
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Since w is a random variable distributed according to f(w) it 
follows that
(2.11) E max [— -—  , — -— ] - — -—( 1 - p )  ( 1 - p )  ( 1 - p ) fuf(w)dw + ( 1 - p ) f(w)dw
which can be rearranged to give
(2.11a) — -—  E max (w,r) “ — —
fu
(1-P) (1-P)
[r + (w-r)f(w)dwj
Substituting into (2.10) we have
ru
' * J,'"
(2.12) r + c.(l-p) « (q[r + I (w-r)f(w)dwj + (l-q)r)p
which gives us an implicit equation for r of the form
(2.13) c(l-p) - qp (w-r)f(w)dw - (l-p)r - 0
This is precisely Lippman and McCall's (1976a.) equation (15)
only with w and r representing a per period payment rather than
. , , 4lifetime earnings streams.
Equation (2.13) or formulations similar to it form the basis 
for by far the greater part of the literature on individual search 
decisions.
4. To clarify notation equate i  to —  , 6 to p and x (on offer) 
w 1-pto 1 -p
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A number of results are apparent at once, namely that r is 
decreasing in c and increasing in p (that is decreasing in the 
discount rate). The effects of changes in the offer distribution 
f (w) can also be signed for certain cases. An increase in the risk 
(in the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1970) sense) of f(w) increases r 
for example (see Lippman and McCall (1976»)) .
Our parameter of interest is q and this affects r positively. 
Thus we have identified two consequences of offer rationing for 
individual search decisions. In the first section it was noted 
that the parameter q was important in determining whether or not 
participation or 'search' was worthwhile, here we have a model for 
examining the role of q in determining the actual quantity of 
search (in expectation) that an individual will engage in.
The first consideration of a search problem where offers might 
be 'rationed' via some probability of search success is to be found 
in Baron (1975) and subsequently Feinberg (1977), this type of model 
is included in the survey of Lippman and McCall (1976a). One way 
of viewing the q parameter is as a component of the 'full' offer 
distribution facing the individual. Denoting by g(w) the 'full' 
distribution then,
(2.14) g(w) “ (1-q) w - 0 
- qf (w) Vw > 0
In this sense an increase in the probability of failure can 
be seen as an unambiguous worsening of the full offer distribution 
which causes search to become less valuable to the individual.
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In the case of our model with a single wage we could only make 
statements regarding the state occupancy of an individual; with an 
analysis including dispersion it is possible to suggest how behaviour 
within a state (namely search unemployment) is determined.
Where (as has been assumed so far) the horizon of the individual 
is infinite and the parameters of the problem stationary through time, 
the reservation wage will be a constant and gives us in part the 
probability that in any period the individual will exit from the 
'search' state into the employed state (pg). The probability of 
receiving an offer in excess of r is simply (l-F(r)) where F(w) is 
the cumulative distribution function of wage offers. It therefore 
follows that the transition probability pg is given by
(2.15) pg - q(l-F(r))
It has long been noted (Baron (1975), Feinberg (1977) and 
Nickell (1979)) that an increase in q has an ambiguous effect 
upon pg. Whilst offers arrive more frequently the individual is 
more choosy and therefore may exit the state of search unemployment 
with a smaller probability. It can be shown, however, that for 
'reasonable' specification of f(w) dpg / dq > 0 (Feinberg(1977)).
We can combine the two models of this and the previous section 
and draw inferences about both the participation and search decisions 
of the individual. If the reservation wage that solves (2.13) declines 
to zero, then it is clear that the individual will not find it 
optimal to participate. It follows that for some value of q the 
prospects of an offer may be so poor that the expected lifetime 
earnings of an individual net of search costs become negative, and 
hence that the worker becomes 'discouraged'.
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The existence of 'income' during search in the form of b of 
course complicates the above analysis somewhat. The intuition, however, 
remains clear, if the reservation wage (which will be a function of b) 
is calculated to be less than b, it is optimal for the individual to 
'accept' b and not engage in further search. It is important to 
notice the dual role of b in this case. An increase in benefits 
unambiguously increases the reservation wage (smaller direct cost of 
search) but may also increase discouragement. It is usual in the 
literature to comment on only the first of these two effects.
The model with wage dispersion and 'null' offers can be generalised 
along the lines of our approach in section 1. It should be clear 
that if jobs have a risk of unemployment attached to them their 
'value' declines as therefore does the reservation wage. The fact 
that different jobs paying the same wage may have differing 
unemployment risks does not result in a trade off, however, of 
wages for security (see Burdett and Mortensen (1980)).
Inclusion of a finite search horizon has exactly the same 
consequences as in our simple vacancy search model. It becomes 
necessary to calculate the reservation wage recursively commencing 
at the horizon. This is the case except if perfect recall is possible 
(see Lippman and McCall (1976)). In this very special case the 
reservation wage is time invariant (and equal to the infinite 
search horizon wage) right up to the horizon. Again, if no recall or 
only imperfect recall is possible (see Landsberger and Peled (1977), 
Kami and Schwartz (1977)), the reservation wage will decline as the 
horizon approaches. Numerical results suggest (see Chalkley (1982a)) 
that the effect of a finite horizon is not particularly great but 
that its imposition may result in a reversal of Feinberg's (1977)
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results concerning the expected duration of unemployment as a function 
of q^.
The model of search with wage dispersion described so far is 
highly stylised. A great deal of the literature in this area has 
been concerned with successive generalisations of this stylised 
model. The results of this research as it relates to our 'null 
offer' augmented search model are briefly outlined in the next 
section.
2.4 Some Extensions
i) Search Intensity
It is a comparatively simple matter to modify the analysis of 
either of the last two sections to include the possibility of choice 
as regards intensity of search, provided one regards all offers 
obtained within a search period as being 'viewed' simultaneously.
In the case of our vacancy search model we might posit a cost of 
(simultaneously) contacting firms of the form
(2.16) c - c(n)
where n is the number of contacts.
Clearly the gain from search is
(2.17) [Min (1, qn)]. — —( 1 - p )
5. Feinberg suggests that the duration of search unemployment is a
negative function of q, but Chalkley (1982a) shows that this result 
may be reversed for 'short' search horizons and small search costs.
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and our analysis goes through as before only with an optimal n to 
solve for subject to search being worthwhile:
A similar modification for the wage search model requires that 
the expected gain from search be written as
(2.18) E[vg(w)] - qE max [w, rj
where w is an n vector of offers.
If variable search intensity is interpreted as being the 'speed' 
with which offers are acquired (i.e. that offers are still viewed 
sequentially), then it is more helpful to consider the search 
problem in continuous time.
ii) Ordering Prospects
Some writers have considered as important the idea that 
individuals might be able to order firms according both to the 
probability that an offer will be given and also as to the distribution 
from which the offer is drawn. Optimal 'search' (given that any 
search is worthwhile) in this case entails the determination of an 
ordering of firms and then a sequential search starting at the 
best firms first.
A model such as this has been examined by Salop (1973). From 
the point of view of the present work, the important results concern 
the effect of differing probabilities of a 'null' offer between 
different firms. In the case of no wage dispersion (vacancy search)
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it is clear that an individual will search firms (if they can be 
identified) with highest q first. Salop (1973) shows that in the 
case of wage dispersion a trade off exists between the quality (w) 
and probability (q) of an offer.
Although not remarked upon by Salop (1973), the above model has 
another interesting implication regarding individual search decisions 
in that it allows for a worker to abandon search (become discouraged). 
It also suggests that better informed job searchers (those able 
to order prospects) will search less (see Gera and Hasan (1980)).
iii) Search in a Dynamic Context
The consideration of search prospects varying across firms 
leads naturally to a consideration of search strategies when 
prospects vary through time.
The simplest possibility is to allow for a set of q's or 
f(w)'s that will face the individual through time and to assume 
that these are known with certainty by the individual. In this case 
the solution of the optimal search problem again becomes one of 
calculating recursively from the horizon the value of search alone 
(in the case of vacancy search) or given a reservation wage strategy 
(in the case of wage dispersion). The case of wage dispersion is 
dealt with by Pissarides (1976bl Allowing for non stationary 
environments of course leads to richer models. In particular the 
possibility exists that an individual becomes discouraged for certain 
'periods' (when prospects are particularly bad) and then becomes 
active again as labour market conditions improve. Unfortunately the 
assumption that the future is so well known is a rather strong one
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but relaxing it considerably complicates analysis.
A more general assumption would be that the economy evolves 
according to some stochastic process, the parameters of which are 
known to the individual. Lippman and McCall (1976c) examine this 
possibility in the wage dispersion search model. As noted above, this 
kind of model is in essence a generalisation of Salop's (1973) work. 
Except for showing that an optimal search strategy will possess the 
reservation 'property' few other results are possible within such 
a general framework.
Given the emphasis here it is useful to consider how dynamic 
considerations might be included into the simple vacancy search model.
Consider the case of no discounting over the course of search 
(but where the value of an offer is finite, i.e. - W) and
assume now that the state of the labour market is reflected in q 
which can take on a finite number of values, q^ i “ l,...n.
The value of search now of course depends upon the 'state' so that
(2.19) Vs(i) qivE ♦ d-q.:
j-1
where p^j is the state transition probability, i.e. (the probability 
that the q changes from q^ to qj) and VE ■ JiZpT*
The decision of whether to search or not will depend upon the 
current state i. Some states will both be directly unfavourable 
and have a low probability of improvement. In such states the 
individual may not find it worthwhile to search. Even in states 
which are currently favourable but which have a high probability
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of worsening, the individual might not find it worthwhile to search.
Some states may be 'captive', that is to say can never be 
escaped from once entered, similarly some states may never be 
entered and therefore be irrelevant to the problem.
If the stochastic process governing the evolution of q is 
time varying (and therefore not Markovian), further analysis becomes 
almost impossible analytically and optimal search strategies will 
need to be investigated numerically.
iv) Risk Aversion
Most studies of uncertainty or probability in economic theory 
start with an analysis of attitude to risk (see Rothschild and 
Stiglitz (1970)). So far, however, it has been assumed that the 
individual maximises his lifetime wages so that utility is a simple 
linear function of uncertain income. The incorporation of risk aversion 
into job search problems is not as straightforward as might appear. 
Nachman (1975), Hall, Lippman and McCall (1978) and Danforth (1979) 
consider this problem.
As far as our basic vacancy search model is concerned, risk 
aversion can be incorporated without difficulty. Following the . 
usual definition (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)) a more risk 
averse individual will have a lower value of search and will therefore 
be less likely to search. Hall Lippman and McCall (1978) show 
that analogues of these results hold in the case of search without 
recall in the wage dispersion model. Allowing for perfect recall, 
however, causes great difficulties since the optimal strategy need 
no longer possess the reservation property. Intuitively the reason
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for this is that with concave utility high offers received at the 
start of the search process may be rejected and later recalled if 
nothing better 'turns up'. The failure of the reservation property 
in a search context is analogous to dynamic inconsistency as 
identified in other economic models (see Kydland and Prescott (1977)) 
and implies similar difficulties in analysis.
v) Learning
So far the environment facing the individual searcher (the 
full distribution of offers g(w)) has been assumed known. The 
possibility that information may be incomplete and acquired over the 
course of search opens up interesting areas of analysis.
In the first instance it integrates search theory with 
'information economics' where the acquisition of information is 
seen as having important consequences for economic analysis (see 
Varian (1978)).
Secondly, allowing for individuals to adapt to their environment 
is clearly a major step towards realism in search models, where 
perhaps the perfect information assumptions seem unduly strong.
The analysis of 'optimal' learning (via Bayesian techniques) 
in search models has been investigated by Rothschild (1974), Kohn and 
Shavell (1974) and Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981). A dissenting view 
and advocacy of satisficing models is given in Hey (1981).
The literature has concentrated on the effects of learning 
about f(w), the distribution of positive offers and the complexity 
of the decision problem in such environments has led to a paucity of
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useful results, useful that is in the sense of providing empirical 
implications. Indeed, much effort has been expended in examining 
under what conditions search is well behaved (possesses the reservation 
property) in a learning environment (see Rothschild (1974) and 
Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981)). Restricting attention to where the 
reservation property holds (Kohn and Shavell (1974)) only one 
'result' is readily available, the ability to learn if perfect 
recall is possible leads to greater search. Since, as has been 
already noted, the perfect recall assumption is a very special case 
in a labour market context, and not without its problems (when one 
considers the effect of risk aversion), it might be thought that 
this approach is rather devoid of content. However, if one is less 
ambitious and considers particular kinds of imperfect information, 
greater analysis may be possible. One very obvious candidate for 
greater investigation is the rationing parameter q. In the next 
chapter we consider analysing the effect of learning about q over 
the course of search, and are able to suggest results for the simple 
vacancy search model and for a model with wage dispersion where f(w) 
is known.
From the point of view of applicability a model that incorporates 
learning about offer availability suggests a far more satisfactory 
explanation of worker discouragement in a search context than has 
hitherto been offered.
vi) The Opportunity Cost of Search
The textbook analysis of labour supply decisions starts with 
a definition of utility involving both income and time, in the form 
of leisure. In such a framework the opportunity cost of searching
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is not simply forgone income (c) and impatience (p), but also 
forgone leisure.
A number of writers have therefore attempted to incorporate search 
decisions into more general time allocation problems, either within a 
period or over a lifetime. Such a consideration of the opportunity 
cost of search is not going to be a feature of our further analysis.
The interested reader is therefore referred to Baron and McCafferty (1977). 
McCafferty (1979) and Burdett (1979), who consider allocation of time 
within the period and Seater (1977, 1979) who considers a life-cycle 
model of search, work and leisure decisions.
This literature essentially relaxes the assumption that search 
is an intensive activity (requires a full input of time) which should 
be considered a maintained (and simplifying) assumption of our 
analysis.
vii) Characteristics of Jobs
The fact that a 'job' is not simply a wage but many other 
characteristics was readily acknowledged by Stigler (1962) who chose 
to concentrate on wages as determining search. The approach of 
Lancaster (1979) can usefully be employed in once again generalising 
the notion of a job in terms of the characteristics embodied in it.
If all characteristics can be viewed upon locating a job offer, 
then our previous analysis generalises relatively easily. The 
individual might set a reservation utility and accept only jobs 
embodying characteristics offering at least that utility.
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A more reasonable assumption might be that some characteristics 
can only be experienced (Nelson (1970)) and an analysis of search 
under such circumstances has been the concern of Hey and Mavomaras 
(1981), McCall (1980), McCall and McCall (1981),
Hey and McKenna (1981) and Wilde (1980, 1979).
Again such generalisations of the notion of a job will not be 
allowed in the following and therefore the results in this literature 
are not reviewed.
2. 5. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter, by considering a particular kind of search 
problem where search may be unsuccessful, has reviewed the central 
results of the literature on an individual's optimal job search 
decisions.
A model of an individual's search decisions can have two uses.
First, as an input into a market equilibrium model of search, 
null offers and unemployment where clearly only the simplest type 
of model, such as that considered in section 2.2 above, will be 
useful. In this respect we will have cause to use the results of 
the literature reported here in later chapters.
Secondly, as an explanation of an individual's decision (and 
therefore predictor of such decisions), when job turnover, unemployment 
spells and uncertainty regarding the location or value of wage 
offers are features of the labour market.
In this latter regard we have identified two decisions for 
which job search theory, where appropriate allowance is made for
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rationing of offers, may prove to be a useful and ultimately 
empirically implementable theoretical foundation.
The first 'decision' is whether any search is worthwhile and 
the way in which search considerations enter into this decision can 
be seen by examining a highly simplified model where uncertainty 
regarding the location of offers is the only feature.
The second decision concerns how much search is to be undertaken 
contingent upon it being deemed worthwhile. Here the paradigm case 
offered in the literature (cf. Lippman and McCall (1976a)) where 
wage dispersion is considered, provides a framework of analysis.
We have seen that in a very simple model the first decision 
will depend upon a) the money costs of search, b) the opportunity 
cost of time, c) the level of unemployment income, d) the value of 
employment, e) the duration (in expectation)of jobs’ and f) the 
extent of offer rationing or availability as captured in q.
Where wage dispersion is added, the second decision depends upon 
all of the above plus the nature of the distribution of wage 
offers. Where the above models are generalised to include ordering 
of prospects, risk aversion, changes through time or learning during 
the course of search, both decisions will depend on these factors 
as well.
One possible area of development that has been identified in 
this chapter is the inclusion of learning into search models. Here 
the existing literature contains few results because of the technical 
complexity of the issues. However, in a labour market characterised 
by relatively constant wages (or wage distributions) and quantity 
adjustment, one might expect individuals to concentrate on
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learning about the availability rather than the value of offers.
This issue has not so far been addressed in the literature and is the 
subject of the next chapter.
We conclude this chapter with a comment on the empirical 
implementation of search theory. Of the two decisions noted above 
the second (concerning how much search) has been singled out for 
empirical investigation. In particular researchers have been 
interested in how government policy instruments influence the quantity 
of search individuals undertake (see Nickell (1979)). Models of 
an individual's search decisions cannot of course be used as a 
basis for welfare judgements regarding the efficiency of search 
unemployment. However, if one were to make broad statements it 
might be suggested that participation rather than the quantity of 
search will have the greater welfare implications. In this case it 
may be appropriate to devote more resources to the study of participation 
decisions in a search context, than is currently the case. In this 
regard the availability, rather than the value of offers may be a 
crucial determining factor.
Learning About Null Offers
Section 3.3 of this chapter in a revised form is forthcoming 
in The Economic Journal (Conference Papers Supplement 1984).
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3.1. Introduction
In chapter 2 we reviewed a model of job search that allowed 
through a probability (1-q) for unsuccessful search on the part of 
the individual. This probability was seen to be an important 
determinant of both the participation decision and the quantity of 
search decision.
Of the generalisations suggested for the basic search model 
one of the most interesting as regards insight into individual 
decision making concerns allowance for the fact that some aspect(s) 
of the individual's environment may be unknown. If this is the 
case search becomes not just an attempt to locate job offers but 
also a method of acquiring information. It has long been realised 
that attempts by economic agents to acquire or transmit information 
have far reaching implications for the analysis of markets (see 
Varian (1978) Ch.8). The acquisition of information also poses 
very interesting questions at a purely individual level. Do better 
informed individuals search more or less? Is the ability to learn 
a good or a bad thing? In what ways does the acquisition of information 
alter the predictions of a model that makes no allowance for learning?
These latter questions are what we shall address ourselves to 
in this chapter. The analysis of the optimal learning problem when 
the distribution of offers (f(w)) is unknown has previously been 
addressed in the literature by Rothschild (1974), Kohn and Shavell 
(1974), Axell (1974) and Rosenfield and Shapiro (1981). As noted in 
chapter 2, the results of this literature are not particularly useful in 
answering the above questions. Learning may 'destroy' much of our earlier 
analysis if it causes the optimal strategy to not possess the reservation
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property (Rothschild (1974) and causes individuals with perfect 
recall to search longer (Kohn and Shavell (1974): Theorem 5).
In this chapter we consider a more restricted problem and look 
at the effects of learning when the only unknown is the probability 
of a successful search q. Since one interpretation of a model where 
offers are rationed is as a model of labour markets where wages 
fail to adjust allowing for uncertainty regarding quantities seems 
a reasonable approach. Considering only q to be unknown offers a 
considerable simplification over models incorporating more general 
imperfect information. In particular information enters into the 
individual's decision problem in a very discrete way. Either an 
offer is obtained or it isn't.
In the next section we again start by considering our simple 
vacancy search model of the last chapter. Within this framework we 
can examine how the idea of learning about q can be incorporated 
into a model of search and consider the effect of uncertainty about 
q in determining whether the individual will participate in the labour 
force or not. Many of the essential features of a more general 
search model where learning about q is allowed are visible even 
in this very simple case.
In section 3 we again consider a search model with wage dispersion 
and start by formulating a general learning problem and then presenting 
the model with learning about q as a special case. The extent to 
which the effects of learning can be analysed are discussed and some 
numerical results presented that suggest more fully than has previously 
been possible what the effects of learning in a job search context are.
The final section of this chapter summarises the results and makes 
some suggestions for future research in this field.
U1
3.2. Learning in the Simple Vacancy Model
We start by taking the simplest formulation of the vacancy 
search model of the last chapter. Jobs once obtained are assumed 
to last for ever, unemployment benefits are ignored and following 
Lippman and McCall (1976a) we ignore discounting over the actual 
course of search and define the value of a job as H *  ^ .
Assuming an infinite search horizon the value functions in the case 
where q is known to the individual can be written
(3.1) Vg = -c + qVE + (l-q)Vg
(3.2) W wTI^ dT
Search will be worthwhile provided that — is less than W,q
in other words, provided the expected gain of one more search (qW) 
is larger than the cost (c).
We now want to consider the effect of uncertainty regarding the 
parameter q. It is natural to incorporate such uncertainty by 
positing some probability distribution over possible values of 
q so that
(3.3) q^.h(q,0)
h is the probability density function (pdf) of q parameterised 
by some vector 0. h is defined over the interval [o,l].
If the function h(q,0) represents the individual's immutable
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beliefs regarding the parameter q, then incorporating uncertainty 
will not affect decision making in this context. The maximand of the 
individual is expected lifetime income so that our individual is 
risk neutral. All we need to do is to replace q with 
'l
h(q,0)qdq(“E(q)) in (3.1) and for cases where the individual's
o
beliefs are unbiased (E(q) « q) exactly the same condition for the 
value of search will result.
Any consequence of uncertainty regarding q that is to arise 
in a model such as this one where risk neutrality is assumed must 
arise because beliefs are not held with certainty and the individual 
learns over the course of search. We shall analyse the problem when 
information acquired over the course of search is incorporated into 
the individual's (subjective) prior pdf h(q,0) in an optimal 
Bayesian fashion. The probability density that an individual holds 
given an observation (the posterior) must be the prior density 
multiplied by the probability (according to the prior) of the observation.
If h(q,0) forms a parametric family of distributions for the 
unknown q, then all updating of the individual's beliefs arises 
through changes in the parameter vector 6.
The complete specification of the learning problem in our 
simple vacancy search model therefore requires knowledge of the 
functional form h(q,0).
Each 'search' in the context of the above problem constitutes 
a Bernoulli trial with parameter q. Success (an offer) occurs with 
probability q and failure (a null) with probability (1-q). The 
problem of estimating the probability q given a sequence of
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observations is a common one in statistical decision theory and has 
its origins in such problems as determining by experiment the 
'fairness' of a coin. The Beta distribution turns out to be appropriate 
in this case.^ The Beta distribution is parameterised by two 
parameters which we will denote y,z and can be written as
(3.4) h(q,0) - ? ( y . + .z )  q(y~1)(l-q)<2~1)
r(y)r(z)
T is the gamma function and is given by
(3.5) T(y) (y-1) -u u e du
The expectation of a Beta random variable is given by — ——
(y+z)
whilst the variance is -----215------ .
(y+z+1)(y+z)2
In order to complete our specification of the problem we need 
to know how sample information is included into the parameters 
y and z. Given a prior distribution that is Beta with parameters 
y,z application of Bayes theorem dictates that the observation 
of an offer results in a posterior distribution (also Beta) with 
parameters y+l,z. The observation of a null offer results in a 
posterior distribution with parameters y, z+1.
Total ignorance regarding q is most sensibly allowed for by 
assuming a prior distribution that is Uniform on the interval (0,1)
1. See for example DeGroot (1970).
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and again the Uniform (0,1) distribution is a member of the Beta 
family with parameters 1,1.
The individual's information set can therefore be seen as a 
set of observations on the success or otherwise of search. In the 
simple vacancy search setting of course, as soon as an offer is 
realised it is accepted, but one can imagine perhaps individuals 
starting the process with exogenous information, either of the 
observed search experience of others or of earlier spells of search 
unemployment.
We can now write down the value of search for an individual 
who currently has information represented by y,z and who will 
update his/her beliefs in the light of search experience.
Rewriting (3.1) we have
rl r 1I I(3.6) V (y, z ) - -c + h (q ,y, z) qdq. V + [1 - | h (q ,y, z)qdq] V (y,z+l)S Jo E jO S
The integral term is simply the expectation (conditioned
Eon y,z) of q which we shall henceforth denote q (y,z).
The value of search now depends not only on the wage offer, 
expectation of q and cost of search, but also upon the value of 
search conditioned on the observation of a 'null' offer. We cannot 
therefore solve (3.6) directly.
We can, however, find an intuitive argument as for why the 
ability to learn might make participation less likely. Consider 
two individuals i and j each of whom holds the same expectation
i
of q but one of whom, j, holds this expectation with certainty. 
Furthermore, assume that i will learn from only one observation 
so that having observed a null offer, i believes with certainty 
that q = y/(y + z + 1). In that case
(3.7) V*(y,z) < V°(y,z)
where superscripts denote the number of searches when learning 
will take place. (3.7) states that an individual who is prepared 
to learn from only one piece of information regarding q has a 
lower value of search than an individual who will never learn.
By simple recursion it follows that
(3.8) V°(y,z) > V*(y,z) > (y,z) ..... > v"(y,z).
Notice that the variance of the individuals estimate of q is 
for finite y,z arbitrarily close to zero and decreasing in y and z. 
Hence complete or almost complete learning is ensured in finite 
time and thus (3.8) shows our result, since (y,z) is individual j's 
valuation function whilst (y,z) is individual i's valuation.
Following the work of Kohn and Shavell (1974) it is usual to 
think of learning as increasing search. As noted earlier such a 
result depends crucially upon the perfect recall assumption in a 
wage search model. Here in a simple model of vacancy search learning 
turns out to be a bad thing (discourages search) for the individual 
because all news is bad news. The intuition underlying Kohn and 
Shavelis(1974) result is that learning can result in good or bad 
information but that recall ensures that bad news is effectively
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insured against. In the present case all that the individual can 
'learn' is that q is smaller than (s)he first thought (in expectation), 
therefore the expected value of search where learning is possible is 
smaller than in its absence.
The above result does not say anything about the degree of 
uncertainty with which individuals hold their views. There is an 
important distinction to be made here between a little 'learning' 
and none at all (for which the result holds) and a little 'learning' 
and a little less (for which we have no result as yet). What we 
are considering in the second case is the diffuseness of a searcher's 
prior distribution and how it affects search behaviour. Casual 
inspection of the form of (3.6) suggests such a result will be very 
difficult to obtain because we wish to compare two individuals who 
have different current values of both y and z. This is because to 
find - result on diffuseness we must hold the expected value
of q fixed. There is therefore no way in which the two individuals 
could hold the same views given some search experience (only z is 
updated over the course of search).
We can, however, employ a rather different recursion argument 
that suggests rather than proves a result. Again index the two 
individuals by i and j and let both have the same expectation of q, 
but allow i to hold these views with less certainty (the variance of 
h(q,y,z) is greater for i).
Taking a point where both individuals are nearly certain, it 
follows that the value of further search for i is less than that 
for j. Both individuals can only acquire bad news but i can only 
acquire more of it. Therefore we have the following
(3.9) V°£( ) < V°j( )
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Again superscripts denote the fact that we are considering 
what might be termed the learning horizon. We shall assume that 
this horizon is reached by both individuals approximately together.
Next notice that with one search to go before certainty is 
reached that
(3.10) V \( ) si v°i< > v>.( ) -v°.( )
so that it follows that
(3.11) V .( ) < V .SI SJ
which establishes our result that i has a lower value of search
(higher w*) than j. Notice that the assumption of equal certainty
horizons was needed in establishing this result. This requires that
the variance of i's subjective distribution on q should decline
more quickly with observations than that of j, since i starts with a 
higher variance.
In fact considering the formula for the variance of a Beta 
distribution reveals that it is indeed the case that
(3.12) y^ > yj, z^ > Zj =^3var^/3z^ > 3varj/3Zj
(3.12) states that the larger are both parameters the more quickly 
does the variance decrease with z.
Indeed, for many cases (particularly for small expectations of q)
, 2the initially more uncertain individual will become'certain sooner.
2. As an example of this phenomena consider x,y of (1,1) or (2,2)
(expectation ■ J), and notice that the variance after 6 null offers 
is respectively 0.012 and 0.016. (Initial variance is 0.08 and 0.05 respectively.)
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This seems a rather counter intuitive result and indeed it is a 
particular feature of the Beta distribution and the fact that 
information enters in a discrete fashion. It does, however, suggest 
that our intuitive result concerning the effect of diffuseness on the 
participation decision is correct in this case.
The result says that of two searchers with the same prior 
expectation, but one of whom holds a more diffuse view of the 
world, it is the latter who will be less inclined to search (or 
conversely more inclined to discouragement).
This kind of result is particularly interesting because it 
concerns risk neutral individuals. It suggests that expectations 
may be 'rational' (i.e. correspond to the true parameter q in the 
labour market) individuals risk neutral and yet an increase in 
subjective uncertainty will result in a real effect, namely a 
decrease in participation. Our earlier result suggested that 
'learning' itself might also decrease participation.
The intuition behind our second result is clear, greater 
uncertainty leads to the conclusion that more bad news is possible, 
furthermore the form of the Beta distribution suggests that the 
unfavourable state of the world will be viewed as more certain 
more quickly if the individual has initially weak views.
In this section we have analysed learning in the context of 
the simple vacancy search model introduced in chapter 2. Up till now 
the literature on 'adaptive' search as the learning case is often 
called, has suggested few useful results. The great difficulty involved 
in solving for the optimal search strategy (even numerically) has 
meant that the consequences of learning within a search context have 
remained relatively unexplored.
55
Here, by Caking a particular form of the problem, we have been 
able to get somewhat further and examine the issue of learning as 
it relates to the participation decision when the probability of 
re c eiving an offer (of known value) is unknown.
The main conclusions are that a) learning decreases the value 
of search in this context and therefore makes search less likely, 
b) having more to learn ceteris paribus is a bad thing and suggests 
again that search is less likely. The strength of these results 
stems from the fact that in the vacancy search model all 'news' is 
bad news, as soon as an offer is received it will be taken up and 
further learning ceases.
Whilst only the simplest formulation of the vacancy search 
model was considered here a number of generalisations are easily 
possible. Discounting over the course of search will not in any 
way affect our conclusions. We need only rewrite (3.6) as
(3.13) Vg(y,z) - -c + p[qE (y,z)VE + (l-qE(y,z)Vg(y,z+l)]
Discounting of course introduces a time cost to search and 
therefore reduces the value of search compared with the next best 
alternative (permanent unemployment).
Incorporating a risk of unemployment and therefore of repeated 
spells of unemployment could also easily be accomplished. In the 
context of a learning model this possibility has somewhat more 
interesting implications. It is presumably those individuals with 
most spells of unemployment who have the best information about the 
search environment (q). The simple model therefore predicts a
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relationship between labour market experience and the participation 
decisions. Of course past information may be a 'bygone' either 
forgotten or ignored because it is thought to be out of date or 
irrelevant.
A finite planning horizon could also be allowed for although 
for very short horizons the proof of our results (which depended 
upon full information being a possibility) would not necessarily 
go through.
Whereas in the perfect information case the infinite horizon 
assumption ensured a stationary environment so that nothing changed 
over the course of search in the learning case.information acquired 
by the individual may well cause a change of mind. The observation 
of one more 'null' may be sufficient to convince the individual that 
search is no longer worthwhile.
The learning model is therefore a considerably richer vehicle 
of analysis than the simple static vacancy search model of the last 
chapter. It allows for an examination of the role of 'uncertainty' 
which is seen to matter even to risk neutral searchers. It allows 
for the possibility of past information and experience influencing 
the participation decision. Finally, it allows (even with a 
stationary environment) an element of dynamics to enter into participation 
decisions.
In the next section we generalise the learning model reviewed 
here to incorporate the possibility of wage dispersion. One way 
of viewing the null offer model with learning is as a special 
case of learning about the distribution of wages. As a special 
case analysis becomes somewhat easier than that in the literature
to date.
Simple generalisations of our results above do not, however, 
follow. A decision to reject some offers made means that over the 
course of search both good and bad information can be accumulated. 
Optimal search decisions and the value of search when learning is 
allowed thus depend upon the balancing of good and bad 'news'. We 
examine two cases, one where full insurance against bad news is 
provided by the perfect recall facility, one where no such insurance 
is possible. In the first case the existing literature suggests 
a rather weak result; in the second case no result at all. We 
therefore use a numerical simulation to suggest under what circumstances 
the analysis of this section might generalise.
3.3. Learning about Null Offers with Wage Dispersion
A model with wage dispersion allows us to consider the effect 
learning about q has on the decision of how long (in expectation) 
to search. Considering wage dispersion also involves us in the 
analytic difficulties associated with job search;in such a setting 
it turns out that the results demonstrated in the last section do 
not necessarily hold for this more difficult case.
We start by reformulating the wage dispersion model where 
null offers are allowed (considered in chapter 2) to allow for 
learning about null offers. Since the assumption regarding an 
individual's ability to revisit offers turns out to be crucial in 
the case of a model with learning we also generalise our analysis 
to consider the perfect recall world (where offers once made are 
never withdrawn).
We start by noting that q is a parameter in the 'full' wage 
distribution g(w) facing the individual. Again using for notational
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w . #convenience W for we can write down the learning analogue of
equation (2.9) which, for the case of search in the absence of 
recall (within search discounting is again ignored and b set to zero) 
can be written
(3.14) Vg(W,0) max {W, V (W,0(W))g(W|q)h(q,0)dWdq} 
0 8
0(W) indicates the parameter vector 0 updated in the light of an 
offer W.
Equation (3.14) is in a form that can be equated with Lippman 
and McCall (1976a) p. 174. The fact that g(w) is conditioned on 
q is explicitly modelled.
Rothschild (1974) shows that the individual's search strategy
has a reservation form only in the e x  post sense. Provided 0
. . . — 3contains information on W then the reservation property is ensured.
We shall consider only this case.
In the present case we are able to considerably simplify the 
general form (3.14) by noting that;
a) the only distinction between an offer from an information 
point of view is whether it is a 'Null' or positive
b) q simply premultiplies V ( ) and therefore may be integrated out.
Using these factswe obtain;
3. A priori the individual may decide to accept a null (quit search) 
if the next offer is zero but reject some positive wage offers 
because the observation of any positive offer informs him that 
search is favourable. Hence the acceptance set is discontinuous.
r.
(3.15) Vg(W,0) _ Fmax {W, -c + q (0) V (W,0(l))f(W)dW 
0 ®
+ (l-qE(0))V (0,0(0))}” s 'x
where 0(1) = 0 updated in the light of an offer and 
0(0) = 0 updated in the light of a null
We can also rewrite (3.15) explicitly in terms of the parameters 
of the Beta distribution for q.
(3.15a) Vg(W,y,z) = max {W, -c + q (y,z) Vg(W,y+l,z)f(W)dW
+ (1-q (y,z))Vg(0,y,z+l)}
The value of search is defined 'recursively' and depends upon 
the value of search given two alternative outcomes an offer or a null.
So far we have only considered search where previous offers 
cannot be returned to. Whilst this seems a plausible assumption in 
a labour market with limited vacancies where vacancies may be filled, 
it is useful to consider an alternative extreme assumption, namely
4the case where any offer may be returned to so-called perfect recall.
If we use W^ to denote the maximum wage offer received to date, 
we can write the value of search as:
A. It is important to distinguish between recall and memory. It 
is assumed that individuals always remember (in particular 
regard to the information content) offers received, but may not 
be able to 'recall' them.
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(3.16) V (W ,y,z) - max {W ,-c + qE (y, z) [F (W )V (W,y+1, z) s m m m s m
oo
+ V (W,y+1 ,z)f(W)dW] + (l-qE (y,z ))V(Wm ,y ,z+l) }
m
Here we have to take into account the fact that any positive 
offer received less than the current maximum suggests a value of 
search simply increased by the suggested change in information.
Any offer received acts as a form of insurance against subsequently 
learning that offers are very scarce.
Provided that a reservation strategy is optimal which can be 
shown (see Kohn and Shavell (1974)), we can write a recursive form 
for the reservation wage corresponding to equations (3.15) and (3.16). 
Remember that intuitively the reservation wage is that wage which, 
if offered, equates the cost and benefit of one more search. In the 
case of no recall r satisfies
(3.17) r(y,z) - -c + qE(y,z)E max (W,r(y+l,z))
+ (l-qE (y,z)) max (0,r(y,z+l))
Whilst in the case of (3.16) we have
(3.18) r (y,z) - -c + qE (y, z) £r (y+1, z)F (r (y+1, z) ) +
r(y,z)
+ (l-qE (y,z)) max (r(y,z),r(y,z+l))
Since both parameters y and z now influence the reservation 
wage and both can vary over the course of search, it is impossible 
to derive much in the way of analytic results regarding the effects 
of learning.
The result due to Kohn and Shavell (1974) mentioned previously
applies to (3.18). Comparing (3.18) with the solution to the
reservation wage in the case of perfect recall and no learning which 
can be written
(3.19) r -c + q [rF (r) +
■co
Wf(W)dw] + (l-q)r
ESetting q in (3.19) equal to q (y,z) in (3.18), it can be 
seen that the observation of a null offer is insured against since 
r(y,z) is the minimum value that further search can attain. Given 
that the last term in (3.18) cannot be less than that in (3.19) and 
given that the second term is at least as great, it follows that the 
reservation wage givenlearning is greater in the recall case.
Nothing can be said regarding the effect of increasing subjective 
uncertainty, however, since this involves the comparison of two 
'learning' reservation wages and no simple recursive arguments 
used earlier can be applied here (where both parameters change).
We can however consider two individuals, i and j, who will both 
'learn' from only one search and then become certain. Where i 
is the individual with greater subjective uncertainty (higher 
variance of q) i will have the higher reservation wage. This 
follows directly from the fact that according to i's beliefs, the 
expectation of q given an offer will be greater than j's. Since 
in the event of null the insurance effect of recall ensures that i
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values further search equally to j the above result holds.
In the case of no recall we can make no statements at all 
about the consequences of learning. This is particularly disturbing 
since the no recall case is far more appealing in the context of a 
labour market with offer rationing. We can attempt to analyse 
perhaps a simplified version of the adaptive no recall search model 
in an attempt to generate some results that can subsequently be 
tested for robustness using numerical analysis. One way to 
simplify analysis is to consider a very short (2 period) horizon 
problem and see what this suggests about the effects of learning in 
the absence of recall.
Assume that only two searches are possible and denote the 
reservation wages when two searches remain as r^, r^. We can 
solve this sort of problem recursively starting with period 1.
Firstly it is obvious that,
(3.20) Vso(W,y,z) - W V y,z
After the last search has been made the individual must take 
whatever is observed on the last search. The reservation wage at 
time 0 is zero.
Using the recursive formulation we have also that
(3.21) r^y.z) - -c + E max (r0 (y+l,z)W)qE(y,z)
+ (l-qE(y,z)) max (0,r0(y,z+1)).
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From the above, however, rg(y,z) = 0  V y,z hence 
(3.21a) r^y.z) = qE(y,z)E(W) - c
Only the expected value of q matters with one search to go 
since further learning will have no effect (the next offer will be 
accepted whatever it is).
When two searches remain we therefore have
(3.22) r2(y,z) + E,q (y,z) max0
(W,r1(y+l,z))f(W)dW
+ (l~qE (y,z)) max (O.r^y.z+l))
Provided that search next period is worthwhile, we can rewrite the 
above (using the earlier formula for E max [w,r]) as
(3.22a) r2(y,z) - -c + qE (y,z)[r* + + (W-r^)f (w)dw] + (l-qE(y,z)r1
Where r^ " qE (y+1,z)E(W) - c 
and r^ - qE (y,z+l)E(W) - c
Within this simple two period case the effect the increasing
£diffuseness of prior beliefs can be seen as an increase in q (y+l,z) 
and a decrease in q (y,z+l). It is important to note that in 
general these two effects will not be symmetric. By assuming that 
they are, we are concentrating on only 'small' increases in diffuseness.
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Given that the two effects above are roughly the same, the 
net effect on the reservation wage (r2) depends upon
(3.23)
3r2(y,z)
3qE(y+l,z)
3r2(y,z) 
3qE (y,z+l)
sign
Applying the chain rule we have
(3.23a)
3r2(y,z)
3q (y+l,z)
3r
3r
3r,
3q (y+l,z)
(3.23b)
3r2(y,z)
3qE(y+l,z)
3r, 3r,
3r. 3q (y+l,z)
3r.
3q
And since we are considering only a two period problem 
+
- E(W).
3r
3q
He can therefore rewrite (3.23) as 
(3.24) Z - E(W)(2qE(y,z) - 1) - E(W) (1-F(r*))
where if Z > 0 increasing diffuseness increases the reservation wage 
and vice versa.
£It follows immediately from (3.24) that if q (y,z) < 0.5,
Er decreases with greater uncertainty. For q > 0.5 the effect of
o5
increasing diffuseness is ambiguous and depends upon the cost of 
search. For some small values of search cost there exists a 
possibility that increasing subjective uncertainty increases r.
The simple two period model suggests that when recall is not 
possible risk neutral searchers will search less the greater is 
their subjective uncertainty. This is again an interesting result 
along the lines of the result for the vacancy search model. In 
order to see whether it continues to hold when the search horizon 
is not fixed arbitrarily at two periods, we must numerically 
evaluate optimal reservation wages for a model of search with learning 
about null offers.
What the discussion so far has suggested is the considerable 
analytic difficulty encountered when dealing with search models 
incorporating learning. When wage dispersion is present we have 
not been able to establish the effect of subjective uncertainty in 
any general way either for search with or without recall. In the 
case of recall we have a result that 'learning' is better (results 
in a larger expected gain from search) than static search whilst 
in the no recall case we have a result that suggests the opposite.
Within our restricted model we do have a straightforward 
recursive expression for the (information contingent) reservation 
wage, which we can employ in a numerical simulation. We can therefore 
use numerical results to examine the unanswered questions and check 
the generality of our analytic results.
The algorithm used and Fortran programming details of numerical 
simulation in this context are detailed in the Appendix of this 
thesis, we will therefore not discuss them further here. As a benchmark
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case we start with numerical solutions to equation (2.13) 
that is, the static search reservation wage.
These results are all based on a truncated Normal wage offer 
distribution p “ 1,000 o “ 100. The controlling parameter used 
was the cost of search and this was varied between values of 1 100.
This range of costs of search gives rise to reservation wages that 
imply almost immediate acceptance (c = 100) to extremely lengthy 
search (c e 1). In table 1 we report r as a function of q given 
5 values for c. These relationships are graphed in Figure 1.
TABLE 1
c \ q .1 .2 .3 3 .5 .6 6 .8 .9r 1085 1108 1141 1154 1175 1181 11841 Pue .0 2 .0 3 .0 3 .0 3 .0 3 .0 3 .0 3r 8 8 0 980 1020 1049 1065 1077 1084i o P ue .0 8 .1 2 .1 4 .1 6 .1 7 .1 7 .1 3r 502 750 780 909 941 961 97250 p u e • l O .2 0 .3 1 .4 1 .4 8 .5 2 .5 5r O 502 697 3 00 852 381 896lO O P ue .1 0 .2 0 .3 3 .4 9 .6 1 .7 1 .7 6

The adaptive search model was then implemented using an identical 
offer distribution and range of values for the cost of search. In 
order to generate some feel for the implied durations of search 
the probability of transition into the employment state («qil-Fir)) 
was also calculated.
Tables 2,3 and 4 present the results calculated for the model 
of search with perfect recall.
TABLE 2. RECALL
E (q ) ■4- V a r ia n c e (q) y -  lO O O , -  lO O , c  *  1 .0 .1 0 1 1 4 4 . 1 1 3 4 . 1 1 2 4 . 1 1 2 4 . 1 1 1 1 . 1 1 0 7 . 1 1 1 2 .0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 10 .2 0 1 1 6 5 . 1 1 5 9 . 1 1 5 9 . 1 1 5 3 . 1 1 4 9 . 1 1 3 8 . 1 1 3 9 .0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 20 .3 3 1 1 7 7 . 1 1 7 5 . 1 1 7 2 . 1 1 7 0 . 1 1 6 8 . 1 1 6 6 . 1 1 5 9 .0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 1 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 20 .5 0 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 7 4 . 1 1 7 4 . 1 1 7 3 . 1 1 6 8 . 1 1 6 9 . 11640 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 30 .6 6 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 7 7 . 1 1 7 6 . 1 1 7 6 . 1 1 7 6 . 1 1 7 5 .0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 O .  3 0 .0 30 .8 8 1 1 8 2 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 8 0 . 1 1 8 0 .0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 30 .9 0 1 1 8 8 . 1 1 8 8 . 1 1 8 8 . 1 1 8 8 . 1 1 8 8 . 1 1 8 8 . 1 1 8 7 .0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3
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T ABLE 3 RECALL
E (q ) - V a r i a n c e (q) -  lO O O , a »  l o o ,  c -  i o .0 .1 0 9 3 7 . 9 1 8 . 9 1 5 . 9 1 7 . 9 1 3 . 9 1 0 . 9 1 4 .0 .0 7 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 8 0 .0 80 .2 0 1 0 1 4 . 1 0 0 3 . 9 9 7 . 9 9 3 . 9 9 1 . 9 8 9 . 9 8 8 .0 .0 9 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 1 0 .1 1 0 .1 10 .3 3 1 0 5 1 . 1 0 4 2 . 1 0 3 7 . 1 0 3 5 . 1 0 3 1 . 1 0 3 1 . 1 0 2 7 .0 .1 0 0 .1 1 0 .1 2 0 .1 2 0 .1 2 0 .1 2 0 .1 30 .5 0 1 0 6 9 . 1 0 6 2 . 1 0 5 8 . 1 0 5 7 . 1 0 5 5 . 1 0 5 4 . 1 0 5 2 .0 .1 2 0 .1 3 0 .1 4 0 .1 4 0 .1 5 0 .1 5 0 .1 50 .6 6 1 0 7 7 . 1 0 7 4 . 1 0 7 2 . 1 0 7 2 . 1 0 7 1 . 1 0 7 0 . 1 0 7 0 .
!
0 .1 5 0 .1 5 0 .1 6 0 .1 6 0 .1 6 0 .1 6 0 .1 60 .8 0 1 0 8 1 . 1 0 8 0 . 1 0 7 8 . 1 0 7 8 . 1 0 7 7 . 1 0 7 7 . 1 0 7 7 .0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8I
|  0 .9 0 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 .
I 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8
T A B LE  * RECALL
|  E ( q )
t
1 V a r i a n c e (q) u -  l o o o . a *  l o o . = -  lO O .
|  0 .1 0 0 . 0 . 0 . O . o . o . 0 .
| 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 00 .2 0 4 9 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 9 0 .0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0j 0 .3 3 7 0 1 . 7 0 2 . 7 0 1 . 701 . 7 0 1 . 7 0 1 . 7 0 1 .
i 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3
'  0 .5 0 8 0 4 . 8 0 2 . 8 0 1 . 8 0 1 . 3 0 1 . 8 0 1 . 8 0 1 .0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 9
i  0 .6 6 8 5 5 . 8 5 4 . 3 5 4 . 8 5 3 . 3 5 3 . 8 5 3 . 8 5 3 . 10 .6 1 0 .6 1 0 .6 1 0 .6 1 0 .6 1 0 .6 1 0 .6 10 .3 8 8 8 1 . 8 8 1 . 3 3 1 . 2 8 1 . 8 8 1 . 8 8 1 . 8 8 1 . j0 .7 1 0 .7 1 0 .7 1 0 .7 1 0 .7 1 0 .7 1 0 .7 10 .9 0 8 9 7 . 8 9 7 . 3 9 6 . 8 9 6 . 8 9 6 . 8 9 6 . 8 9 6 . I
1 0 .7 6 0 .7 6 0 .7 7 0 .7 7 0 .7 6 0 .7 6 0 .7 6
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These serve to show that the suggested analytic results are 
particularly robust with respect to the effect of increasing subjective 
uncertainty. Greater subjective uncertainty (a more diffuse prior) 
results in a larger reservation wage and therefore more lengthy 
search. As the costs of search increase so the gains from search 
fall and in particular the gains from information, so that subjective 
uncertainty has virtually no effect for high costs of search.
In terms of gains from information the individual stands to gain 
most if he has a low initial expectation about q. Here the 
increasing effect of diffuseness is greatest because there is a 
chance that information of considerable advantage will be learnt 
over the course of search. For very small values of q (y,z) 
there exists a possibility that the reservation wage is actually 
decreasing for some increases in diffusion, but this effect does 
not seem significant and in any case we know from our analysis that 
the value of search with learning (r) always exceeds that when no 
learning is possible.
These results then confirm and extend the analysis of the 
learning model when recall is allowed. With insurance against 
bad 'news' learning increases the expected value of search which 
is also generally increasing in the amount of learning that is 
possible. The value of learning will be greatest when initial beliefs 
suggest that a lot of good news may be possible. Finally, costs of 
search dictate the net benefit of information (it is of little 
value to know that offers are available if to obtain them is very 
expensive) and hence the effect of learning is greatest the lower
are search costs.
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In tables 5, 6 and 7 and figures 2 and 3 we present the results 
of a numerical simulation involving the learning model assuming 
no recall. These results are perhaps the most interesting because 
our analysis was able to say very little about the effects of 
learning and yet the no recall assumption is thought to be more 
realistic.
TABLE 5 NO RECALL
E ( q ) V a r ia n c e (q) u - looo, O «  loo f c  *  1
0 .1 0 1 0 4 2 . 1 0 6 7 . 1 0 7 4 . 1 0 7 8 . 1 0 8 0 . 1 0 8 1 . 1 0 8 3 .0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
0 .2 0 1 0 8 8 . 1 1 0 8 . 1 1 1 4 . 1 1 1 6 . 1 1 1 8 . 1 1 1 9 . 1 1 1 9 .0 .0 4 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
0 .3 3 1 1 2 0 . 1 1 3 6 . 1 1 4 1 . 1 1 4 3 . 1 1 4 4 . 1 1 4 5 . 1 1 4 5 .0 .0 4 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
0 .5 0 1 1 4 6 . 1 1 6 1 . 1 1 6 3 . 1 1 6 4 . 1 1 6 4 . 1 1 6 5 . 1 1 6 5 .0 .0 4 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 2 0 .0 2
0 .6 6 1 1 7 2 . 1 1 7 5 . 1 1 7 6 . 1 1 7 7 . 1 1 7 7 . 1 1 7 7 . 1 1 7 7 .0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3
0 .8 0 1 1 8 3 . 1 1 8 4 . 1 1 8 4 . 1 1 8 5 . 1 1 8 5 . 1 1 8 5 . 1 1 8 5 .0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3
0 .9 0 1 1 8 9 . 1 1 8 9 . 1 1 8 9 . 1 1 8 9 . 11 1 8 8 . [ 1 1 8 8 . j1 1 8 8 .0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3 0 .0 3  | 0 .0 3  j 0 .0 3 0 .0 3
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T A B L E  6 NO R ECALL
E (q ) ■4- V a r i a n c e (q) U -  lOOO a -  l o o ONÜ
0 .1 0 6 9 2 . 8 3 2 . 8 6 4 . 8 7 8 . 8 8 6 . 8 9 0 . 8 9 4 .0 .1 0 0 . 1 0 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .0 9 0 .0 90 .2 0 8 4 3 . 9 3 5 . 9 5 4 . 9 6 2 . 9 6 6 . 9 6 9 . 9 7 1 .0 .1 9 0 .1 5 0 0 .1 4 0 .1 3 0 .1 3 0 .1 2 0 .1 20 .3 3 9 3 2 . 9 9 2 . 1 0 0 4 . 1 0 0 9 . 1 0 1 2 . 1 0 1 3 . 1 0 1 5 .0 .2 5 0 .1 8 0 .1 6 0 .1 5 0 .1 5 0 .1 5 0 .1 50 .5 0 9 9 3 . 1 0 3 8 . 1 0 4 3 . 1 0 4 5 . 1 0 4 6 . 1 0 4 6 . 0 4 7 .0 .2 6 0 .1 8 0 .1 7 0 .1 6 0 .1 6 0 .1 6 0 .1 60 .6 6 1 0 5 6 . 1 0 6 2 . 1 0 6 4 . 1 0 6 5 . 1 0 6 5 . 1 0 6 5 . 1 0 6 6 .0 .1 9 0 .1 8 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 7 0 .1 70 .8 6 1 0 7 5 . 1 0 7 6 . 1 0 7 7 . 1 0 7 7 . 1 0 7 7 . 1 0 7 7 . 1 0 7 7 .0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 80 .9 0 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 . 1 0 8 4 .0 .1 8 0 . 1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8 0 .1 8
T A B L E  7 NO R ECALL(E (q ) ■4- V a r i a n c e (q) U -  lO O O , a -  lO O , c  -  l o o0 .1 0 0 . O . O . 0 . O . 0 . 0 .0 .1 0 0 . 1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0 .1 00 .2 0 1 1 9 . 2 8 5 . 3 3 9 . 3 7 5 . 3 9 9 . 4 1 6 . 4 2 8 .0 .2 0 0 . 2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 0 0 .2 00 .3 3 4 3 3 . 5 5 1 . 606 • 6 3 4 . 6 5 0 . 6 6 0 . 6 6 7 .0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 3 0 .3 30 .5 0 6 1 7 . 7 5 2 . 7 7 6 . 7 8 4 . 7 8 8 . 7 9 1 . 7 9 2 .0 .5 0 0 . 5 0 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 9 0 .4 90 .6 6 8 0 7 . 8 3 6 . j 8 4 3 . 8 4 6 . 8 4 7 . ! 8 4 8 . 8 4 9 .0 .6 4 0 .6 3 i 0 .6 2 0 .6 2 0 .6 2 i 0 .6 2 0 .6 20 .8 0 8 7 2 . | 8 7 7 . . 8 7 8 . 8 7 9 . 1 8 7 9 . j 8 7 9 . 8 8 0 .0 .7 2 0 .7 1 ; o . 7 i 0 .7 1 ! 0 .7 1 i 0 .7 1 0 .7 10 .9 0 8 9 5 . 1 8 9 6 . ’ 8 9 6 . 8 9 6 . | 8 9 6 . 8 9 6 . 8 9 6 .0 .7 7 0 .7 7 0 .7 7 0 .7 7 ! 0 .7 6 i 0 .7 6 0 .7 6
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First, it can immediately be noted from the tables that our
suggestion derived on the basis of the two period model generalises
for the infinite horizon case and is remarkably robust. Increasing
uncertainty (in complete contrast to the recall model) actually
reduces the reservation wage in the vast majority of cases. The
possibility of bad 'news' dominates the individual's evaluation of
the gains from search activity. Thus in this case, as with the
simple vacancy search model, increasing uncertainty reduces search
even for risk neutral searchers. This result is particularly
robust and holds for all reported values in the tables. We were
able to generate the opposite result by considering very small
costs of search (* .15) but such values are both implausibly small
£and only caused a reversal for q (y,z) > -8. As in the case
of search with recall the effect of uncertainty is greatest when
Ethe potential gains and losses are largest so that when q is small 
subjective uncertainty has very large effects.
As has already been noted increasing costs of 
search in the absence of recall suggest a larger effect - the 
individual is concerned with the expected cost of waiting which is 
greater the larger is c.
These results therefore suggest a natural extension to the 
results for our simple vacancy search model given learning about 
offer availability. The greater is subjective uncertainty, the 
less likely is participation in the labour market and given participation 
the less search is conducted. A model with wage dispersion enables 
us to conclude that if recall is not possible, learning is a bad 
thing (decreases the value of search) for even a risk neutral
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individual because the possibility of learning information to the 
detriment dominates. This is not a result that has been available 
before and runs counter to the suggestions of analysis made with 
perfect recall as a maintained assumption. The models of this 
section generalise very easily along the lines suggested for the 
simple vacancy search model. The arguments used there will not 
therefore be repeated.
3.4. Summary and Applications
In this chapter we have considered a logical generalisation 
of the model of search incorporating offer constraint reviewed 
in chapter 2. Allowance was made for the fact that individuals 
may be imperfectly informed regarding the parameter q and learn 
about q over the course of search.
We started by considering a simple vacancy search model which 
enables an examination of the search participation decision. We 
were able to generate strong results within the context of this 
simple model regarding the role of imperfect information and learning. 
Uncertainty regarding q was seen as being a discouragement to 
search, greater subjective uncertainty led even risk neutral 
individuals to participate less. Even within this simple model, 
however, we needed to exploit the particular functional form of 
prior beliefs in order to generate unambiguous results.
We next considered the extension of the vacancy model to allow 
for wage dispersion and saw that the results here were much more 
difficult to obtain and depended crucially upon the assumption made 
regarding the availability of previously sampled offers.
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The assumption previously maintained in the literature that 
all offers remain available gives rise to a net gain from imperfect 
information for risk neutral searchers. The ability to learn 
suggests a greater expected wage with the possibility of bad news 
occuring effectively insured against by recall. More learning, 
however, could not be demonstrated as always being better than less. 
Under the assumption of no recall, no results exist, suggesting 
the consequences of learning. We considered a simple two period 
example and deduced that in this case a reversal of the result for 
recall was rather likely. Increasing subjective uncertainty might 
lead to less search, imperfect information/greater dispersion was 
a bad thing.^
These analytic results were confirmed by our numerical analysis 
in the case of a Normal distribution of offers. Furthermore, the 
circumstances under which imperfect information was most important 
were outlined. Where imperfect information is a good (recall case) 
search costs devalue it where it is a bad (no recall) search costs 
negate it.
Throughout this and the previous chapter we have attempted to 
suggest the applicability of individual search models. Of the two 
possible uses outlined in chapter 1 it should be clear that the 
additional complexity of learning models makes them an impractical 
input into market equilibrium constructions. Such models do, however, 
offer richer analysis of individual decision making. In this 
chapter we have identified an important role for learning in
5. Dispersion in beliefs about q must be distinguished from objective 
dispersion of wages (f(w)). The latter always leads to greater 
search for risk neutral individuals, the former as we have 
suggested does not.
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determining both participation and expected duration decisions.
A no learning model portrays participation as a once and for all 
decision in a stationary environment. When learning is allowed 
the individual must constantly review his position. This corresponds 
very much more closely to the notion of discouragement (a process) 
rather than non-participation (a state). In states of the world 
where individuals hold diffuse priors, single observations may 
be sufficient to discourage further search. Where information is 
good and priors 'tight' such discouragement may only come about 
very slowly. Even if individuals' beliefs are unbiased (q (y,z)“q) 
and risk neutrality assumed, there may be value in information so 
that discouragement does not prevail. Again we are considering 
only a partial equilibrium model and we must guard against making 
equilibrium type conclusions. Extending to the wage dispersion 
case our preferred results (no recall) suggest that imperfect 
information might lead to sub optimal search.
The central insight of this chapter has therefore concerned 
the role that information or the lack of it might play in determining 
an individual's labour market decisions. Simple comparisons with 
decisions made under certainty regarding 'q' are not possible. An 
individual's response has been shown to depend upon the value of 
certain economic parameters (the cost of search) and upon the 
possibility or otherwise of returning to previously offered employment. 
This latter facility it has been argued acts as a form of insurance 
against discovering something unfavourable and therefore promotes 
greater search activity. In the absence of recall imperfect 
information may discourage search even to the extent of leading an 
individual to abandon labour market activity altogether. What are 
the applications of this analysis?
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One way in which government actions can according to the models 
of this chapter affect outcomes is therefore through 'beliefs'. An 
increased faith in a government's ability to stabilise economic 
activity would suggest according to the analysis of this chapter 
a real effect upon search decisions. It may well serve to increase 
both participation and search activity in the economy, which we might 
in turn expect to have some effect upon the employment decisions of 
firms and hence turn out to be self-fulfilling belief!. This kind 
of role for governments is very much at the heart of Keynesian macro­
economic analysis and therefore suggests one application of our 
results towards a macro explanation of unemployment. What in a 
sense is most revealing in our results in this context is the minimal 
assumptions which give rise to real phenomena. We have not assumed 
risk aversion nor have we assumed that an individual's beliefs 
are in any sense irrational and yet a move towards greater (perceived) 
certainty might generate an employment 'boom'.
Whilst the analysis of this chapter is suggestive of macro 
applications it has been essentially micro economic. At the micro 
level a number of conclusions can therefore be drawn. The first 
thing to note is that 'information' is in a sense an additional 
explanatory variable. If we have a set of observations of individuals 
search behaviour which we wish to explain then the information that 
those individuals have will be important. We cannot unambiguously 
say whether better informed individuals search more or less but 
can conjecture that the second is perhaps a plausible possibility 
in many circumstances. Secondly, the analysis we have considered 
gives rise even in otherwise 'stationary' circumstances to time 
dependent behaviour, so that as we noted above an individuals
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'discouragement' is not so much an event as a process. We argued 
in chapter 2 that the discouraged worker phenomena was perhaps 
an under exploited aspect of the search literature - one to which 
a consideration of 'rationing' in search automatically led. The 
analysis of this chapter is therefore perhaps most important in 
providing a more satisfactory account of discouragement in a 
search environment.
Discouragement occurs because an individual's labour market 
experience leads them to the conclusion that the import of more 
resources into the job seeking process is not justified. Is this 
a good or a bad thing? In as much as an individual's experience 
represents the true nature of the economic environment (s)he 
faces we might regard it as good. After all, the assumption we 
have made is that of individual rationality - an individual would 
not drop out unless to do so was 'for the best'. There does, 
however, exist the strong possibility that an individual's experience 
represents the luck of the draw. The best analogy here is to simple 
games of chance. Imagine being offered the chance to bet on the 
'tails' outcome of a tossed coin not knowing its fairness.
Three consecutive heads may well serve to persuade that the game 
is rigged and yet this 'unlucky' observation occurs 12{Z of the 
time even with a fair coin. If individuals become discouraged from 
labour market participation by similar bad luck we may well perceive 
the need for corrective action even though given their information 
sets individuals are acting rationally. One response might well 
be the provision of information itself or the improvement of the 
mechanism whereby information is transmitted. The development of 
these ideas is left to future work.
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Chapter 4
Job Search and the Firms' Decisions 1; Wage Determination
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4.1. Introduction
In the previous two chapters we have been concerned exclusively 
with the decisions of job searching individuals and in particular 
upon the consequences of offer rationing for search decisions. In 
this and the next chapter we turn attention towards the decisions of 
employing firms in a search environment. In conventional terminology 
chapters 2 and 3 were concerned with the supply side of a labour 
market characterised by search, chapters 4 and 5 will concentrate 
on the demand side.
The conventional derivation of the demand for labour as 
contained in standard texts (Addison and Siebert (1980)) views a 
firm as taking wages as given and employing labour up to that point 
where the value product just equals the wage. Where labour is the 
only variable input, diminishing marginal productivity ensures 
that the employment decision is bounded and maximises the firm's 
profit. The assumptions that underlie this static profit maximisation 
approach ensure that time doesn't matter. In particular it is 
assumed that the labour input can be instantaneously and costlessly 
adjusted.
The introduction of worker search together with some notion of 
job turnover in the labour market is inconsistent with these last 
two assumptions. As we have seen in previous chapters it is a 
fundamental assumption of search models that search is costly and 
takes time. Furthermore, if job searchers chose amongst firms to 
contact randomly, any one particular firm will face an uncertain 
flow of job applicants. A second direct consequence of assuming 
search activity is that wage taking on the part of firms is no
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longer plausible. To understand this it is necessary to understand 
that a firm once contacted by a job searcher is different to that 
searcher from other firms in the market. The reason for this is that 
to contact other firms the individual must engage in costly search.
Again in conventional terminology every firm in a labour market 
characterised by search possesses monopsony power. Indeed the 
assumptions of perfect competition or wage/price taking are inappropriate 
in any market characterised by imperfect information, a point made 
as long ago as 1959 by Arrow.
The above comments suggest that there are two aspects of firms' 
decisions that we might consider when modelling the demand side of a 
'search' labour market.
There is of course the conventional employment decision - 
although here the possible stochastic nature of applicants to the 
firm suggests that employment is a natural random variable not 
entirely the choice of a firm. We shall therefore replace employment 
decisions by vacancy decisions. If labour adjustment were instantaneous 
and costless these would be the same thing, where search is involved 
it is the latter that the firm determines in order to influence the 
former. From the point of view of our analysis in previous chapters 
it is vacancy decisions that give rise to the null offer phenomena.
If firms accept applicants without limit, then all search is by 
definition successful. The point at which firms refuse applicants 
is that point at which null offers are received.
Secondly, there is the wage decision of firms, how much to 
offer an applicant. Again in a search setting this offer may have 
an uncertain outcome. If the minimum wage acceptable to an individual 
were known by a firm, then clearly the reservation wage would be
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offered. If, however, as seems likely, reservations differ over 
individuals, some individuals will reject certain wage offers. Again 
the offered wage is a variable that a firm might set in order to 
affect its employment and profit.
We address these two decisions in reverse order, considering 
wage decisions in this chapter and examining vacancy creation in 
the next. One of the objectives of this chapter is to lay the 
groundwork for the analysis of both chapters 5 and 6. The second 
objective is an analysis of wage decisions. Such an analysis is 
necessary for an understanding of the wider implications of search 
for market outcomes. We have seen in chapters 2 and 3 how wages 
act as signals to individuals concerning the value of search and 
participation. Here we consider the factors that might be important 
in generating such signals. This issue has not previously been 
directly addressed in the literature although the work of Pissarides 
(1979), McKenna (1980) and Eaton and Watts (1977) are related to 
the current analysis.
In the next section of this chapter we consider a stylised 
model of a firm's wage and vacancy decisions in a search context 
that serves to highlight the areas of difficulty. In the remainder 
of the chapter we concentrate on the simplest case of offer rationing, 
that of a single vacancy firm. Wage setting behaviour is then 
subjected to examination. We are interested in isolating those 
parameters which affect a firm's wage offer and in determining the 
direction of change. It turns out that even within a very simple 
setting, determining a firm's wage offer proves rather difficult.
The problems arise when job searchers have an unknown reservation 
wage from some p.d.f.
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In both this and the following chapter our general approach 
is the following. We model a firm whose employment evolves over 
time according to a stochastic process. The parameters of this 
stochastic process are in part determined by firstly the search 
environment and secondly the vacancy creation and wage decision of 
the firm, in a manner which needs to be made precise. The objective 
of the firm is expected profit maximisation. In a dynamic context 
this is generally taken to be the discounted sum (or integral) of a 
finite or infinite stream of profits. Here we shall consider only 
the average per period profit, an approach that will be justified 
in section (4.3). In all cases separations from the firm (losses 
of employment) are considered exogenously determined by job turnover 
in the labour market. Our analysis is limited for the most part to 
models where labour is assumed to produce equal increments of output 
irrespective of total employment. This assumption is made for 
analytic tractability and in cases where numerical analysis is 
employed (chapter 5) is shown not to be critical. In all cases we 
consider the employment process to evolve in continuous time for 
reasons that will become clear as analysis develops.
4.2. A General Framework of Analysis
Throughout the following, w will refer to a firm's wage offer 
(which will be assumed to be constant over time) and L will denote 
the total number of job slots or vacancies that a firm creates.
L is the cut-off point of applicants accepted.
In the conventional static theory of the firm, output is 
generally taken to be some smooth continuous function of capital and 
labour inputs. Here we shall assume capital fixed and consider
labour input as synonymous with the number of individuals employed
('hours' or 'effort' variables are ignored). Consider a firm that
at time t has a labour force l  (integer). Given a number of
stochastic influences operating in a labour market, it is reasonable
to expect individuals to leave the firm. Leaving may take many
forms, quitting in order to find a better job (possibly search for
a better wage or other job characteristics), layoff, illness or
retirement. Here we assume that 'learning' is exogenous and therefore
that the latter explanations are dominant. The exogenous leaving of
individuals from a firm will be modelled by assuming a probability
ufit that an individual leaves the firm in a time interval fit.
For suitably small fit the probability of more than one individual
2leaving is of order (fit) and approximately zero. The advantage 
of working in continuous time is now clear. In continuous time we 
can concentrate attention on employment processes that change by a 
single increment rather than more general 'Markov' processes.
Once unemployed, individuals are assumed to search for new 
employment. It is of no consequence whether search is discrete, 
each contact taking exactly 1 week, say, to achieve or continuous, 
given a distribution of searchers over time, it will still be the 
case that the firm will be contacted periodically by job searchers.
We will denote the probability of a contact to the firm (again 
relative to an interval fit) by y S t .  Of course, if individuals 
differ as to their reservation wages there will be a probability 
that the firm's wage offer w will be rejected. If we denote by 
g(r) the probability density function of job searchers' reservation 
wages, then the probability that a job searcher contacting the firm 
will accept an offer of w is simply G(w) where G(w) is the cumulative
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distribution function. We can therefore write the probability that 
the firm's employment increases by one unit of labour in time fit 
(call this Xfit) as,
(4.1) Xfit » yG(w)5t
In the simple framework just described, the firm's employment 
level is a random variable which evolves through time. Increases 
in employment have been made dependent (through G(w)) on the firm's 
wage offer whilst decreases in employment occur through exogenous 
influences. The structure described above is perfectly capable 
of handling endogenous quitting. If for example search 'on the job' 
were possible, then one element determining the rate at which 
employment declines would again be the firm's wage offer. By paying 
a high wage the firm would reduce the probability of employment 
losses. We will, however, remain with the framework described above 
which is consistent with 'intensive' search as described in the 
previous two chapters.
Starting from some employment level l  at time t, the possible 
employment outcomes at time t+5t can be shown via a simple probability 
tree (Fig.l).
l  + 1 3 . P ( l  + 1, t + fit) - Xfit
l ------» p(£, t + 5t) ■ 1 - (X + p)fit
l  -  1 p(£ - i, t + fit) ■ yfit
Figure 1
The probability of finding a firm at some employment level at 
a given time will therefore in general depend upon the initial 
state, the time elapsed since the initial state was occupied, the 
parameters y, v> and the firm’s wage offer w. We shall have
distribution function. We can therefore write the probability that 
the firm's employment increases by one unit of labour in time fit 
(call this Xfit) as,
(4.1) Xfit « yG(w)6t
In the simple framework just described, the firm's employment 
level is a random variable which evolves through time. Increases 
in employment have been made dependent (through G(w)) on the firm's 
wage offer whilst decreases in employment occur through exogenous 
influences. The structure described above is perfectly capable 
of handling endogenous quitting. If for example search 'on the job' 
were possible, then one element determining the rate at which 
employment declines would again be the firm's wage offer. By paying 
a high wage the firm would reduce the probability of employment 
losses. We will, however, remain with the framework described above 
which is consistent with 'intensive' search as described in the 
previous two chapters.
Starting from some employment level i  at time t, the possible 
employment outcomes at time t+5t can be shown via a simple probability 
tree (Fig.l).
P(A + 1, t + fit) - Xfit 
PU, t + fit) - l - (x + p)fit 
p(i - l, t + fit) - pfit 
Figure 1
The probability of finding a firm at some employment level at 
a given time will therefore in general depend upon the initial 
state, the time elapsed since the initial state was occupied, the 
parameters y ,  y and the firm's wage offer w. We shall have
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cause to simplify analysis by considering only steady states of 
the employment process, in which case only the last two factors 
enter into the problem.
So far attention has been confined to describing the environment 
in which a firm operates. It is now time to consider the value to 
a firm of being in a particular employment state, and of transmitting 
through states over time.
4.3. Production and Profit
In line with conventional theory of the firm, we assume here 
that firms produce output (Q) sold on a competitive market at price 
p. To keep things as simple as possible, consider product market 
conditions fixed.
As far as factor inputs are concerned we shall consider capital 
fixed and consider output to vary with employment, so that we can 
write total revenue as
(4.2) TR - ?Q(H) ; Q' (D > 0, Q"U) S 0
where Q(£) is a smooth continuous production function. The costs 
of producing a given output are in the form of a wage bill (w£) and 
rental on capital equipment. This capital rental we shall denote 
by a general cost function k(L). The argument of this function L, 
denotes the total number of vacancies that a firm creates. In fact 
the assumptions embodied in this formulation are rather appealing. If 
one views 'machines' and 'men' as complements in production, then 
the function k(L) represents the cost of a fixed number of machines.
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In fact in this chapter we shall abstract from such capital costs 
and consider only firms facing a simple cost k. However, we shall 
see in chapter 5 that reintroducing the cost of capital function 
naturally endogenises vacancy creation decisions.
In the meantime we can simply write the flow of profit to a 
firm in state A as
(A.3) it = pQ(A) - wA - k
Of course the state that a firm occupies varies over the course 
of time according to a probability process so that the value of a 
stream of profits is presumably what motivates a firm's decisions. We 
can again use the 'principle of optimality' to write a dynamic 
programming value function for the firm.
(4.4) V(A,t) = tt(A,w) 6t + X5tV(A+l,t-6t) + yStV(A-l ,t-6t)
+ (l-X6t-y6t)V(A,t-6t)
In equation (4.4) time is to be thought of as running backwards, 
hence V(A,t) is the maximum value of a firm's profit stream when 
time 't' remains and the current employment state is A. Discounting 
is being ignored here for simplicity, but can be incorporated quite 
simply.
To solve equation (4.4) we must firstly rearrange terms and take 
limits to yield a differential equation in V( ) and then solve a 
set of (L+l) such equations simultaneously to yield an explicit 
functional form. Not surprisingly this approach is not feasible
except in cases of small L. We are interested in this chapter in 
examining the optimal wage decisions of firms when the number of 
vacancies is exogenously fixed.
If we ignore discounting but consider an infinite time horizon, 
total profits become unbounded, however 'average' per period profit 
will be (under certain conditions) a bounded and well behaved 
function of the firm's decision variable w.
Indeed, we can write an expression for expected per period 
profit directly
L _
(A.5) e [tt] = Ip(Jt) [pQ(f) - wl - Tc]
£=0
where p(J.) has the interpretation of the long run or steady state 
probability of a firm occupying state l .  p(Jt) may be thought of 
as the proportion of time that a firm spends in state l  in the 
'long run'. Provided that p(t) can be determined, equation (4.5) 
gives a direct expression for which maximising choices of the firm 
will be considered. It forms the basis of the analysis of this 
chapter and the next.
The key assumptions in making this simplification are the lack 
of discounting and the infinite horizon. We are therefore abstracting 
from all forms of impatience in modelling firms' decisions. As we 
shall see later, the effect of discounting can be demonstrated and 
conforms with intuition; it is considered more important in this 
chapter to have a general grasp of the determination of firms' 
decisions in a search context. Some loss of generality is therefore 
the price which must be paid.
One further simplification to analysis follows when the form 
of Q(J.) is linear (i.e. Q(l) * at). Then the expression for expected 
profit depends not on all the state probabilities separately, but 
rather on the expected steady state employment of the firm.
Hence (4.5) becomes
(4.5a) E(tt) = (g-w)t - k
_ _ L
where 6 = pa t * I tp(t)
f =0
Where a particular closed form expression is possible for t 
(4.5a) represents the most compact analytic form for considering 
a firm's wage decisions. Of course linearity of the production 
function is a strong assumption but does often provide a useful 
first case.
We have in this and the previous two sections described a 
framework of analysis. In the following two sections we consider the 
application of this framework to an analysis of a firm's wage decisions 
in a market characterised by search. We consider in turn two 
specialisations of the above model, both of which abstract from 
decisions regarding the creation of vacancies.
In the first of these specialisations the firm is assumed 
to possess only a single job slot so that the effect of search and 
job turnover is to create at most a single vacancy at the firm.
This is the simplest model consistent with the generation of 'null' 
offers since those searchers who contact the firm when the single 
job slot is occupied will be unsuccessful. The determinants of 
a firm'8 wage offer to applicants for this single vacancy are examined.
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To contrast with this 'null' offer case we then consider a firm 
that can expand employment without limit, that is to say that every 
searcher who contacts the firm will be made a wage offer, all search 
is successful. Again we examine the firm's wage offer in these 
circumstances under the assumption that a single wage is paid to 
all employees.
We will therefore have a model of monopsony wage determination 
in a search environment.
4.4. The Single Vacancy Firm
In this section we submit to formal analysis a firm described 
as in section 4.3. under the assumption that L = 1. There are two 
interpretations of this extreme limiting case of rationed vacancies.
The first has already been alluded to above. One can think of this 
model as one of the short run decisions of a firm which has fixed 
capital stock and for which the possibilities of labour/capital 
substitution are highly limited. This is quite appealing. A 
second interpretation which also has appeal in a different context, 
considers the firm as being one facing a strong constraint on sales 
in its product market. The limiting case of course considers a 
firm that can sell the output of only a single employee. For such 
a constraint to bind implies that output is highly perishable.
The first interpretation seems appropriate to a market clearing 
approach to vacancy rationing, the second to a non market clearing 
approach.
Maintaining the idea that it is expected steady state profit 
that a firm maximises, we need to derive expressions for the probability
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(in steady state) that a single vacancy firm has a vacancy (state 0) 
or is employing (state 1).
The method of deriving steady state probability distributions 
of stochastic processes is detailed in Cox and Miller (1970) and 
we will not be concerned with formal proofs here. The proportion 
of time that a firm spends in each state in the long run reflects 
the probabilities of transmitting between states and not the initial 
state. Hence we can write^
(4.6) Ap(0)6t = pp(l)6t
Furthermore the probabilities p(0) and p(l) must sum to unity 
so that (4.6) can be solved to yield
(4.7) P (0) “ (x+y) » P(1) (A+p)
Remembering that p is exogenous to the firm whilst A depends 
through G(w) on the firm's wage offer equations (4.7) show the expected 
dependency of 'state' on wage. p(0) is decreasing whilst p(l) is 
increasing in w. The higher is the wage offer the greater the 
probability of a randomly contacting job searcher accepting it and 
therefore the greater the proportion of time a firm spends with its 
vacancy filled.
Substituting (4.7) into (4.5a)and differentiating yields, a 
first order condition (foe) for expected profit maximisation of the form
1. Cox and Miller (1970) p. 356
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( 4 . 8 )  3E (ir) 
3w
(e-w)pxw
(p+x)2 (X+p)
X 0 (e-w)p g(w) _ G (w)
(p+YG(w))
(4.8) is of course necessary for a maximum, we also require that the 
derivative (wrt w) of (4.8) be negative for sufficiency.
As w is increased the profit from a filled vacancy falls 
whilst the proportion of time a vacancy is filled increases. Setting 
a wage so as to maximise profits entails balancing at the margin 
these two effects. Hence the first term of (4.8) is the increase 
in profit due to increased employment whilst the second term is 
the loss in profit due to a lower wage/value product margin.
The actual shape of the profit function will of course 
depend upon the distribution of reservation wages, but since (6~w) 
equates to zero for some w,it will in general be a well behaved 
function of the wage offer. One possibility is drawn in Figure 1.
E(tt) ,p(l) -
(ß-w)w
Figure 1. Expected Profit and w
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p(X) is monotonie in w and approaches y as w «*• .(y +u )
For say a normal distribution of reservation wages it will be
very close to this value for all w > w + 2o - w. (B-w) isw w
clearly monotonically decreasing in w.
The first order condition (A.8) is obviously highly non linear 
and so will not easily yield analytic solutions. However, information 
about the determinants of the profit maximising wage offer can be 
recovered via a comparative statics exercise.
For some parameter z of equation (4.8)
The main parameters of interest in this very simple model are 
B (the value product), y  (the contact rate of job searchers) ,
V (the exogenous leaving rate) and parameters of G(w) .
Starting first with the parameter B which represents the 
marginal revenue product of labour, it can be seen directly from
(4.8) that dw/dS > 0. Hence the firm's (monopsonistic) wage offer 
is increasing in labour productivity. Following a demand shock 
such that the price of output rises we would expect to observe 
an increase in wages and hence steady state employment. The intuition 
behind this result is simple. An increase in B leads to an 
increase in the opportunity cost of an unfilled vacancy; ceteris 
paribus we would expect a reduction in the proportion of time that 
vacancies remain unfilled. The only avenue open to firms in our 
simple model is via wages so that increases in B are synonymous with 
increased wages.
(4.9) dw z
dz w
< 0 by the second order condition.
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If we now consider the parameter p which represents the extent 
of turnover in our model, then differentiating (4.8) with respect 
to p we obtain
(4 .10 )  + -  S±-y)y&L”X  v c(w) , > 0
V  [p+yG(w)]2
Hence dw/dp > 0 so that increased turnover leads to higher wage 
offers. This implies that firms respond to an unfavourable increase 
in turnover by partially offsetting the employment consequences 
of this change using higher wages.
The parameter y represents the contact rate of job searchers 
at the firm. We might therefore expect the consequence of an 
increase in y  to be similar to those of a fall in p. This is 
indeed the case as can be seen by differentiating (4.8) with respect 
to y .
(4.11) * - -(B-w) pG(w) g(w) _
Y [p+YG(w )]2 V  %
Hence dw/dy < 0.
Our results concerning the effects of changes in the parameters 
y and p are intuitive. If for example an increase in y is considered 
as being synonymous with an increase in steady state unemployment 
(assuming a fixed number of firms) then our results suggest that 
there will be downward pressure on wages. Notice that care is 
needed, however, before drawing conclusions for employment since 
the two changes have opposite effects on p(l). An increase in y  
suggests that p(l) increases, the resultant wage change has the 
opposite implication.
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If we now consider the effects of changes in the form of the 
distribution of reservation wages g(r) very little can be said.
The effects of both mean shifts and increased risk (in the Rothschild- 
Stiglitz (1970) sense) are ambiguous. We can only suggest the 
consequences on wage offers for certain special cases.
In order to clarify discussion, let r rg(r)dr
0
and define a as the measure of riskiness of g(r).
Firstly considering shifts in r with a  fixed. As r increases 
we cannot systematically sign the consequence for g(w) (of course 
G(w) falls as r increased). Hence the partial derivative <J>— is 
ambiguous in sign.
In the case of a mean preserving spread of g(r) we can draw 
conclusions if the solution to equation (4.8) lies 'close' to 
r (i.e. if w * r + e  or w ■* r - e )  . To see this it is useful to 
bear in mind that a Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk implies 
that G(w) increases if w < r. Diagrammatically an increase in 
risk of a symmetric distribution has consequences for the distribution 
function as shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 2
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G' (r) is here drawn more risky than G(r). An increase in a will 
also result in a lower value for g(w) provided w is sufficiently 
close to r.
g(r) ,
Figure 3
Hence in this particular case <f> _ < 0 thus dw/do < 0. In
w-r-e
this special case an increase in the riskiness of searchers' 
reservation wages leads to a reduction in the firm's profit maximising 
wage offer. Clearly this result is not general and if w > r or 
if w is not sufficiently close to r an increase in risk has 
ambiguous consequences for w.
This section has therefore analysed the comparative statics 
of wage determination of the single vacancy firm. Our model is 
one where a firm can control its inflow of applicants by setting 
its wage offer. The higher the offer the greater the proportion 
of randomly contacting job searchers who will find it acceptable.
We have seen that the profit maximising wage offer is increasing 
in the value product of labour and the degree of labour turnover 
and decreasing in the contact rate. We could not predict the 
consequences of changes in the mean or riskiness of the reservation
wage distribution g(r). The firm we have considered is the most 
simple consistent with the generation of null offers. Indeed we 
can draw some conclusions from our analysis for the determination 
of the null offer probability that featured as an important determinant 
of individual search behaviour in chapters 2 and 3. It is worthwhile 
pausing here to consider the predictions of the model developed 
here. The null offer probability is given by p(l) so that our 
parameter q in chapter 2 is here given by (l-p(l)). Only therefore 
in the case of the parameter B have we an unambiguous prediction 
concerning the effect on q. As 6 increases the firm wage offer 
and p(l) increases, ceteris paribus q falls and according to our 
earlier analysis individual search behaviour will be affected through 
both wage and offer probability effects. This will presumably be 
reflected in a change in g(r) and hence the market equilibrium 
effects will work through. The model presented here does not 
therefore suggest itself as very useful in examining the equilibrium 
consequences of offer rationing, since we have been unable to 
suggest the likely consequences either for the null offer probability 
or for wages of changes in individual behaviour. For this reason 
our own equilibrium analysis in chapter 6 will simplify the model 
analysed here by considering a degenerate distribution of reservation 
wages.
In the remainder of this chapter we shall be concerned with 
further analysis of our framework by considering the consequences of 
relaxing some of the special assumptions that have been made.
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4.5. The Infinite Vacancy Firm
The model of section 4.4. considered a firm's profit maximising 
wage offer when there existed a single job slot to fill. In this 
section we consider the polar opposite case of a firm able to 
expand employment without limit. In terms of the two interpretations 
offered above we are now considering either a firm for which capital 
stock does not limit employment or one which faces no constraint 
with respect to sales of output. The central question addressed 
here therefore concerns the consequences for wage determination 
of unlimited vacancies.
With L * “ it is natural to look for a simplification on 
technology that allows only one (as opposed to an infinity) feature 
of the employment process to be considered. We have already discussed 
the role of constant returns (linear technology) in this respect.
Rather than look at steady state probabilities we therefore consider 
only expected employment in steady state, and derive an expression 
for expected employment.
If the same wage is paid independent of employment, the employment 
process has again two parameters, X (a function of w) and p (exogenous 
to the firm).
A process such as this which grows without limit and has just 
two parameters is considered in Cox and Miller (1970), p. 356 
The 'expected' state is simply given by
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( 4 . 1 2 )  l - X M
V
Since each individual leaves with probability y6t the larger 
the firm grows the greater the rate of loss, which therefore acts 
as a natural limit to firm size. Again the expected result that 
employment increases in w (and is bounded by X ) and decreases in 
p (bounded by zero) can be seen immediately. Expected profit can 
now be written as
(4.13) E (it) (B-w)X(w) _ —
y
and wage determination examined by considering the f.o.c.
(4.14) (B-w)g(w)y , G(w)y
y y
In contrast with the single vacancy case the firm's wage offer 
is independent of y  or y. As before, an increase in 8 unambiguously 
increases w, whilst in general shifts g(w), G(w) are ambiguous in 
effect.
The most interesting result concerns the simplification with 
respect to y  and y. When vacancies can be created 'costlessly' the 
parameters y  and y enter into the two elements of 'marginal' 
profit (profit per vacancy and marginal employment) in the same way 
and hence become irrelevant for wage determination.
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If one once again thinks of Y as reflecting the slackness of the labour 
market, (i.e. Unemployment), then in this special case such slackness 
does not affect wages. It is therefore clear that an unrationed 
vacancy world is inconsistent, at least at the micro level, with 
explanations of the Phillips relationship.
Away from such an extreme assumption it is clear that our 
analysis of the 'single vacancy' firm can without difficulty be 
generalised as the 'L vacancy' firm. Again it follows that y  and 
p will be important in determining the firm's wage offer but that 
their effect iray' be ambiguous. Hence when it comes to chapter 5 
we will have an idea of the sort of factors determining wages in 
a search setting even if we cannot sign parameter changes. There 
are, however, two strong assumptions made above which must now be 
examined, namely those that wages paid do not depend on employment 
and that the future is not discounted.
4.6. State Contingent Wages, The Two Vacancy Firm
So far we have ruled out by assumption the possibility of 
making wage offers dependent upon the employment state occupied.
In order to formally examine this question in the simplest framework 
possible, we can extend the model of section 4.4. and consider a 
two vacancy firm.
Again we shall assume constant returns and the expected per 
period profit maximisation framework but now allow for the firm to pay 
a different wage when fully employed (Jt “ 2) say Wj to that period
when under employed (i. ■ 1), w^.
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First we need to derive the steady state probabilities given 
wages w^, w^ and then examine the maximising choices of a firm with 
respect to these.
The employment process is pictured in Fig. 4 and from previous 
discussion we have the following relationships between the steady 
state probabilities
(4.15) XjpCO) - pp(l)
X2p(l) - pp (2)
Where 
currei
2
1 
0
p (0) + p(l) + p (2) = 1
X^  ^- X(w^) the probability of gaining an employee given 
0 employment and an offer w^.
Figure 4
Solving equations (4.15) yields
(4.16) p(0) - (1+XX / p[l+X2 / p])_1 
p(l) - [Xx / p]p(0)
p(2) - [X2 / p]p(l)
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Notice now that all state probabilities depend upon both 
and u, and that p(l), p(2) are increasing in both w^ and w,.
There is now a problem when we come to consider expected steady 
state profit since there exists at present a possibility that a 
firm offering w^ whilst in state 0 will wish to revise and offer 
w, if an individual accepts (w0 being the profit maximising wage 
contingent on state 1).
We will therefore assume that the firm makes a binding commitment 
to pay a wage of when in state 2 and w^ when in state 1.
A worker who contacts the firm when it is in state 1 will know that 
with his accepting the firm's wage offer w,, the firm will move to 
state 2 and that thereafter his wage payments will vary with the 
firms employment state.
Hence profits in steady state can be written:
(4.17) E(tt) = (B-w^)p(l) + (8-w0) p(2) - k
When in state 1 (which accounts for a proportion of p(l) of 
each period) a firm employs a single individual who must have been 
recruited from state 0 and hence is paid w^. When in state 
firm has two employees to which it pays w^.
2 the
102
Notice now that all state probabilities depend upon both 
w^ and w, and that p(l), p(2) are increasing in both and wr
There is now a problem when we come to consider expected steady 
state profit since there exists at present a possibility that a 
firm offering w^ whilst in state 0 will wish to revise and offer 
w, if an individual accepts (w,, being the profit maximising wage 
contingent on state 1) .
We will therefore assume that the firm makes a binding commitment 
to pay a wage of 'r, when in state 2 and when in state 1.
A worker who contacts the firm when it is in state 1 will know that 
with his accepting the firm's wage offer w,, the firm will move to 
state 2 and that thereafter his wage payments will vary with the 
firms employment state.
Hence profits in steady state can be written:
(4.17) E(n) = (ß-w^pd) + (ß-w,) p(2) - k
When in state 1 (which accounts for a proportion of p(1) of 
each period) a firm employs a single individual who must have been 
recruited from state 0 and hence is paid w,. When in state 2 the 
firm has two employees to which it pays w„,.
The first question we can address is whether making wage 
payments contingent upon employment state is generally preferred 
by the firm to state independent wages.
Maximisation of (4.17) implies that the following first orde 
conditions are satisfied
(4.18a) -p(l) + p1(l)(6-w1) + 2(6-w 2) p x(2) - 0
(4.18b) -p(2) + 2p2(2)(6-w2) + (B-wx) p2(1) - 0
In equations (4.18) p^(l) denotes 3p(l)/3w^. For a unique wage
offer w* to satisfy equations (4.18) simultaneously we require
that (conditional on w^=w2) p(l) “ p(2), p^(l) = p2(l), and
p (2) ■ p (2). Referring back to equations (4.16) we can express 
1 2
the partial derivatives (conditional on wx=w2) and hence X^  * X2) 
the steady state probabilities as
Px(l) - [Aw/y]p(0) + [X/yJp^O)
Pl(2) - [2XXw/p2]p(0) + [X/p]2px(0) 
p2(l) - [Xw/y]p(0) + [x/y]p2(0)
p2(2) - [2XXw/y2lp(0) + [X/y]2p2(0)
p (0) - p2(0) - -(Xw/jj + ). p (0)2
V2
It is therefore clear that p^(l) “ p2(l) and p^(2) - p2(2) . 
However p(l) +  p(2) except in one special case where X/y - 1. 
Since X is endogenously determined by the firm's choice of w it 
will only be by pure chance that both equations (4.18) will be 
solved by a common w.
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We can therefore conclude that in general state dependent wages 
will be preferred by the firm. It cannot be possible for the maximum 
profit obtained by choosing w^ and W£ unconstrained to be less 
than the profit obtained under the constraint w^ “ w2 • 
apparent from the above that only under exceptional circumstances 
will the outcome of the two problems (constrained and unconstrained) 
be equal.
The second question which we can ask is whether wages increase 
or decrease in the level of employment. Intuition here suggests 
the latter possibility. As the firm approaches full employment of 
its available capital we might expect it to be less concerned with 
increasing employment further. However, consideration of the first 
order conditions of our model suggest that no generals result of this 
nature are possible.
Consider once again equations (4.18) when w^ “ w2 “ w*‘ Two 
situations are possible. When p(2) > p(l) (evaluated at w*)
(4.18a) > (4.18b) and vice versa. We can use this fact together 
with the second order conditions for profit maximisation to deduce 
the sign of W£ - w^. The second order conditions require the 
derivatives of (4.18a) and (4.18b) with respect to w^ and Wj be 
negative.
Hence when p(2) > p(l) we can deduce that in order for equation
(4.18) to be simultaneously satisfied w^ > Wj. In this case therefore 
the intuition that wages decrease in employment. Notice that 
p(2) > p(l) when Xj/u > 1 where of course X^  " yGiWj). The inequality 
is therefore likely to hold ceteris paribus when y  is large 
relative to p.
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We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that p(2) < p(l) 
at the firm's optimal choice of , v ^ .  In this case the wages 
increase in employment. Our conclusions are therefore ambiguous.
It is not difficult to find intuition for these results. In 
the case where arrivals are frequent in comparison with departures 
the firm reduces its wage offers as employment rises. As full 
employment of available capital approaches the firm becomes less 
anxious to fill vacancies and prefers instead to reap a large 
profit from already filled vacancies. Such a firm by nature of 
its environment spends most of the time near full employment. 
Conversely a firm which faces frequent departures and few arrivals 
chooses to make a large profit per vacancy whilst in low employment 
states.
The possibility of state contingent wages obviously greatly 
complicates analysis. We can deduce for example that both w^ and w^ 
are increasing in 8. Other comparative statics results however 
are not possible. In chapter 5 when we return briefly to wage 
setting we shall therefore assume state independent wages. In 
practice such an assumption might well be realistic for reasons not 
modelled here. In making offers to 'new' employees firms may be 
constrained by existing wage structures within the firm. Economic 
theory has already elaborated many roles for wage structures and 
incentives to 'efficient' human capital investment (see Becker (1975) 
Cronau (1971)) and these considerations may dominate any desire by 
firms to alter wages in response to random employment fluctuations.
There is also a sense in which the time consistency issue noted 
above comes to the defence of a model which does not allow employment 
state contingent wages. The problem with conditioning a wage
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offer upon states is that it gives an incentive when a different 
state arrives to renegotiate wages. Of course, in a more realistic 
setting there are many factors which may change a firm's perception 
of the best wage offer, perhaps far more important in this respect 
than the state of recruitment are product demand considerations.
Recently contract theory has been applied to suggest circumstances 
under which wage agreements between workers and firms may arrive 
at wages paid independently of the state of the world (see Hart (1983)). 
This literature would seem to offer some support for the notion of 
state independent wage offers, which will form the basis of analysis 
in Chapter 5.
A. 7. The Role of Discounting
In the analysis of this chapter so far we have ignored the 
role of discounting and concentrated on expected per period values.
This is indeed a necessary simplification if one wishes to endogenise 
the decision of firms to create possibly many vacancies. We can, 
however, examine the role of discounting in a very simple framework 
in order to deduce its effect in more general settings.
In this section we revisit the simple single vacancy firm of 
section A.3., consider a discrete time analogue and allow for 
discounting.
Letting 6t + 1 we can consider the value to a single vacancy
2 . . .  firm of the profit stream, when random matching and quitting are
2. This approach is somewhat unsatisfactory since in discrete time
there is nothing to rule out multiple contacts to the firm. However, 
for illustration purposes it suffices.
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a part of the environment. Immediately we can write
(4.20) ( 1 + t ) V(0) = - k+XV(l) + (l-X)V(O)
(l+x)V(l) = 6-w-k + pV(0) + (l-y)V(l)
In equations (4.20) x is the discount rate (end of period 
discounting is assumed) and V(0), V(l) the discounted expected 
profit of a firm commencing with an unfilled and a filled vacancy 
respectively.
In order to find an explicit solution to the firm's profit 
maximising wage offer it is first necessary to solve equations (4.20) 
This can most easily be done by writing (4.20) in matrix form so 
that
(4.21)
T+X - X v(0) -k
- p  T+P V(1) 6-w-k
The solution of equations (4.20) can therefore be written as A H> 
where A  ^is the inverse of the matrix t +X  - X  P T+p 
-1
and b is the
vector on the right hand side of (4.21). A can be written asT+p X
(4.22) £  p t +X.-1 where e - x(x+X+y).
We are most interested here in analysing the effects of discounting 
on the wage offer a firm chooses. The firm sets a wage to maximise 
V(0)
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We once again have a potential problem in that the firm will 
desire to make a high wage offer to induce an applicant to accept 
and then actually pay low wages when the offer is accepted. Again 
we rule such behaviour out by assumption and analyse the wage choice 
that mazimises V(0) above.
To examine the effect of the discount rate upon the wage 
we again use the fact that
(4.2 3) sign = sign V (0), WTdT
From equation (4.22) we know that V(0) can be written
(4.24) £ V(0) = - (t + u) k + A (S - w - k)
Differentiating (4.24) with respect to w and x and rearranging
we obtain
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(4.25) £ V (0) = - (e V(0) + V (0)e + e V(0))WT TW W  T W  T
On the right hand side of (4.25) we have three terms, the middle 
one of which must be zero by the first order condition for profit 
maximisation. By inspection the first term (e V(0)) is positive 
whilst the third term (e^V^iO)) is negative.
However, if we differentiate (4.24) with respect to ~ we 
obtain an implicit expression for V_(0), namely
(4.26) V^(0) = - (k + e _V(0)) / £
Using (4.26) we can rewrite (4.25) as
(4.26) e V = V(0) |e e - £E + £ kWT - W T WT"1 w
Differentiation of £ as defined in (4.22) results in the
observation that
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( 4 . 2 7 )  ( e e -  e e  ) = t A ( 2 t -  t ) =  x A > 0W  T WT W w
Hence since e is positive we can deduce that V (0) > 0WT
which in turn implies that dw/dx > 0. An increase in the discount 
rate induces the firm to make higher wage offers.
The intuition behind this result is easily seen. Incorporating 
discounting into our analysis allows for an impatience effect.
We have assumed that the firm sets its wage offer from the vacant 
state. Impatience in this case implies that the firm attaches a 
cost to the time it takes to find a suitable employee. The higher 
is this cost (the larger is the discount rate) the more the 
firm will be prepared to pay in order to attract a suitable worker 
more quickly. Conversely, as the rate of time preference of the 
firm becomes smaller it becomes less important to fill a vacancy 
now rather than later. In the limit we move to the case of a 
zero discount which we have analvsed in section 4.4.
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A.8. Wage 'Bargains' and Wages
It might be objected that the discussion of this chapter has 
proceeded along the lines of unilateral wage offers by firms, whereas 
in a market characterized by imperfect information all agents have 
'monopoly' power. Just as a firm once contacted is different to 
the individual from other firms yet located, so is that individual 
different to the firm from others yet to find the firm. This idea 
of bilateral monopoly in a search setting is prevalent in the 
literature (see for example Diamond (1982)) and will indeed be 
used in Chapter 6.
The main conclusions we have drawn from our analysis are, 
however, concerned with only one side of this bilateral monopoly 
problem. These conclusions remain valid when wage bargaining is 
allowed since what our analysis has really determined is one extreme 
of the contract curve along which bargained outcomes must lie.
The work of Nash (1960) on bargaining outcomes suggests a way of
choosing points from a set of possible bargaining solutions all of
3which must be privately efficient. At one extreme of the set 
lies one agent's 'ideal' or most preferred outcome and this is 
precisely what we have derived above for the case of a bilateral 
worker/firm wage bargain in a search setting. There is some rather 
loose justification for concentrating on the firm's wage choice 
rather than any bargained outcome if one is prepared to believe 
that firms are able to extract the most surplus on account of their 
size vis a vis individuals. There is also the possibility that 
unilateral wage offers rather than wage bargains will predominate 
in situations of asymmetric information. In the setting we have 
modelled above it would seem reasonable to regard an individual's 
reservation wage as 'private' information something that the individual 
knows and the firm cannot observe.
Even without such beliefs, however, the central insight of 
this chapter carries through since a knowledge of the end points 
of the contract curve is a pre-requisite for an analysis of a wage 
bargain. We have established how a firm's optimal wage offer will 
vary in response to changes in the economic parameters that naturally 
characterise a search setting.
3. That is to say must exhaust the gains of trade between the agents 
concerned, but need not be socially desirable.
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4.9. Summary and Discussion
This chapter has concentrated on the wage offer decisions of 
firms in a simple constrained vacancy setting. We have examined 
in some detail a method of modelling firms in a search environment 
which entails considering employment as following a simple stochastic 
process governed in part by a firm's decisions. To capture the 
notion of 'limited' vacancies we considered a single vacancy firm, 
but also allowed for some generalisation and in particular briefly 
considered an 'infinite' vacancy firm.
Emphasis has been laid on the fact that in a search setting 
it is no longer reasonable to think of the wages that motivate 
individuals search decisions analysed in chapters 2 and 3 as being 
competitively determined by the forces of supply and demand. Instead 
we have chosen to model the determination of wages when firms are 
able to make choices about the compensation to labour. Since we are 
most interested not only in 'search' models but in search models 
where individuals may be unsuccessful when contacting firms we built 
null offers into the model examined here in a very simple way by 
exogenously restricting the vacancies on offer at the firm.
Taking the simplest of all cases we found that it was possible 
to unambiguously determine the effect upon wage offers of certain 
crucial labour market and firm specific variables. The profit 
maximising wage offer was increasing in the value product of labour 
and the exogenous separation rate (vO and decreasing in the contact 
rate (y). No general results were possible, however, concerning 
shifts in the distribution of workers reservation wages that the
firm faces .
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These results suggested that monopsony wage offers respond in 
an intuitive fashion. In a search setting we have argued that the 
firm's wage offer regulates the rate at which vacancies are filled 
The faster unemployed searches contact the firm the lower the wage 
required to maintain employment.
In the remainder of the chapter we attempted to add to these 
results and check their robustness to the simplifying assumptions 
made.
Moving away from the single vacancy firm towards an 'infinite' 
vacancy setting it was shown that the rate of flow into and away from 
the firm became in this very special case irrelevant to wage 
determination. Since unlimited vacancies implies the impossibility 
of null offers the infinite vacancy firm is not of particular further 
interest except that we shall use the model developed to highlight 
the equilibrium consequences of offer rationing itself.
In the case of multiple (finite) vacancy firms there exists 
the possibility that firms will condition wage offers on their employment 
condition. We demonstrated for one case that indeed there did exist 
an incentive to make state contingent wage offers. This considerably 
complicates analysis and does not correspond well with casual 
empirical observation. There is good reason to believe that many 
factors in labour markets constrain wage offers to be made independent 
of the individual firms employment condition.
Finally, we relaxed our no-discounting assumption and succeeded 
in deriving some intuitively appealing results concerning the effects 
of discounting. For a firm commencing from a position of unfilled 
vacancies an increase in the discount rate leads to an increase in
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wage offers as firms become impatient to fill their vacancies. For 
a firm starting with a filled vacancy the effect of an increase in 
the discount rate is the opposite of the above. Where the future 
matters little such a firm will attempt to maximise the return 
from its already filled vacancy having little regard for future 
employment consequences .
In many ways this chapter has been a first attempt at a problem 
worthy of considerably more analysis. The early search literature 
was very concerned with applying search ideas to such macroeconomic 
issues as the unemployment/inflation trade off (see Phelps (1970)) 
for example). At the centre of this analysis lies the question of 
how wages respond to changes in the unemployment rate as this proxies 
the state of labour demand and supply. We would suggest that the 
analysis of this chapter might have a role to play in this strand of 
what has become known as the'micro-foundation/ literature. Our 
main concern however lies in the analysis of search in labour 
markets characterised by null offers and with this view in mind we 
leave the issue of wage determination in order to consider the 
actual generation of vacancies.
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Chapter 5
Job Search and the Finns' Decisions
2: Vacancy Creation
11?
5.1. Introduction
In chapter 4 we considered issues related to a firm's wage 
offers in markets characterised by search. In order to capture 
the notion of offer rationing or null offers we dealt with a model 
of the single vacancy firm. It has already been noted that a 
constraint on the number of job offers a firm makes may be imposed 
exogenously by limits on sales of a perishable output; in this 
chapter we wish to consider the endogenous determination of such 
constraints, brought about by the costly nature of vacancy creation.
The interest in the determinants of the number of vacancies 
in a search environment arises because of the policy relevance 
of this topic. Recently many writers including Layard et al (19S(*) 
have considered ways of influencing the employment decisions of 
firms in order to generate more vacancies. A word of caution is, 
however, needed here. In order to proceed with our analysis we 
shall have to make some strong assumptions which considerably reduce 
the ability of the model developed here to answer policy orientated 
questions. The reason why such strong assumptions are necessary 
is because we wish to deal explicitly with job search as a phenomenon 
and this, as has been already noted, entails a consideration of 
both stochastic and dynamic problems. In order, therefore, to 
consistently model the role of search parameters in a firm's 
vacancy creation decisions we must abstract considerably from reality. 
The hope when performing such an exercise is that some insights are 
gained which may prove useful components of more policy orientated, 
less pedantic models of labour market operations.
As in chapter 4, the framework for analysis adopted here 
involves consideration of the firm's employment following a
11«
stochastic process. We shall assume away the wage determination 
problem in the first instance so that the only decision a firm has 
to make is with regard to the number of job slots or opportunities 
to create. This 'cut-off' point of course determines the pattern 
of employment the firm can effect and hence the firm faces a conventional 
cost-benefit appraisal. Vacancy creation will in general ensure 
greater employment but will also be costly. We wish to examine the 
ways in which this trade-off depends upon the search parameters, 
which we have previously identified as being the rate of contact 
(y) and the leaving rate (p).
The final section of this chapter is taken up by a brief 
consideration of the likely implications of firms' decisions on 
market equilibria, a topic which is the explicit concern of chapter 6.
5.2. A General Model of the L Vacancy Firm
Consider as in chapter 4 a firm which in continuous time faces 
a stochastic flow of applicants (probability of contact - y6t) and 
stochastic separations (probability of loss “ pfit). In contrast 
to chapter 4, however, we now assume that all individuals have of 
common reservation wage r so that
(5.1) X(w) - y  V w 5 r
- 0 V w < r
Hence the firm's profit maximising wage offer is simply r.
As before, we shall limit our attention to steady states of the 
resultant employment process and consider the firm to maximise 
expected per period profit. The firm is now able to decide how 
many job slots (L) to create and this decision in turn affects the 
steady state probabilities of different employment levels. In 
our previous notation we have
L
(5.2) E(x) - Ipa)(pQ(Jl) ~ rl) - k(L)
1
The only new term in (5.2) is k(L) which is assumed to be the 
vacancy (job slot) cost function. For the time being the only 
restriction we shall place on this is k^ > 0. k(L) is consistent 
with the idea that production requires capital or 'machines' which 
is a perfectly complementary input. In other words imagine exactly 
one man to a machine, then the number of machines installed determines 
the maximal productive employment that a firm can offer. The 
dependence of each p(f.) on the choice of L has been suppressed, 
but should be borne in mind.
Maximisation of (5.2) requires that L be chosen so as to equate 
the marginal cost of a job slot kj^ , with the marginal change in 
revenue product. Of course strictly speaking L is an integer 
variable so that discrete methods are required. However, it is 
usually possible to think in terms of a continuous analogue and 
there are no real conceptual problems here.
What therefore can be said of the choice of L? We need to know 
exactly how L affects each of the p(£) in the first instance, but 
we can reasonably expect from a consideration of the stochastic 
process detailed in chapter 4 that that total revenue net of wage
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costs is increasing for at least some L. Given that kL is positive, 
this will be the only range in which the firm would choose to produce 
anyway. It would also be reasonable to expect an increase in 
y(p) to increase (decrease) total revenue for all feasible L.
However, in order to say anything at all about the determination 
of L we need to know how a parameter affects the marginal effect 
of a change in L. We therefore need to consider precisely how L 
affects the probability distribution of employment states and payoffs 
to the firm. It is easiest to determine the consequences of 
marginal changes in L upon total revenue when there exists a 
closed form expression for the latter. This necessitates an 
assumption of constant returns to labour which we will apply in the 
first instance.
5.3. Employment Probabilities and Vacancy Creation
Whereas the simple stochastic process for the single vacancy 
firm is one frequently analysed in the literature of stochastic 
processes (see Cox and Miller (1970)) an equivalent to what we 
have termed the 'L' vacancy firm does not appear. We shall first 
therefore derive the steady state employment probabilities.
Denoting by P(4,t) the probability of being in state 4 at time 
t, the discussion above suggests the following relationships
(5.4) P(4,t+6t) - X6tP(4-l,t) + yfitP(4+1,t) + (l-X6t-y6t)P(4,t)
for 0 < 4 < L
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(5.5) P(0,t+5t) ■= p5tP(l,t) + (1-XSt)P(0,t) 
for 1 = 0
(5.6) P(L,t+6t) - (l-p6t)P(L,t) + X5tP(L-l,t) 
for l  - L
Equations (5.4) - (5.6) are simply statements relating to 
the time dependency of state probabilities. We now wish to move 
to steady states, so transposing terms of P(f,t) P(0,t) and P(L,t) 
dividing by St and taking the limit as St -*■ 0 yields three differential 
equations.
(5.7) Pt(f,t) - -(X+p)PU,t) + XP(f-l.t) + yPU+l.t)
(5.8) Pt(0,t) - -XP(0,t) + pP(l,t)
(5.9) Pt(L,t) - -pP(L,t) + XP(L-l,t)
In steady state by definition Pt(i,,t) - 0 V l  so that (5.7) - (5.9) 
imply by recursion that
(5.10)
P(l) - P (0) . £ 
P (2) - p(0)(£)2
. pU) - p(0)(£)*
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Finally, we require that probabilities sum to unity so that 
p(0) can be solved for as
(5 .1 1 )  p (o) -  [ l  + A + (A )2 ..........(A)L] _1
Equations (5.10) and 5.11) serve to confirm our earlier 
conjectures over the role of L. As more job slots are created, 
the probability of the highest employment state increases from 
0 to p(0)(A)L whilst the steady state probabilities of other lower 
states decline.
We can distinguish two cases and represent them diagrammatically 
(see Fig. 1). The first is where X > p so that probabilities 
increase in employment, the second where p > X where the reverse 
holds
Fig. 1. Approximate Graph of Steady State Probabilities
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The effect of a change in L upon the firm's total revenue is 
of course ambiguous. It might well be that the extra product 
of the Lth worker obtained for a proportion p(L) of each period 
does not compensate for the loss of some proportion of production 
for other employment states. We do know, however, that the firm 
will choc*« to produce in a region where revenue is increasing in L.
The parameters y  and p also enter into the steady state 
probabilities in the conjectured fashion. Notice that an increase 
in y  reduces p(0) and increases the probability of at least some 
high employment states, whilst p has the opposite effect. The 
conjecture of equation (5.3) is therefore confirmed by our formal 
analysis.
Since we are concerned with an analysis of optimal decisions 
regarding L it is most useful to have a continuous analogue to the 
above discrete case. This is therefore derived as our next step.
By analogy to the discrete case (equation (5.10)) we have
(5.12) pp(4+64) - Xp(4)
Rearranging by subtracting pp(4) from both sides yields
(5.13) p(p(4+5£) - p(D) - (X-p)pU)
-  5fcp(p(A+lU -_P.W-> .  (x-p)pU )
54
_  4p.w  .  1 *zhI  pW
d S L p
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Solving this differential equation for p(fc) we obtain
(5.14) p(f) - Ce
C = p(0)e° - p (0)
Where C is a constant of integration. Again we can solve for p(0) 
by requiring probabilities to integrate to unity so that
Finally we shall be considering in the first instance the 
case of constant returns to labour, where the objective function (5.2) 
can be integrated directly to yield
(5.16) E ( it) - (S-w)T - k(L)
We therefore require an expression for expected employment T.
Using the above derivations we obtain
This section has served to generate the tools needed in order 
to conduct a comparative statics examination of the determination 
of L the number of job slots. Such an analysis is the concern of the
■L
(5.15)
0
(5.17) l  - p(i.HdJl - 
■ 0 (ebL-l) - (1/b)
next section.
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5.4. The Comparative Statics of L
Differentiation of (5.16) w.r.t. L yields the following 
first order condition for the choice of L to satisfy
(5.18) (B-w H l - kL - 0
Where can t>e written
(5.19) *L ‘ PL (0> £ e b ^di. +  L p ( 0 ) e b L ; p .  ( 0 )  = - b 2e bL
0  L ,  bL . . 2 ^  “(e  - 1 )  < 0
Using the fact that p(0)ebb = -p^(0) eh^ di. (since the probabilities
must sum to unity before and after a change in L) (5.19) can be 
rewritten as
(5.19a) *L - pL(0) (Jt-L)ebLd£ > 0
So that expected employment is increasing in the number of 
job slots L. This accords with intuition; the firm can influence 
expected employment by creating vacancies (at cost k(L)). The first 
order condition (5.18) can easily be interpreted as stating that 
the firm should expand the number of job slots until the marginal cost 
(k ) is equal to the marginal gain ((B~w)IT).Li L
The second order conditions for profit maximisation imply that
(5.20) (6_W)*LL < “ll
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Differentiation of (5.19a) reveals that Z  .  is ambiguousLL
in sign, hence in order to be sure that the maximisation problem is 
well defined we require that k(L) be 'sufficiently' convex so 
that (5.20) holds. It might be argued that a natural specification 
for k(L) is linear so that k^L - 0 but this criticism need not 
detain us. The problem really arises because we have assumed 
linear production and would be alleviated if diminishing returns 
were assumed thus tending to make the profit function concave.
As in chapter A we can examine the comparative statics of the 
choice of L by noting that sign dL/dz for some parameter z is 
given by sign |3f(L)/3z| where f(L) is the first order condition (5.18).
It is clear that since Z ^  >  0 (from (5.19a)) then dL/dB > 0.
An increase in the value product of labour leads to the firm creating 
more job slots.
The other comparative statics results of interest are as in 
the case of chapter A, X and y (notice that since G(r)- 1 
and w « r, y  m  X ). Results concerning X  and y are somewhat 
more difficult to obtain. Differentiating (5.19a) with respect to 'b' 
(b is increasing in X and decreasing in y) we obtain.
( 5 . 2 1 ) Lb ’Lb«» U-L)ebLd f  + PL (0 ) U-L)LebLd*
From equation (5.19) we know that p^(0) <  0 it is therefore 
necessary to sign p^CO) i*1 or^er to sign the comparative statics 
results. Differentiating (5.19) we obtain
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,r N , bL bL Lb2ebL Tt2, bLv 2(5.21a) pLb - (e -1) (2be + ------- 2 - Lb (e )
(e° -1)
,.2 bL , , bL ..2 .-Lb e / (e -1) < 0
Since both expressions under the integrals in (5.21) are 
negative (since l  S L) it follows that > 0  so that
dL / dX > 0  and dL / dp <0.
This implies that an improvement in the conditions faced by 
the firm results in an increase in the number of job slots created.
An improvement may take the form of either increased inflows (A+) 
or decreased outflows (p+). Either of these has the effect of 
increasing the marginal value of an extra job slot.
The effect of an increase in the common reservation wage r 
is simply the opposite of an increase in productivity 8. This can 
be seen directly from equation (5.18). Hence an increase in wages 
results in a reduction in vacancies within the firm.
The decision to create vacancies we have considered here is 
the analogue of the labour demand decision of a firm operating in 
a deterministic environment. We have shown that a firm will expand 
the number of vacancies in response to an increase in the productivity 
of labour or a fall in the given wage rate. Similarly as the flow 
of applicants becomes greater or the outflow of employees smaller 
the firm will reduce the number of vacancies it creates. The vacancy 
creation decision we have considered is a well-defined problem even 
under the assumption of constant returns to labour because the 
stochastic process whereby vacancies are related to expected profits 
induces non linearity into the problem. Nevertheless the constant
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returns assumption is a restrictive one since it implies the 
irrelevance of firm size. We therefore next consider relaxing 
the constant returns assumption in order to see what can be said 
about vacancy creation under more general production conditions.
Rewriting equation (5.2) in continuous l  and differentiating 
we obtain the following first order condition for profit maximisation
(5.22)
L
PL U )  (pQU) - rl )  + pQ(L) - rL = kL
0
Where p ({.) ■ is the effect of an increase in vacancies
L 3L
on the steady state probability of the Jl'th employment state. 
Inspection of equation (5.14) reveals that pT (Z) < 0 for all 
values of t.. Increasing the cut off point of employment has the 
effect of decreasing the probability of all lower employment states 
whilst adding another possible employment state. Equation (5.22) 
therefore has a fairly simple interpretation. The marginal cost of 
a vacancy comprises two parts, the first and third terms of equation 
(5.22). The first term accounts for the lost revenue from lower 
employment states that results from an increase in the number of 
vacancies, the third term accounts for the direct money cost of an 
additional vacancy. The marginal benefit is given by the second 
term of equation (5.22) and comprises the expected revenue derived 
from the L'th employment state.
Despite the fact that we now have to consider the effect of 
the vacancy decision on all employment states separately rather 
than simply on expected employment, equation (5.22) can be simplified. 
Since probabilities must sum to unity it follows that
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L
(5.23) p(L) - - pLU)<U 
0
Therefore (5.22) can be written more compactly as
L
(5.24) PL00 (s 00 - s (L) ) df. = kL
0
where s ( Z )  » pQ(i.) - rt
The effect of an increase in r can therefore be evaluated 
directly. Differentiating (5.24) with respect to r we obtain
Now since p ( l )  < 0  and (L-i.) > 0 for all values of L L
it is clear that (5.25) is negative, hence dL/dr < 0. Our result 
regarding the effect of wages upon vacancy creation is therefore 
robust to different production technologies. Higher wages cause 
firms to restrict the number of vacancies.
If Q(i.) is given by a simple Cobb-Douglas production function 
Q(£.) _ l a  (a<l) we can use equation (5.24) to evaluate the effect 
of an increase in the productivity parameter a. Differentiation 
of (5.24) with respect to a yields
L
(5.25) PL (Jl) (L-Jl)di.
0
L
(5.26) PL ( A ) ( a p f . a  1 -  a p L a  1 )d i .
0
Since (5.26) is positive it implies dL/da > 0 so that a result 
analogous to our result concerning the parameter 8 above is also
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robust in a non constant returns world.
When we come to consider the contact rate y  and loss rate p 
however, we cannot unambiguously sign the effect of these parameters. 
Differentiating (5.24) with respect ot b *= X/p yields the following
_L
PLb(£) ” s(L))d£
0
Neither term under the integral can be unambiguously signed for 
all values of £ and hence the whole of expression (5.27) is 
ambiguous in sign.
In order to give some kind of feel for the effects of y  and 
p on the choice of L in a non constant returns world we engaged 
in some numerical analysis. Using a Cobb-Douglas production function 
as above and allowing for variation in parameter values we were 
able to confirm that the choice of L varies as predicted by the 
constant returns model. L is increasing (decreasing) in p(y) for 
most conceivable parameter values at least as far as the Cobb- 
Douglas technology is concerned. In table 1 below a sample of our 
numerical results are given
(5.27) 3f(£)
3b
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L* u Y
a - 1 > 2 24 •5 •7
a = 29 •7 •5
a
-  3/4 31 •5 •7
a " % 39 • 7 •5
Table 1
Sample Numerical Results^ for Cobb-Douglas Case
These results suggest that there exists the possibility of a 
positive feedback effect of workers' search decisions upon vacancy 
creation. Taking for example the case of discouraged workers dealt 
with in chapters 2 and 3, it can be seen what the demand side effects 
of a reduction in the number of discouraged might be. The first 
round effect would be on our parameter y  and this in turn would 
lead to greater vacancy creation (L*+). By a consideration of firms' 
vacancy decisions we are therefore beginning an examination of the 
kind of interdependencies that might exist in markets characterised 
by imperfect information. It is important to notice that these 
interdependencies are not reflected in prices (i.e. the wage rate) 
but rather in quantities. Therefore there exists the possibility of 
equilibria with bootstraps properties where intervention may result 
in entirely new employment, vacancy and search configurations. This 
is a theme we shall deal with in more detail in chapter 6 (where, in 
fact, the entry of firms is seen as the force generating more vacancies). 
In the remainder of this chapter we shall consider integrating both 
wage and vacancy decisions and thereby integrating the analysis of this 
chapter and that of chapter 4.
1. See Appendix A for details of Numerical Methods.
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5.5. The integration of wage and vacancy decisions
The constant returns technology example used above provides the 
basis for a model which allows both a wage decision and a vacancy 
creation decision to influence the employment outcomes of the firm.
In this section we relax assumption (5.1) and return to a consideration 
of job searchers with a distribution of reservation wages as analysed 
in chapter 4. Our previous derivations of the probability distribution 
of employment states of course remains perfectly valid. It must now 
be remembered that \  is a function (through G(w)) of w. Since 
wages were shown to react ambiguously to parameters even in the most 
simple (single vacancy) case it should not be thought that clear 
results will be possible here. Rather, we are more concerned in 
examining whether our results concerning vacancy creation are robust 
to endogenising wage decisions.
We continue with the assumption that the objective of the firm 
is expected per period profit maximisation (the consequences of which 
should now be clear) and consider the problem of jointly choosing 
w and L.
The first order conditions of this problem can be written
(5.22)
(B-wH - i  w
(B-w )Il - 1^
0
0
The second order necessary conditions for this problem require 
that the Hessian of (f> be negative definite so that
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(5.23) < O, *LL < O
* w  ywL
lw tLL
> 0
The second order partíais . are
(5-24) * = (6-w)^ - 2*ww ww w
(5.25) *LL « (6-w )All - kLL
(5.26) ^Lw - *wL - (6-w H wL - tL
We have previously defined S.^ and notice that
(5-27) Iw - bw ) > 0 • bw - d=)
(5.28) l . bww*w + b2 ( L3(ebL+l)
w (ebL-l)3-2b-3
.. ..... 7 . rLebL(ebL(Lb-2) + Lb+2).(5.28) l  bw (------- bL 3 5(e -1)
Again considering z as some parameter of <j> a change in 
z will simultaneously affect the optimal choice of w and L. 
signs of these changes are given by
sign dvdz - sign
— <Pwz ^wL
”^Lz ‘•’ll
sign dLdz - sign
"^Lz '•’ll
“ <f>WZ <pWW
The
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All these components can readily be signed except for $Lw which 
is ambiguous. In tables 2 and 3 below we therefore report results 
for both contineencies < 0)
z 6 y M
dw
dz +?- +?- -? +
dL
dz + ?+ ?_
Table -e-CM < 0
z 6 y y
dw + -?+ +?-
dz
dL ?+dz
Table 3 <f> r > 0wL
A ? indicates ambiguous results, in these cases the signs given 
in the table indicate the results of numerical analysis conducted 
on the model, some examples of which are included below. Where only 
one sign is given this indicates that for all our numerical experiments 
the sign was constant.
Immediately it can be seen that nothing can be said of wage 
determination in the general L vacancy model. Even the result that 
wages increase in productivity is questioned when $wL < 0 (there
135
is no economic interpretation of this function and therefore no 
a priori knowledge of its sign).
The only comparative statics results for L that are 
unambiguous concern the effect of an increase in 8. As before an 
increase in the productivity of labour leads to an increase in the 
number of job slots.
Given the difficulty in signing comparative statics results for 
the case of only wage determination in chapter 4, the ambiguity of 
many results should come as no surprise. Given this problem it 
seems reasonable to use numerical experiments to attempt to confirm 
suggested theoretical results.
As can be seen in tables 2 and 3 the numerical experiments were 
most successful in the case of our L variable. It was relatively 
easy to specify parameters for the model that results in ambiguous 
results for the optimal wage, whilst, results on the optimal choice 
of job slots remain robust.
These results therefore serve to confirm our earlier analysis 
where wages were assumed (through a degenerate distribution of 
reservation wages) to be exogenously fixed. The result that the 
number of job slots is an increasing function of the contact rate 
seems fairly robust.
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w* L* I E(tt) *wL a
e - 6o 24 7 2.83 56.8 + i
6 - 8 0 38.83 18 12.18 193.5 + i
6 - 100 40.81 29 23.36 550.9 - i
B - 80 30.92 6 3.14 76.5 + 2
6 - 80 22.51 4 1.65 53.4 + 3
Table 4: Sample Numerical Results
[Notes on Table 4: For the purposes of producing some illustrative 
results an exponential form for G(r) was chosen, other numerical 
experiments used a Normal distribution. In table 4 the values used 
are p « 0.3, y  -  0.5. Finally the parameter a is a parameter of 
a quadratic vacancy cost function k(L) - aL (see Appendix for 
further details).]
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5.6. Null Offers and Vacancy Decisions
A primary concern of chapters 2 and 3 was an examination of the 
consequences of offer rationing on an individual's search behaviour. 
Rationing of offers was modelled by allowing for a probability (1-q)
allows for a firm's decisions regarding vacancy creation to determine 
the probability (1-q). The probability that a firm randomly 
contacted will not possess a vacancy is in the notation of this 
chapter p(L), the probability that a firm is in its highest employment 
state. In the case where the wage offer is set at r it is the firm's 
vacancy decision 'L' that entirely determines p(L). What then 
can be said of the determinants of the null offer probability?
From equation (5.10) we can write
We know already that p(L) is increasing in X for any L and 
that p(L) is increasing in L if X > y. It therefore follows that
that search would be unsuccessful. The model discussed in this chapter
(5.31) 1
P(L) = r 1+X + ( X)
L y y
(5.32) M I  > o if X > y
< 0 if y > X
dX
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In other words if a firm already has a tendency to grow more 
quickly than it 'dies' (X > u) then a favourable shift (increase 
in X say) increases the number of vacancies and increases the 
probability of that firm being contacted in a state of no vacancies.
If vi > X the effect of an increase in X on p(L) is ambiguous.
As a first round effect p(L) increases but then L increases and 
may offset this.
In this latter case we have an interesting possiblity, which 
again hints at the possible bootstraps nature of search equilibria.
As more individuals search, so both the number of vacancies and the 
probability of receiving an offer increase. It is this latter
variable as we have seen in chapters 2 and 3 that is important in
determining the participation of individuals. We therefore have 
the possibility of a positive feedback loop - more search activity 
leads to more offers, leads to more search activity.
Here we have constructed an heuristic argument.In the following 
chapter we shall be concerned with making precise the above suggestions.
5.7. Summary and Discussion
This chapter has been concerned with generalising the single 
vacancy firm model and endogenising vacancy decisions. Within the 
framework of stochastic employment evolution the probabilities 
(in steady state) of various employment levels and the relationship 
between these probabilities and the firm's vacancy creation decision 
have been derived. Vacancy costs were modelled in a simple way by 
considering capital and labour as complementary inputs. In this case 
a choice of capital stock by the firm is equivalent to a decision
concerning the maximum labour force that a firm will employ, i.e. 
a vacancy creation decision.
It has been demonstrated that for a constant returns to labour 
technology that vacancies increase with a favourable shift in 
conditions where a favourable shift can take the fcrm of either an 
increased flow of job applicants or a reduction in the loss rate. 
Numerical results suggest that constant returns is not a crucial 
assumption for this result, neither does endogenising the firm's 
wage decision (as discussed in chapter 4) cause any problems, 
although in this case only numerical results are possible.
The greatest interest in these results stems from the suggested 
nature of feedback from individual search decisions back onto firm's 
vacancy creation decisions. It was shown that increased search 
activity was consistent with more vacancy creation so that supply 
could create its own demand . More importantly it was also shown 
increased vacancy creation was consistent with a reduction in the 
offer constraint parameter (p(L)) which individual job searchers 
face. The analysis of this chapter has therefore offered insight into 
the possible bootstraps nature of search equilibria.
It is worth considering briefly the implications of this and 
the previous chapter taken together. The usual notion of a competitive 
market with a wage adjusting to eliminate excess demand or supply 
has been completely ruled out by explicitly allowing for search 
and imperfect information. In a world of imperfect information the 
only internally consistent view of wage determination is as a 
bilateral bargaining game in which agents bargain over a trading 
surplus. This is quite unlike the usual Walrasian setting (see
140
Arrow and Hahn (1970)) where all excess profits are bid away. There 
is no reason to believe that privately bargained wages in such a 
world will generate the socially correct signal to agents contemplating 
entry or participation. This point is made explicit by Diamond (1982)). 
The work of both Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1983) postulates an 
environment in which both firms and individuals are numerous.
Where firms are few and individuals numerous the balance of power 
in a bargaining game will tend towards firms. Chapter 4 provides a 
more complete analysis than available elsewhere of the determinants of 
wage offers in such circumstances.
Even ignoring an active role for wages in offering incentives to 
entry, the work of this chapter has served to illustrate how multiple 
offer constrained equilibria might arise. Where one agent's decisions 
determine another's actions (as in the case with firms creating 
vacancies and individuals searching) then positive feedback from 
one to the other opens up just such a possibility. In this chapter 
the possibility of this effect has been demonstrated.
It now remains to draw together our earlier analysis and that 
of the last two chapters in order to discuss in an equilibrium 
framework the job search, offer rationing and unemployment.
1 Al
Chapter 6
Market Equilibrium: An analysis of the effects
of offer rationing in equilibrium
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6.1. Introduction
In previous chapters we have been concerned with analysing 
the consequences of quantity constraints or null offers for individual 
decision making and in specifying models of a firm's behaviour 
consistent with null offers and job search in the labour market.
In this chapter we turn attention to the analysis of market equilibrium 
in a search context. In particular we shall be concerned with the 
existence of offer constraints in the labour market as an equilibrium 
phenomena.
It is only within an equilibrium framework that answers to many 
interesting questions can be attempted. Much of the early search 
literature, for example, explicitly noted the dangers of drawing 
'comparative statics'conclusions from a partial equilibrium framework 
(see Rothschild (1973), Lippman and McCall (1976a)). Whilst the 
simple search model of chapter 2 indicated that an increase in 
search costs would reduce reservation wages and hence in the first 
instance individuals' durations of unemployment, whether this results 
in lower or higher unemployment depends at least in part on firms' 
responses to increased acceptance of offers. It is quite possible 
within an equilibrium setting to imagine a 'perverse' result, where 
an increase in search costs increased unemployment.
Besides being useful in generating predictions regarding the 
changes in equilibrium that result from exogenous shifts in parameters 
an equilibrium model can also suggest something about the desirability 
or otherwise of market outcomes. What ought to be as opposed to what 
is, is clearly a question that entails by its very nature value judgements. 
Most would, however, agree that if some outcome entails the possibility
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of improving an agent’s utility at no cost to others it is in some 
sense undesirable. Whether a particular market outcome is efficient 
in the above 'Paretian' sense is another question that may be asked 
of a market equilibrium model.
The greater depth of analysis possible within a market equilibrium 
framework is obtained at the cost of analytic complexity. This is 
particularly true where search is a feature of the market. The 
previous chapters should make clear the fact that a consideration of 
search activity involves modelling of decision making under uncertainty 
over time. In attempting to model an equilibrium in such a setting 
it is natural to pursue the analysis of states where, excepting 
random events, the world is essentially static, i.e. 'steady states'. 
Modelling search markets out of steady state is not impossible (see 
Diamond (1982)) but is very difficult and will not be attempted here.
Instead we shall be concerned with providing a consistent steady 
state, equilibrium model of a labour market characterised by search, 
unemployment and null offers. In this chapter the simplest possible 
case is examined which corresponds to the 'vacancy' search model as 
outlined in chapters 2 and 3. In other words, we will model a market 
within which there exists a single wage but uncertainty on the part 
of individuals concerning the location of firms and turnover of 
employment. This setting naturally gives rise to a fairly straightforward 
specification of the individual's search problem. In order to capture 
the idea of offer rationing within this setting the simple 'single' 
vacancy model of the firm as contained in chapter 4 is used for the 
demand side of the market. This rationed vacancy model is contrasted 
with the 'infinite' vacancy firm also discussed in chapter 4. Steady 
state equilibrium in both settings is characterised by an equality
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between (expected) inflows to employment and (expected) outflows 
from employment. In the limited vacancy model search by individuals 
may frequently be unsuccessful and this fact will feed back onto 
participation decisions. With unlimited vacancies there will be no 
such feedback.
The idea that search equilibria will generate inefficient (too 
much or too little) unemployment has been explored by Diamond (1982) 
and Pissarides (1984). Inefficiency in search equilibrium arises out 
of a failure of wages to reflect the social value of agents in 
matching. This inefficient entry incentive problem is independent 
of whether offers are in any way rationed or not, we shall consider 
later how the inefficiency arises within the explicit model considered 
in this chapter.
The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance 
of offer rationing in determining the nature of search equilibrium. We 
therefore consider a much simpler search or matching technology than 
that of Diamond (1982). Using this simpler notion of a matching 
technology we are able to compare for the first time an equilibrium 
model of search where null offers are a feature with a model where 
all search is successful.
It will be shown that the effect of rationing on search equilibrium 
is important and interesting. In a world of unrationed offers 
unemployment is in a simple model determined entirely exogenously 
by the parameters of the matching process. In contrast to this, 
offer rationing implies a multiplicity of equilibria some with low 
unemployment, some with high unemployment. This seems to capture 
an essential feature of rationed search, the idea that 'Bootstraps'
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equilibria are possible, where in a model with unlimited vacancies 
unemployment is at a unique natural rate.
Before actually proceeding with analysis of the equilibrium 
search model a brief summary of the literature and of the relationship 
between it and the current work is in order.
The difficulty in modelling equilibrium in a search setting has 
led to a paucity of the literature in this area. The major contributions 
to date have been those of Lucas and Prescott (1974), Eaton and 
Watts (1977), Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1979), (1984),
Lucas and Prescott (1974) employ the notion of a market 
clearing wage in order to solve for equilibrium in a set of spatially 
distinct markets. Unfortunately the idea of a decentralised market 
clearing wage seems highly inappropriate in a search context as the 
previous two chapters have shown.
Eaton and Watts (1977) drop the assumption of market clearing 
and consider firm determined wage decisions in an equilibrium model 
of search that defies analytic solution. Whilst this gives rise to 
a model which is consistent with the central idea of search the lack 
of analytic solution limits its usefulness.
The framework used by Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1984) 
is very similar to that pursued here. Pissarides considers a single 
vacancy firm in discrete time and models search equilibrium in steady 
state. Numerous efficiency issues are considered. Diamond (1982) 
uses a continuous time formulation that most closely resembles the 
approach chosen here. There are of course detailed differences.
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Whereas Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1984) consider the incentive 
to entry that a search equilibrium generates, neither explicitly 
considers the role of offer rationing or null offers in equilibrium. 
That is the departure of the present work where we are able to 
draw on the work of chapter 4 and formulate for comparative purposes 
a model where vacancies are unlimited.
Towards the end of this chapter we will discuss extensions of 
our framework which allow one to generate a search equilibrium with 
wage dispersion and hence a model where null offers affect the 
'how much' search decision as well as the participation decision.
Our conjecture is that 'Bootstraps' type equilibria will also result 
in more complex models for the same reasons they arise in the simpler 
framework considered here. Where offers are generated in limited 
numbers and where this constraint affects search decisions, it is 
likely that equilibria are non unique and that some equilibria entail 
(unnecessarily) high unemployment.
6.2. Overview of the Equilibrium Model
We start by considering the basic equilibrium model of search 
to be detailed in this chapter. The labour market is assumed to 
consist of n firms and N individuals.
Each firm produces a homogenous output using labour as an input 
and subject to a fixed 'capital' cost. Output is sold on a perfectly 
competitive auction market at some price p which is considered 
fixed. There are two alternative simplifying assumptions regarding 
the generation of vacancies.
In the null offer model each firm employs at most a single 
individual who in conjunction with capital (the rental on which 
will be denoted by k) produces an output Q.
In the unlimited vacancies model each firm corresponds to the 
simple infinite vacancy firm of chapter 4. All randomly contacting 
individuals are employed by such firm and each in conjunction with 
capital produce Q output (so that there are constant returns to 
labour) .
Both types of firm face job turnover as described in Chapter 4 
so that employees leave the firm over time. The probability that 
any individual separates from the firm in a time interval 6t is 
denoted by pit.
Individuals who have separated from firms search for alternative 
employment. With identical individuals the only equilibrium that 
can be sustained is one with a unique wage offer made by all firms 
so that all firms pay a wage w. Individuals are assumed to know 
of the location of firms and to contact a firm at a deterministic 
rate Y£ (so that y^St firms are contacted in time interval St). 
Where null offers are a feature of the market individuals do not 
know which firms currently have a vacancy therefore individuals always 
select a firm to contact randomly (i.e. by drawing from a hat).
The process of contacting firms (search) is assumed to involve 
a flow search cost c (search for an interval St costs cSt). Where 
offers are unlimited the decision to participate or not simply 
depends upon whether the wage once obtained compensates for the period 
of time required to contact the firm. Where null offers are sometimes 
the outcome of search it also matters to the individual that some
contacts may be unsuccessful. We shall see that it is in this aspect 
of search decisions that positive feedback effects suggest multiple 
equilibria as a possibility.
Stochastic equilibrium in a market with firms and individuals 
as described above occurs where expected separations equal expected 
matching, there is no incentive to entry or exit and where the wage 
satisfies either the firm's monopsony offer or some Nash bargaining 
outcome. The possibility of a bargain over wages will be examined 
in detail later. It is important to bear in mind that the wage will 
be endogenous to search equilibrium. Associated with steady state 
equilibrium will be steady state unemployment.
We start our detailed exposition of the above model by reconsidering 
the simple vacancy search model (with turnover) in continuous time.
6.3. Unemployed Vacancy Search
As noted above, we wish to reformulate the basic vacancy search 
model of Chapter 2 in continuous time. For simplicity discounting 
will be ignored throughout this chapter.
It is easiest to start by considering the proportion of time 
that an individual spends unemployed when the rate of contact at 
firms is y .^ Considering expected per period values is natural 
when discounting is ignored and an infinite horizon is assumed.
The infinite lifetime of an individual is spent alternating 
between just two states, employment and unemployment. We again have a 
simple stochastic process to solve for (see Figure 1).
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Employed
Unemployed
(l-uôt)
Figure 1.
The probability x6t depends on whether offers are rationed 
or not. In the first case xit is equal to qy^6t where q is the 
probability of a vacancy ((1-q)- probability of a null) in the latter 
case x6t is simply y^6t.
The steady state probabilities of this process can be solved 
for using the same techniques as in chapter 4 to yield
(6.1) p (U)--- y—
(y+x)
P(E)--- —
(y+x)
p(U) and p(E) are respectively the proportion of time spent in the 
unemployed and employed states.
When in the first of these states the individual is assumed 
to receive (b-c) (unemployment utility minus search cost) whilst 
in the second a wage of w. Expected per period income given participation 
is thus simply:
V8 - (b-c)p(U) + wp(E)( 6 . 2 )
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The participation wage w* can be calculated by equating 
Vg to the expected per period value of non participation which by 
definition is b. Hence the participation wage w* satisfies
(6.3) b - (b-c)p(U) - w*p(E) « 0
Provided the market wage is greater than w* all individuals will 
prefer participation to pure leisure.
It is important to notice that in the case of unlimited offers 
w* is entirely determined by exogenous parameters whilst in the 
case of null offers w* in part depends upon (1-q) the null offer 
probability that will be endogenous to our model.
One interesting result should be noted, if c * 0 then w* = b.
This follows directly from equation (6.3) using the fact that probabilities 
sum to one, we shall have cause to use this special case in which (even 
with rationed offers) the participation wage is exogenous. On 
reflection the exogeneity of the participation wage in the case of 
zero search costs is obvious - in the absence of such costs and 
discounting - the probability of state occupancy is irrelevant. In 
such circumstances any wage greater than the value of leisure will 
induce participation.
When money search costs are allowed individuals must receive a 
wage sufficient to compensate them for unsuccessful but costly search.
The model of individual decisions outlined here is the simplest 
possible, allowing only one endogenous parameter ((1-q) the null 
offer probability) to determine behaviour (participation), y ^ ,  u, b and c 
are all exogenous parameters.
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In the next section we consider in detail two alternative models 
of firms upon which individual search decisions will feed back and 
hence generate a market equilibrium.
6.4. Vacancies, Profits and Wages
In this section we simply require a simplification of the 'single' 
and 'infinite' vacancy firms discussed in detail in chapter 4, 
consistent with the single wage equilibrium model.
Since all searching individuals are assumed identical the 
continuous distribution of reservation wages used in chapter 4 
is degenerate. Hence we can simplify G(w)
(6.4) G(w) = 1 V w > w*
“ 0 V w < w*
The monopsonistic wage offer of all firms in such circumstances 
is obviously simply w*.
Hence we can write steady state per period profit functions 
for the single and infinite vacancy firms as
(6.5) its “ (B-w*)p(F) - k 
iri « (B_w*)e - k
Where p(F) is the steady state probability of a 'filled'
vacancy and e is steady state employment.
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In the next section we consider in detail two alternative models 
of firms upon which individual search decisions will feed back and 
hence generate a market equilibrium.
6.4. Vacancies, Profits and Wages
In this section we simply require a simplification of the 'single' 
and 'infinite' vacancy firms discussed in detail in chapter 4, 
consistent with the single wage equilibrium model.
Since all searching individuals are assumed identical the 
continuous distribution of reservation wages used in chapter 4 
is degenerate. Hence we can simplify G(w)
(6.4) G(w) = 1 V w > w*
= 0 V w < w*
The monopsonistic wage offer of all firms in such circumstances 
is obviously simply w*.
Hence we can write steady state per period profit functions 
for the single and infinite vacancy firms as
(6.5) 7ts » (B-w*)p(F) - k 
iri - (B~w*)e - k
Where p(F) is the steady state probability of a 'filled'
vacancy and e is steady state employment.
To maintain consistency with our previous notation we denote 
by y6t the probability that a firm is contacted in the interval 
6t by an unemployed job searcher (the relationship between and Y'.
will be examined in the next section). From the results of chapter U  
we can immediately write
(6.6) p (F) ■= — *—
( y + u )
e = 1
V
In the case of single vacancy firms p(F) is the probability 
that a randomly contacting individual will find the firm with no 
vacancy. We therefore have the following important identity:
(6.7) p(F) = (1-q) the 'Null Offer' probability
Total employment under the two alternative firm types can also 
be written directly as can steady state unemployment
(6.8) Es - np(F) - n(l-q)
Ei “ ne
(6.9) Us - N - Es 
Ui - N - Ei
In order to complete our detailed exposition of the equilibrium 
search model we next consider the process whereby unemployed individuals 
and firms meet. In doing this we establish the relationship between
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the probability that a firm is contacted (y) and the rate at 
which unemployed individuals contact firms (y^)•
6.5. The Matching Process
As has been noted by both Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1984), 
a well specified model of matching processes in markets where one or 
both sets of agents search randomly has not yet been developed. In 
the absence of such a matching model it is usual to assume a contact 
function and specify in general terms some of its properties. If 
there are U searching individuals and a possible n firms for them 
to contact we might expect the number of matchings that occur during 
a unit time interval to depend positively on both U and n. Denoting 
by M6t the number of matchings occurring in time interval 6t it is 
usual to write
(6.10) M - m(U,n) , > 0 mn > 0
It is far from clear, however, whether m(U,n) should be concave 
or convex in either of U or n, or whether m(U,n) possesses 
homogeneity of any particular degree. In this latter respect it is 
perhaps most reasonable to assume that a doubling of U and n 
simply doubles the number of matchings that will occur. m(U,n) may 
be viewed as a kind of 'contact' production function which, if the 
above restriction applies, exhibits constant returns.
The model of this chapter is based upon a far simpler specification 
of the matching technology. We assume that search by individuals is 
deterministic except that the firm to be contacted is selected at
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random. This specification appears a reasonable representation of 
labour market search processes where individuals often know the 
whereabouts of firms but do not know which particular firms have vacancies.
We therefore explain the number of matchings occurring by first 
defining the number of contacts between workers and firms. In line with
the argument above, the total number of contacts will be considered a
simple linear function of unemployment, hence we write
(6.10a) C = y lU
From (6.10a) we can also define the contact probability for a firm ( y )  as
(6.11) y = C/n = Y^U/n
Matchings are now simply defined as the number of successful contacts.
In the infinite vacancy case M = C since all contacts are by definition 
successful. In the single vacancy case M = (l-z)C since z defines 
the probability of an unsuccessful contact.
We shall subsequently show how z depends on the number of firms 
in equilibrium, in which case our matching technology is simply a 
special case of equation (6.10).
We now have all the components of essentially two equilibrium 
models of search allowing for vacancies to open up without limit as 
individuals accept jobs or to be 'used up' so that other job searchers 
face a probability of null offers.
6 ,6. Equilibrium; The Unlimited Vacancies Case
The choice of variables to solve for in equilibrium is somewhat 
arbitrary since simple identities link some of the endogenous variables 
identified in the infinite vacancies model of search. It should be 
clear from inspection that all the behavioural relationship within 
this model can be written in terms of w*, e and n and we will
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therefore solve for these variables. The following relationships 
should therefore be noted
(6.12) y - ey
(6.13) U - (N - ne)
In order to determine the equilibrium values of w*, e and n we 
need three determining equations.
The determination of the firm's monopsony wage offer has already 
been considered and this has been shown to depend only on exogenous 
parameters of the model. The actual wage paid, however, may take 
into account 'bargaining' between worker and firm. This is possible 
because when a job searcher and firm meet in a search context they 
jointly have a surplus to distribute that arises because both will 
lose out by failing to engage in production. The cost for the 
individual is of course a search cost, for the firm it takes the 
form of unemployed capital.
To formally model this bargaining game that arises in a search 
context, the threat points of each of the players must be examined 
and then some rule for selecting from amongst the feasible wage 
bargains described. Diamond (1982) pursues exactly this course. 
Here, however, we seek a simpler formulation which nevertheless 
captures the essence of a bargained as opposed to monopsonistically 
determined wage. The essence of the bargaining solutions described 
by both Diamond (1982) and Pissarides (1984) is that wage payments 
reflect the strength of the two parties involved as essentially 
reflected in the level of unemployment. With high unemployment
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individuals will expect a lengthy search before a job is found and 
firms will expect large flows of applicants. The converse is true 
when unemployment is low.
We therefore assume that in the presence of wage bargaining 
the wage paid will be determined by equation (6.14).
(6.14) Vg - (b-c)p(U) + wp(E) = a(U)
Equation (6.14) allows for individuals to derive a positive 
surplus from participation which is seen as being a function of 
the level of unemployment. As we have argued above the effect of 
an increase in U is to decrease a so that 3a/3U < 0 .
This formulation is atl hoc in the sense that it might seem 
more appropriate to allow for individuals to secure a proportion 
of the total surplus generated by employment rather than a fixed sum. 
The problem with this is that if we allow free entry to determine 
vacancies the total surplus will be driven to zero. This problem does
not arise in Diamond's (1982) paper because discounting is assumed, 
this forces a wedge between the profits of potential entrant firm 
(who must wait to receive applicants) and existing employing forms.
As noted above (6.14) captures the essence of a bargaining solution
without the need to view the complication of discounting.
Equation (6.14) provides the first determining equation for 
equilibrium. Notice that w depends through U on equilibrium 
employment.
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A natural choice for a determining equation for n is a zero 
profit condition. We therefore write
(6.15) iri ■ (8-w)e - k = 0
As firms enter the market the number of individuals contacting any 
one firm in any given interval declines, hence e declines and 
iri falls. When iri is identically zero there is no incentive 
for firms to enter and by the assumed symmetry of firms no incentive 
to exit.
Finally, we require a condition determining employment in 
equilibrium. Here we use the fact that in steady state inflows to 
employment must balance outflows so that employment in steady 
state satisfies:
(6.16) y^iN-ne) - pne « 0
The left hand term of equation (6.16) is the number of matchings 
(equals number of inflows) whilst the right hand term is the number 
of separations.
Equations (6.14) - (6.16) form a set of non linear simultaneous 
equations determining n, e and w. It should be apparent from 
inspection that the actual structure of these equilibrium equations for 
the 'infinite' vacancies model is rather simple, and therefore that
many of the features of equilibrium can be deduced simply from 
inspection.
158
First consider the case where a  m 0 for all U so that w “ w 
which is determined solely by the exogenous parameters of the model.
It is now clear that equation (6.15) can be solved for e purely 
in terms of parameters whilst equation (6.16) can be solved for n in 
terms of e. We therefore obtain an explicit solution of the form
(6.17) w w* - + H>b " (b-c)b
(6.18) e ■= k
(B-w)
y N
(6.19) n - ----=----
e(Y£ + u)
Equations (6.17) - (6.19) have a recursive structure that enables 
the effect of changes in exogenous parameters in steady state 
equilibrium to be immediately worked out.
We summarise these effects in Table 1 below
b C k B V N
V + + 0 0 + - 0
e + ♦ + - •f - 0
n - - - ■f - + +
ne 0 0 0 0 - + +
Table 1
Table 1 is worthy of detailed attention since it contains 
information that fully characterises the determinants of search 
equilibrium for the infinite vacancies or unrationed offers model 
of search.
Starting with an increase in the utility of leisure b we see 
that this increases the participation wage directly and hence under 
the assumption of a  “ 0 also the market wage. With the necessity 
to pay higher wages profits fall and some firms exit the market (n+) , 
with this loss of firms the remaining firms receive a greater flow 
of applicants so that the steady state employment at each firm (e) 
increases. The effect on total employment of a change in b is 
zero. Employment is neutral to many changes in this model and to 
see why we refer back to equation (6.18). This shows that total 
employment (ne) is determined only by the parameters N and y
and is independent of the endogenous determination of w. Hence 
changes in e and n must in most cases simply offset each other. 
Employment can be seen in this model as technologically determined, 
essentially by the matching technology and the separation rate y.
The effect of an increase in search costs is of course identical 
to that of an increase in b; the above comments therefore continue 
to apply.
If we consider an increase in the productivity of labour 8 we 
can see that in the absence of worker bargaining power over wages 
the effect on the market wage is identically zero. With greater 
productivity and unchanged wage payments profits will increase 
inducing entry of firms (nt). With more firms in equilibrium each 
firm will receive a smaller share of total applicants so that e falls.
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Again the total employment effect of a change in 6 is identically 
zero.
to increase in capital cost k is analogous to a decrease in 
productivity and the above comments apply in reverse for the parameter k.
The parameters and p are respectively the rates at which
firms and unemployed individuals meet and separate. Intuitively 
we should expect increased matchings to result in greater employment 
in steady state and vice versa for separations. This indeed is the 
case. Because the participation wage incorporates an element of 
compensation for costly search, the employment effect of these 
parameters feeds through onto wages.
In the above analysis we have assumed that an equilibrium exists. 
Existence within this simple model is an issue easily examined. The 
simplest way to see this is diagrammatically by graphing the 
equilibrium conditions (see Fig. 2)
Figure 2
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Provided a positive solution for w* exists and provided that 
w* < 6, an equilibrium will exist and furthermore will be unique. 
This is so because e is a constant, whilst n is a continuous 
function of e on the interval (0,” ) with negative slope. A 
unique intersection in the positive quadrant is ensured.
So far we have made the simplifying assumption that a = 0; what 
happens when we allow for worker bargaining power? Technically we 
lose the simple recursive structure of the determining equations 
alluded to above and now need to solve simultaneously for e and 
w. Without loss of generality we can set b « 0 (the effect of 
b is entirely analogous to that of c) and rewrite our solution as
( 6 . 20) a(U)
(6.21) e - —
B-w
y .N
(6.22) n -
+ p)
Simple inspection of equations (6.20) - (6.22) reveals that 
introducing the possibility of bargaining has no substantial effect 
except on wage determination. This is because employment remains 
determined in equation (6.22) by the search technology. Hence there 
exists a unique solution to equations (6.20) - (6.22) which can 
be determined recursively. Once the equilibrium employment level 
(ne) has been solved for from (6.22) the wage can be determined 
from (6.21) (using the fact that U ■» (N-ne)) . The wage can then 
be used in equation (6 .21) to solve for equilibrium steady state
employment in each firm and hence (using (6.22)) the number of 
firms in equilibrium.
The comparative statics of equilibrium are summarised in Table 2
c k e V Yi N
V + 0 0 ? ? -
e + + - ? ?
n - - + ? ? +
ne 0 0 0 - + +
Table 2
The first three columns of table 2 are identical to those of 
table 1. When, however, we consider the consequences of changes 
in the parameters' y and the effect of wage bargaining is
to make ambiguous our results.
To see why this is so, consider an increase in the leaving 
rate y. From equation fc .22)this unambiguously reduces employment 
(ne), therefore unemployment rises. The effect of this upon wages 
is hence ambiguous. Higher unemployment certainly leads to an 
increase in the 'participation' wage but there is a countervailing 
effect through unemployment on workers' bargaining. Since the 
wage effect of an increase in y is ambiguous, so from (6.21) 
is the effect upon expected employment at each firm.
Turning to the last column of table 2 the effect of an increase 
in the number of individuals participating can now be thought through.
As N increases so (from (6.22)) does employment. However, calculating 
the rate of change of employment with respect to N reveals it to 
be y./(y^ + h) which by definition is less than unity hence unemployment 
rises. Higher unemployment leads to lower wages (through the effect
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on bargaining) and hence entry of firms and a lowering of each 
firm's level of employment.
So far we have described the physical aspects of equilibrium in 
our infinite vacancies model; what are the efficiency properties?
In order to examine the efficiency issue and also to cast further 
light on the nature of the outcome we have described it is useful 
to consider the total value to all agents involved of the operation 
of the labour market we have described.
The flow of total value can be written as 
(6.22a) TV = (B-b)ne - (c-b)(N-ne) - nk
Steady state employment results in an expected value of output of 
Bne. In producing output an expected number of ne individuals 
lose the value of their leisure (b). A further expected number 
(N-ne) are unemployed and enjoying leisure but incurring search 
cost c. A total of n firms are incurring flow costs of capital k.
As a social planner concerned with maximising the money value of output 
net of all relevant costs and ignoring the distribution of gains 
between workers and firms could choose n - the number of firms 
operating to maximise (6.23) subject ot the steady state employment 
condition given by (6.22).
This particular programming problem has a very simple solution, 
however, since whatever n is chosen equation (6 .22) reveals that 
total employment is fixed. Graphing TV against n therefore 
reveals a downward sloping linear relationship as in Figure 3.
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£\TV, a(U)
Figure 3
This reveals the artifical nature of the infinite vacancy assumption 
and also proves useful in considering the welfare consequences of 
search equilibrium.
First note that the optimum number of firms is simply 1.
This arises because as equation (6.22) shows employment in steady 
state is independent of the number of firms. The best that can be 
done therefore is to minimise the capital payments required to 
generate the given employment level. This is not a surprising 
result given our assumptions on the nature of vacancies in the 
infinite vacancy world - they have zero marginal cost.
What of the unregulated market outcome then? If workers 
possess no bargaining strength so that a~0 for all U, then the 
zero profit condition (6.21) dictates that n* firms will exist in 
equilibrium. Entry will occur until TV is driven to zero.
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If individuals bargain for wages according to the prevailing 
rate of unemployment then n firms constitute an equilibrium. In 
this case the zero profit condition implies that nir = 0 where 
nir « TV - NVg - TV - Na(U). Since unemployment along with employment 
is technologically determined Na(U) is constant as drawn in 
Fig. 3.
In our infinite vacancy setting worker bargaining is always 
(to a limit) a good thing, giving rise to higher welfare and affecting 
employment. This is precisely because firms are not required to 
increase vacancies when vacancies within any one firm are unlimited. 
What is useful about the model we have described here is that it 
provides a base against which to compare the more realistic null 
offer model.
We have shown that in an infinite vacancy setting a unique 
employment equilibrium exists and is characterised by employment 
independent of the demand price of output, cost of capital or search 
costs. The outcome is not affected by the existence of worker 
bargaining except that bargaining serves to reduce excessive entry 
and hence improves welfare. Search is always successful in such 
a setting; a job once accepted does not reduce the stock of jobs 
waiting for unemployed searchers. These last features are the 
essential distinction between the infinite vacancy world and the 
null offer world that has been subject to partial analysis in 
earlier chapters. What are the consequences therefore of allowing 
for null offers on the structure of search equilibrium?
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6.7. Equilibrium: The Case of Null'Offers
In order to examine the equilibrium of the single vacancy firm 
model of search, we simply need to rewrite the determining equations 
with appropriate substitutions made.
In place of steady state employment at each firm (e) we now 
have the proportion of time that each firm spends with its vacancy 
filled. We can therefore consider the number of firms to be determined 
by a zero profit condition.
(6.23) trs ■ (6-w)z - k = 0
For clarity we will henceforth use z to denote (1-q) the 
null offer probability (q is the probability of obtaining an offer).
Wage payments can again be considered to be determined by wage 
bargaining subject to the complication that the availability of 
offers (q) enters into the determination of the participation wage.
Using the fact that q - (1-z) we have
(6.24) w s.t Vg(w) - a(U)
t . (Vg (w*) - o ' )
Finally we need an analogue of equation (6.16) to determine 
steady state employment. Straightforwardly we therefore write
(6.25) Y,-(N-nz)-^
( 1 - z )
0
(6.25) takes into account the fact that of total contacts, only 
a proportion (1-z) (“q) will be successful.
Equations (6.23) - (6.25) form a set of non linear simultaneous 
equations fully determining a search equilibrium in which n firms 
spend of a proportion of time z with a single vacancy filled and 
where (1-z) denotes the probability that search is successful.
Again we start by abstracting in the first instance from wage 
determination. Since with offer rationing the availability of offers 
determines in part the minimum wage offer that will induce participation 
we need to impose stronger assumptions to exogenise wages. It 
was noted in section (6.3) that equating search costs to zero ensured 
that w* = b, we therefore assume in the first instance that a ■= c « 0 .
We can rewrite the determining equations (6.23) - (6.25) as
(6.26) w = b
(6.27) z -
(6.28) n
(YiZ )
With exogenously determined wage the null offer model is formally 
identical to the infinite vacancies model. This should not be 
surprising since the only substantive role for offer rationing lies 
in its determination of individual behaviour (participation).
In the absence of any feedback onto firms' profits the only difference 
between the 'null' and 'unlimited' offers models lies in the technical 
condition for steady state employment equilibrium.
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We can again establish that provided z lies within a feasible 
range (0 < z £ 1 by virtue of being a probability) then equilibrium 
exists and is unique. Equation (6.28) inverts to solve for z as 
a single valued monotonically decreasing function of n and 
therefore Fig. 2 is again an appropriate diagram. If k > (B-b) 
then no equilibrium exists.
The comparative statics of this simple equilibrium are (excepting 
the exogenous wage) exactly the same as for Table 1.
What happens when we allow for offer rationing to feed back 
(via wages) on profits and therefore on entry incentives? To consider 
this, allow b = a = O but assume that c > 0. Setting b to zero 
again involves no loss of generality, assuming costly search makes 
certain that offer rationing matters. Again for simplicity we set 
worker bargaining power at zero.
We now have the following equation determining the equilibrium wage.
•^(1-z)
Equations (6.23), (6.25) remain valid for the determination 
of n and z.
With this slight modification of our model an interesting 
possibility is opened up. z must now solve a quadratic function 
so that we have the possibility of multiple equilibria.
Diagrammatically
Figure 4.
z^  and represent the possible positive roots of
(6.30) -Sz“ + (k + S - cu)z - k « 0
It will be noticed that in the unlimited vacancy model the 
assumptions made here would ensure a unique equilibrium. More 
important, however, than non-uniqueness is the fact that the multiple 
equilibria described here for the null offer model will in general 
entail different levels of employment. Non uniqueness results from 
the fact that wages reflect the extent of offer rationing. We have 
the possibility of an equilibrium with considerable risk of null 
offers (high z) which therefore requires a high wage payment to 
encourage participation which in turn discourages the entry of firms 
to create more vacancies. However, if more firms were to enter 
then the probability of a filled vacancy declines as does the
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equilibrium wage. Another equilibrium may exist again with zero 
profits, a large number of firms and only a small probability of 
being unsuccessful upon randomly contacting a firm.
In Figure 4, A corresponds to the first equilibrium possibility 
which we might call a tight labour market (high null offer probability, 
small number of vacancies), B corresponds to the second possibility, 
a 'loose' labour market.
It is not clear which equilibrium of A or B represents 
greater employment since total employment is given by nz. We can, 
however, exploit our equilibrium conditions further in order to resolve 
this issue.
To do this we start by noting that there must be consistency 
between an individual's unemployment experience and aggregate 
employment. This consistency is expressed in the identity (6.31)
(6.31) p(U) IJ _ (N-nz) N N
The proportion of time that each individual spends unemployed 
must represent a 'fair share' of total unemployment.
Using this identity the participation wage can be re-expressed 
as a function of total employment rather than simply offer rationing. 
We therefore obtain (b » 0)
(6.32) w* cp (U) _ c(l-(|j)z)
p(E)
(N)Z
The participation wage is therefore decreasing in total employment 
since greater aggregate employment means less individual unemployment.
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We can, however, use this fact to deduce that unemployment is 
higher in that equilibrium associated with the highest wage. In 
other words the tighter labour market (equilibrium A) is associated with 
higher unemployment, higher wages, more rationing of offers and fewer 
firms.
By allowing in the simplest possible way for a constraint on 
vacancies in a model of search we have opened up the possibility of a 
genuinely interesting multiplicity of equilibria. Where two 
equilibria are allowed one may be associated with lower employment 
and greater rationing of offers than the other. This bootstraps 
feature of search equilibrium is absent from a model that ignores 
offer rationing because in such a model there is no feedback from 
rationing onto profits and therefore entry. Even where in the 
unlimited vacancy model we endogenised wages we saw that even 
multiple equilibria were associated with a unique employment level.
The existence of multiple equilibria of course complicates 
the comparative statics analysis of outcomes. It is clearly 
possible that the two different equilibria have completely different 
and possibly opposite comparative statics properties. However, by 
restricting attention to only stable outcomes we are nevertheless 
able to carry out a comparative statics exercise.
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Our three determining equations are (6.27) - (6.29) which 
for compactness we will denote fj respectively. The
effect of an increase in some parameter 6 on the equilibrium 
values of w*, z and n can be ascertained from a consideration of 
the differentials of the three equilibrium conditions, since 
before and after the change in 6 these must be satisfied. Hence
dfl fie de'
df2 - J dn + f20 de
df3 dw f36 de
Where J is the Jacobian Matrix of the determining equations.
The sign of the effect upon the endogenous variables of an increase 
in 6 is therefore given by
dz/de f i e
dn/de -1* sign J f 2 e
dw/d0 f 36_
The Jacobian of our three equation system has a sign pattern 
given by
J 0
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If we restrict attention to a stable equilibrium then by
the Routh conditions (see Chiang(1974)).
the determinant of J is positive.
The comparative statics properties of a stable equilibrium are 
therefore summarised in Table 3.
Table 3 indicates that not only does rationing imply non unique 
employment equilibria but also that any equilibrium is non neutral 
(vis a vis employment) to changes in the exogenous parameters.
The sign pattern of Table 3 corresponds closely to that of 
Table 2 so that we will not repeat an explanation of these effects. 
The main differences between Tables 2 and 3 concern the employment 
effects which we will detail below and the wage effects of changes 
in S and k in the null offer case.
c 8 k y N
w + 0
z + 0
n
+
Table 3
These latter effects arise exactly because of the employment 
effects that have been described. Taking for example an increase
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in the value produce (8) of labour, it can be seen that the direct 
effect of this is to increase profits. Subsequent entry therefore 
reduces the degree of offer rationing and there follows a reduction 
in the participation wage. The overall effect upon the wage is 
hence negative.
Turning now to the employment consequences of parameter shifts 
it can be seen that changes in c, 8 and k are no longer neutral 
with respect to employment.
In the case of an increase in search costs the effect of an 
increase in the participation wage is to decrease profits.
Decreased profits in turn cause exit which in turn causes z to 
increase. This latter increase in rationing reinforces the initial 
effect on the participation wage so that the above process is 
repeated. The increase in z in equilibrium is not sufficient 
to offset the loss of firms and employment is lower. The new equilibrium 
is therefore characterised by lower employment, more rationing of 
offers and higher wages. This then is a 'general' equilibrium 
refutation for the usually suggested partial result of the consequences 
of an increase in search costs. In this model, however, the effect 
is complicated, since all agents always participate any employment 
effect comes through entry of firms rather than increased reservations.
Once again a welfare analysis is most easily made by considering 
the aggregate total value given in equation (6 .22a) (replacing e 
with z). In order to understand the null offer model it is necessary 
to calculate how total expected employment (nz) varies as a function 
of the number of firms in equilibrium. To see this consider once 
again equation (6.28). Equation (6.28) can be regarded as defining
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employment (nz) as an implicit function of the degree of offer 
rationing (z). Differentiation of this relationship reveals that 
dnz/dz < 0 which in turn implies that dnz/dn > 0. This is a sensible 
result since it implies that the entry of firms decreases unemployment. 
As firms enter of course the rate of contact by unemployed workers 
declines but the total effect of entry on employment is positive.
We have shown above that zero profit equilibrium is consistent 
with two possible values of z and hence of n. We can therefore 
deduce the shape of total profit (which in the absence of bargaining 
equals TV) as a function on n. This is drawn below in Figure 5.
Figure 5
The zero profit condition implies in the absence of worker bargaining 
two equilibria, shown in the diagram above as n and n. We have 
demonstrated earlier that n is associated with higher total 
employment, a lower (participation) wage and a lower null offer 
probability (z) .
Both equilibria are identical in welfare terms and both 
inferior to the social planners best choice indicated by n*. In the
case of n there is too much entry and too little unemployment.
All agents could potentially be made better off if one firm were 
to quit the market and the saved capital payments redistributed 
amongst existing firms and individuals. In the case of 11 the 
opposite is true, all could gain by the entry of an additional firm 
and an increase in steady state employment provided some system 
existed for lump sum transfers out of the extra value product of 
output (8).
Figure A can also be used to give some intuitive feel for the 
implicit dynamics of the equilibria. Whenever total profits are 
positive there is an incentive to enter so that n increases, 
if total profits are negative then we would expect firms to exit. 
According to this dynamic therefore the n equilibrium is stable 
(over the range of n > n n < ") whilst the t» equilibrium is 
globally unstable. Hence figure A helps us to deduce that our 
comparative statics exercise reported above refers to the n (high 
employment) equilibrium. Indeed to confirm the comparative statics 
analysis one simply has to shift the TV curve in Figure A and examine 
the consequences for n and then use equations (6.27) and (6.28) 
to deduce the consequences for z and w*.
So far then by considering the single vacancy null offer model 
we have deduced an interesting possibility. Even in the most simple 
circumstances there exists the possibility of multiple employment 
equilibria. The same set of parameter values may be consistent 
with both a high unemployment or low unemployment outcome. However, 
both equilibria generate the same level of total welfare for the 
agents involved and only one (the high employment equilibrium) 
is stable. Both equilibria are inefficient because firms act as
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Nash agents calculating the profit to be gained if they enter 
assuming that the effect of their entry on market outcomes is 
negligible.
Allowing for workers to bargain for a part of the total surplus 
allows some of the more questionable features of our model highlighted 
analysis to be resolved.
Firstly, it should be noted that whereas above unemployment 
and wages are positively correlated (since wages represent a minimum 
compensation for the costly search necessitated by participation) this 
correlation is broken once bargaining is considered. Our wage 
equation (6.14) allows for wages to increase as unemployment falls 
and workers are better able to bargain with firms.
Secondly the welfare implications of equilibria are altered.
The effects of wage bargaining can most easily be seen using 
Figure 5. If we draw the total value to workers on Figure 5 we 
obtain an upward sloping relationship as in Figure 6.
Figure 6 .
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The NVg schedule is upward sloping because of the relationship 
between n and unemployment (N-nz) . Equilibrium is now not given 
by the intersection of the TV schedule with the n axis. Using 
the fact that TV - NVg + mr zero profit entry requires that 
TV - NVg “ 0 so that our multiple employment equilibria are 
n and n* . It is now clearly the case that n* implies a higher 
level of welfare than the low employment equilibrium n*. Hence 
bargaining for wages may give rise to more desirable equilibria and 
may also imply that multiple equilibria have different welfare 
properties. As drawn in Figure 6 the high employment equilibrium 
is again stable and save for the fact that the wage is indeterminate 
table 3 can be used to examine comparative statics properties.
In drawing Figure 6 the value accruing to workers is shown 
as a linear function of n, even though U is a non linear (concave) 
function of n. If we relax this unrealistic linearity and simply 
require Ncx(U) to be monotonically increasing in n (though the 
fact that U is monotonically decreasing in n) then the equilibrium 
possiblities multiply. Figure 7 shows one possibility.
With a highly non linear bargaining function the possible 
equilibria proliferate. The intuition behind this is clear.
Previously (when a  = 0 for all U) the only source of feedback 
from market outcome onto firms entry arose through the participation 
decision of individuals. High unemployment necessitated large 
wage payments to encourage participation. Now with bargaining 
there is a second avenue of feedback that complicates the picture, 
unemployment affects the bargaining position as well as the 
participation decision. If this feedback is appropriately non 
linear the multiplicity problem worsens.
As drawn in Fig. 7, there are four possible equilibria 
n^ with the lowest employment and lowest welfare through to n^
(highest employment and welfare). Whilst it is still true that 
n. is unstable and n. a stable outcome it is now possible to have 
an equilibrium which is inefficient compared with alternative 
and stable. Starting from n in the interval n^ < n < n^ the 
implicit dynamic process of entry leads to as an equilibrium.
Allowing for wage bargaining in the null offer framework has 
therefore opened up the possibility of a genuinely interesting 
multiplicity of equilibria. We have shown how stable inefficient 
equilibria might arise even in a world characterised by a very 
simple search technology and production process. Equilibria 
entail different employment outcomes, different null offer probabilities 
(which are negatively correlated with employment) and different 
wages (which may show no particular correlation with employment) .
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These possibilities can be contrasted with our analysis (assuming 
the same search and production technology) of the infinite vacancy 
world which allowed for only successful search. Employment was 
uniquely determined in such a setting as a function of only the 
search process.
6.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter we have drawn together the component parts 
introduced in previous chapters and formulated an equilibrium model 
of search with offer rationing or null offers. In considering an 
equilibrium model of search we have trodden new ground; the analysis 
of search equilibria is in its infancy.
The main purpose of this chapter has been to compare and contrast 
models of search where offer rationing is or is not a feature and 
to that end we have formulated the simplest models that seem to 
capture the appropriate notions of vacancy creation. It has been 
seen that an essential difference implied by the existence of 
constraints on offer creation is with regard to the uniqueness of 
employment in equilibrium. In the case of unrationed vacancies 
employment was technologically determined by our simple matching 
assumption. Employment was independent of all parameters save 
those directly affecting the matching process. It is important to 
note that this conclusion is not robust to different specifications 
of matching technology, indeed the work of Diamond (1982) and 
Fissarides (1984) confirms this. However, as assumptions go our 
assumption was not a bad one. Contacts were seen as being initiated 
by unemployed searchers so that total contacts were independent of the 
number of firms in equilibrium. This simplifying restriction on 
matching processes we feel at least worthy of testing or empirical 
investigation. In any case, it remains an interesting question
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whether assumptions that give rise to uniqueness and neutrality in 
a model with limitless vacancies continue to give these conclusions 
when offer rationing is allowed.
We have in fact seen an important distinction between rationed 
and unrationed models. When offer constraint was allowed it has been 
shown that steady state employment once again depends upon all the 
parameters of the model. Indeed, we have shown that simplistic 
partial equilibrium results concerning the effect of increased 
search costs for example are reversed in an equilibrium setting. 
Higher search costs imply higher wages, fewer firms, greater 
rationing and lower employment. More importantly, however, rationed 
equilibria are non unique. There exists the possibility that the 
market can be in equilibrium with high unemployment and wages when 
exactly the same parameters are consistent with a low unemployment 
equilibrium. The problem exists because offer constraint determines 
the wage required to induce participation which in turn partly 
determines profit and thereby entry incentives. High wages, high 
unemployment and 'rationed' vacancies can therefore persist as an 
equilibrium in circumstances where if firms could be induced to 
enter a low unemployment, zero profit equilibrium is possible.
We believe this non-uniqueness of equilibria is the most 
important insight to come out of an equilibrium model of search with 
null offers. Inefficiencies of Nash wage bargains will exist 
whether offers are scarce or effectively infinite, bootstrap 
equilibria, however, arise out of the very nature of offer rationing 
and the feedback on vacancy creation implied by it.
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From this point of view it should be noted that the simplifying 
assumptions made in the course of analysis add strength to the 
results. We deliberately restricted attention to a very simple 
matching technology which allowed for total matching to be a 
linear function of unemployment. If a more general matching function 
is allowed for it follows that the multiplicity of equilibria 
result will be reinforced. Furthermore by introducing worker 
bargaining into the simple framework discussed here we have 
established that stable inefficient equilibria exist. These 
equilibria are inefficient not only with regard to the social 
optimum but also in comparison with other market outcomes. This 
distinction is important since social optima may not be obtainable 
(depending upon the ability to make the appropriate lump sum transfers 
to keep firms in business) whereas market outcomes are certainly 
feasible. The existence of the kind of inefficiencies discussed 
in this chapter offer a rationale for intervention which does not 
depend upon precise welfare calculations but simply upon the desire 
to shift the 'natural rate' of unemployment to a more desirable level.
Finally, it should be noted that the equilibrium models discussed 
here are of the 'vacancy' search kind discussed in chapter 2. 
Equilibrium consists of a unique wage offer made by all firms. It 
is, however, possible to use the techniques discussed here to model 
search equilibria with wage dispersion. Indeed, the simplified form 
of the models developed in this chapter makes a model that generates 
wage dispersion analytically tractable in a way not possible with 
the work of Diamond (1982). A necessary condition for wage 
dispersion is that searchers' reservations differ. Clearly a
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continuous distribution of reservations (via a dispersion of 
search costs) cannot easily be handled. However, a two-point 
discrete distribution can easily be allowed for. Equilibrium may 
then consist of a proportion of firms paying low wages which only 
high cost (low reservation) searchers accept whilst the remaining 
firms make offers that all (high and low cost) searchers find 
acceptable. It is not to be expected that the efficiency or non 
uniqueness questions posed by this chapter will significantly differ 
in these new circumstances. The questions which one may ask concerning 
such a model are the determinants of the degree of wage dispersion, 
/gain this issue is left to future work.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
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7.1. Summary and Discussion of Results
This thesis has attempted to analyse the consequences and 
causes of offer rationing in markets characterised by job search.
The previous chapters can be divided into three headings according 
to the focus of investigation. The results of the analysis are 
considered below, in line with that division.
a) The Consequence of Null Offers for Individual Decisions
In chapters 2 and 3 the consequences (in a partial equilibrium 
sense) of offer rationing in a search environment were discussed.
Chapter 2 provided a somewhat restricted survey of the literature, 
the results of which are well known and hence will not be discussed
further. Chapter 3 started from a belief that learning by individuals 
is an interesting and important phenomena. There is no empirical 
evidence to support this but considerable casual evidence (see 
Hey (1981)) that individuals are not fully informed as to the 
circumstances in which they search. Imperfect knowledge was limited 
to the parameter of offer rationing and a number of results were 
demonstrated. In situations where bygones are bygones (and past 
offers cannot be revisited) it was shown that imperfect information 
may be a discouragement to search, a result which runs counter to 
most results concerning the effects of imperfect knowledge. The 
reason for this reversal stems from the inability to return to 
past offers because where 'recall' is allowed it acts rather like 
insurance and thereby encourages more search. There are two kinds 
of application for this sort of study. Firstly imperfect knowledge 
suggests one way in which 'optimism' or pessimism might enter into 
economic models. It is not necessary for agents to hold false 
expectations nor even be risk averse for economic policies which 
act upon beliefs about the future to be effective. Merely making 
individuals more certain about the future may have payoffs.
186
Secondly it is desirable that attempts at empirically implementing 
models of individual search behaviour should incorporate at least 
the possibility of learning effects. It is of course very difficult 
to think of a suitable proxy for as abstract a notion as 'diffuseness 
of priors' but degree of belief in predictions is something that 
may be available.
Taking the first possible application of our results in chapter 
3, one can think of macroeconomic models. A popular held belief 
associated with the development of the rational expectations 
hypothesis concerns the neutrality of many kinds of macropolicy 
intervention. It is argued that if individuals know how the economy 
works and condition their expectations on such knowledge, any 
govemment policy which relies on only changing the beliefs of 
individuals will fail. The 'Adaptive' model of search decisions 
analysed in Chapter 3 points to one deficiency in this kind of 
argument. Even if individuals form expectations of the effect of 
policy that are unbiased, the degree of belief in those expectations 
might also be important. This is so in an 'adaptive' situation even 
if agents are risk neutral. Hence any policy which simply confirms 
expectations and means that individuals hold their beliefs with 
greater certainty in the future, may well have real effects.
Simply confirming the state of the labour market (as proxied by 
q in our notation) might be sufficient to encourage greater economic 
activity (participation).
Turning now to the second application, we believe that the 
model of chapter 3 has most direct relevance to the issue of worker 
discouragement. In the absence of learning the idea of a discouraged
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worker is more closely related to the idea of an idle machine.
Some economic environments are sufficiently unrewarding as to lead 
to an optimal decision of idleness. The word discouragement, 
however, implies a process rather than a state and it is that 
process that the analysis of chapter 3 captures. Individuals 
may become idle even when circumstances dictate a positive net 
benefit to participation simply because of a run of bad luck.
Bad luck in chapter 3 took the form of a sequence of unsuccessful 
searches. Crucial therefore to an explanation of worker discouragement
is the notion of adaptive learning.
b) The Nature of Wage Payments and the Causes of Null Offers
Unlike the literature on individual search decisions the literature 
on the decisions of firms in a job search context is very limited.
The first job in chapters 4 and 5 was therefore to outline a 
framework of analysis that would provide some insight into the 
determinants of wage offers and vacancy creation. This job was 
therefore one of model specification. In order to allow for some 
generality as regards vacancy creation it was necessary to make 
fairly strong assumptions regarding both the objectives of firms and 
the environment in which they operated. Where possible (i.e. in 
special cases) the importance of these assumptions was, however, 
considered.
Chapter 4 dealt with the determination of wages and it was 
argued that the only notion of wage determination consistent with 
job search involved monopsony or bilateral monopoly bargaining.
Given this, the profit maximising choice by a firm over its wage 
offer was considered. It was demonstrated that even in a very
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simple setting the existence of a dispersion of reservation wages 
causes considerable difficulty for analysis. The response of 
monopsony wage offers to changes in job search parameters is 
largely ambiguous when the firm has more than a single vacancy to 
fill. The important point to note about this result is that it 
rules out any notion of wages performing the task of eliminating 
excess demand or supply. Ai increased flow of applicants might 
result in an increase in wage offers thereby increasing the incentive 
to enter the market and search. Only in one special case were 
wages easy to determine and this was when vacancies were unlimited.
In this case wages were totally invariant to labour market conditions. 
Since unlimited vacancy creation entails an assumption of costless 
vacancies this special case is really of little interest. In 
general the monopsony wage offers of firms respond in an ambiguous way 
to changes in labour market conditions.
Chapter 5 was concerned with the determination of vacancies 
and thereby of offer rationing. The analysis concentrated on a 
fairly appealing kind of technology that naturally gave rise to 
limited offers by firms, independent of any product market sales 
constraints. It was shown that vacancy creation depended in a 
fairly intuitive way upon labour market conditions. For example, 
an increase in the flow of applicants was consistent with an 
increase in the maximum labour force that a firm would employ.
Vacancy creation was also related back to offer rationing and the 
possibility of a positive feedback to firms and individuals' 
decisions was a possibility. This offers some idea of the 
way in which a search equilibrium may be non-unique and display
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bootstraps type features. The results of chapter 5 were shown to 
be reasonably robust. Where analytic methods failed to produce 
unambiguous answers numerical experiments were employed to check 
robustness. Chapter 5 did not consider a firm varying its wage 
offer with employment, but given state independent wages the 
analysis there suggested offer rationing as quite a general feature 
of markets characterised by search.
Chapters 2, 3 and 5 taken together offer some insight into the 
nature of equilibrium in markets characterised by search and null 
offers. Offer rationing can arise quite naturally out of a stochastic 
employment process. If expanding employment is costly it will 
never pay to be prepared to accept applicants for jobs without limit. 
Indeed, if labour is only productive in conjunction with some 
other inputs then a decision regarding, say, capital is in fact 
an implicit decision about vacancies. This relationship is 
formalised in chapter 5.
We have also seen in chapters 2 and 3 that wages (or their 
dispersion) and the extent of offer constraint are important 
determinants of both search and participation decisions yet it 
is the outcome of these decisions that feedback onto firms in the 
form of flows of applications. A more thorough analysis of the 
feedback nmchanism constitutes our third area of research.
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c. The Equilibrium Consequences of Null Offers
Taking as a starting point the analysis of previous chapters, 
chapter 6 instigated an investigation of quantity constraint and 
search equilibrium. A consistent equilibrium model of search and 
turnover poses considerable difficulties, therefore the first part 
of chapter 6 dealt with conceptual problems. Equilibrium in a 
search model that incorporates rationing is then contrasted with 
an infinite vacancy world. The important point to come out of 
this analysis makes rigorous the suggestion made in chapter 5.
Offer rationing determines an individual's search decisions; in 
a simple model where all individuals are identical this is reflected 
in the 'participation wage' discussed in chapter 2. But the 
'participation wage' is also a parameter of the firm's profit 
function and thereby determines the incentive £orentry. Multiple 
equilibria can exist in which one equilibrium entails high unemployment, 
a strong rationing constraint and high wages whilst another equilibrium 
entails lower wages and unemployment. In the absence of offer 
rationing there is seen to be no feedback effect between firms and 
workers' decisions and unemployment has a unique natural rate.
The model discussed in chapter 6 is highly simplified and 
capable of generalisation. For example' searchers could be allowed 
to choose a level of search intensity. The central issues would, 
it is conjectured, remain the same. The results are robust to 
assumptions regarding the determination of wages with either wage 
bargaining or unilateral wage setting by firms consistent with 
multiple equilibria. The analysis of chapter 6 makes explicit the 
multiple equilibria possibility alluded to by Diamond (1982).
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Upon a more thorough analysis of the multiple equilibria 
problem we were able to indicate that once wage bargaining is 
allowed for different equilibria have different welfare consequences. 
Furthermore there existed the possibility that undesirable 
equilibria were stable and could therefore persist. Hence inefficiency 
does not rest upon a comparison of market solutions to possibly 
unattainable social optima.
In one sense the simplifying assumptions made throughout 
chapter 6 add strength to the nature of the results. Complicating 
factors, such as multiple vacancy firms, non linear matching 
technologies or search intensity decisions can only make matters 
worse as far as the non-uniqueness problem of equilibrium is concerned.
In conclusion chapters 2 and 3 concentrate on the consequences of 
offer rationing,4 and 5 on the causes and chapter 6 on both. We 
have seen that offer rationing ’matters' in that it affects individual 
search decisions, is consistent with a firm's profit maximising 
decisions and has important consequences for the nature of equilibrium.
7.2. Future Research
The stated purpose of this thesis was an examination of the 
consequences and causes of offer rationing in labour markets 
characterised by search. 'Consequences' were considered in a 
partial equilibrium sense in chapters 2 and 3 whilst 'causes' were 
the concern of chapters 4 and 5. A market equilibrium view of 
both causes and consequences was offered in chapter 6.
The reasons why offer rationing and search should be an interesting 
area of analysis for an economist have yet to be discussed, in such 
a discussion lies suggestions for further work.
Search theory does provide a theoretical view of labour market 
operation that is broadly consistent with observations about labour 
market functioning. The new view of unemployment as detailed by
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Clarke and Summers (1979) notes that unemployment spells are 
experienced by many members of the working population, that 
unemployment spells are relatively short and therefore that the 
'unemployed' turnover relatively quickly. This stock-flow 
emphasis on unemployment is hard to reconcile with standard (static) 
textbook labour market theory but does correspond well to the 
ideas of job search and job turnover dealt with in the preceding 
chapters.
Perhaps because of the views of the original contributors search 
theory most often assumes that job offers will always be forthcoming 
and that wage payments are the most important element in an 
individual's job choice decisions. As long as wages reflect the 
true (social) value of an individual's labour such assumptions are 
generally taken to imply an efficient labour market in which 
unemployment is efficient and productive. The optimising decisions 
of individual agents cannot be improved upon as long as these 
decisions are made contingent on correct prices.
It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that such a 
view, if not incorrect, then certainly needs to be viewed with 
caution once one allows for offer rationing or null offers. Such 
rationing does not arise only because markets fail (see chapter 5) 
and therefore our analysis is not limited to 'Keynesian' or any 
other particular view about product market clearing. The fact that 
agents' decisions interact through an offer constraint variable opens 
up the possibility of multiple equilibria which differ considerably 
as regards unemployment and efficiency.
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There are many aspects of search and offer rationing that remain 
to be analysed. As far as individual search is concerned I am 
inclined towards the view that individuals are motivated by a great 
deal more than simply the search for better wages. An alternative 
view towards the motivation for search can be found by adapting 
Lancaster's (1979) approach to product variety. Jobs differ in 
many respects and wage dispersion might simply reflect compensating 
differentials. Individuals differ in their subjective evaluation of 
the trade-off of characteristics and therefore search for a good 
'match'. This has the important implication that search is socially 
desirable provided that it results in better matching of agents to 
jobs. In such a setting offer rationing inhibits search and might 
result in searching agents crowding each other out of their most 
desired job locations (as casual evidence for this one can cite 
the increase in better qualified applicants to unskilled jobs in 
times of high or rising unemployment).
M  far as firms' decisions are concerned, economic theory still 
needs to produce a theory of firms' behaviour which is consistent 
with attaching wages to the characteristics of jobs rather than 
the applicants for them. This is a pervasive and well documented 
phenomenon. Typically wages are not seen to respond to either 
employment conditions, the state of the labour market or to 
product demand conditions. The invariance of wages to product 
demand is the concern of the recently emerged (and still emerging) 
contract literature (see Hart (1983)). The idea is that firms insure 
workers against such fluctuations and this idea I believe will be 
instrumental in explaining the invariance of wages to labour 
market conditions and employment. In this explanation lies a more
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convincing account of the failure of firms to increase employment 
by making lower wage offers. In our work, we have assumed 'sticky 
wages'; the causes of this phenomenon remain to be examined.
Finally much remains to be done in considering the consequences 
for market equilibria of search activity. The models so far discussed 
in the literature have provided considerable insight. The inefficiency 
of search equilibria is a pervasive phenomenon given the externalities 
involved in matching processes. I feel that some empirical work 
on the nature of real world matching processes and on the effects 
of job agencies (government or private) in search environments is 
absolutely crucial. All policy conclusions depend upon a more 
precise knowledge of these matching processes, without such knowledge 
economists must remain silent on important policy issues relating 
to search. On a wider point I also feel that work is urgently 
needed on equilibrium models of search that allow for the features 
described above, namely search motivated by a desire for better 
(and not just better paying) jobs and firms that pay wages 
independent of many prevailing economic conditions. In such an 
environment I would suggest that freely operating agents are 
unlikely to produce efficient outcomes, that the notion of 
involuntary unemployment again becomes meaningful and that costs 
of unemployment (in the form of mismatching) hitherto ignored 
become crucially important. Finally, work on the nature and causes 
of wage dispersion in markets characterised by job search is still 
required.
In short, much remains to be done.
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.fopendix : Computational Methods
In chapters 3, U and 5 numerical results were used in order to 
examine the effects of parameter changes on agents' behaviour where 
no analytic results were possible. The purpose of this appendix 
is to explain the techniques used.
A1 Alaptive (learning) Reservation Wages
The analytic derivation of the reservation wage for an individual 
facing an offer distribution f(w) was dealt with in chapter 2. 
Unfortunately it is not possible to solve explicitly for r and 
therefore even in the full information case a numerical evaluation 
routine is needed. The form of the equation to be solved is
Standard or Modified Newton (slope) methods can be used to solve 
(Al) for r provided that a numerical integration routine is used 
to provide function values. I am grateful to B. Bacon for providing 
a ready written 8 point Gaussion routine
A straightforward recursion technique can then be employed to 
calculate information contingent reservation wages. In the case 
of search without recall
(Al) x(r)dr = 0
• r
(A2) r(y,z) - - c + i max
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Equation (A2) is derived in chapter 3, here the expected value of 
the Beta distribution is written explicitly. In order to calculate 
a set of information contingent reservation wages it is simply 
necessary to find starting values for the recursion.
For large values of y,z the residual variance of the Beta 
distribution is very small and 'adaptive' reservation wages approach 
those for the full information case. We used y = z - 100 as 
an initial starting point and calculated using (Al) the full 
information reservation wage. Recursion is thereafter straightforward.
Where recall is allowed quation (3.18) can be used as the basic 
recursion and the above procedure goes through as before.
To calculate a set of information contingent reservation wages
2 .using the above method requires 100 iterations and as many 
numerical integration calls. Using a Burroughs B6700 mainframe 
computer each run took approximately 40 seconds c.p.u. The actual 
program written to perform these calculations is included at the 
end of this appendix and forms one of a group of programs written 
by the author to facilitate analysis of individual search problems. 
Whilst a normal offer distribution |f(w)| was assumed, any analytic 
distribution can be handled without difficulty. The parameter values 
for the offer distribution were scaled so as to avoid rounding 
errors that inevitably accumulate over a large number of iterations.
I would like to thank Mr. P. Fisher for assistance in mounting 
and running programs on the Burroughs B6700
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A2. Firms Wage/Vacancy Decisions
Where analytic results were not possible in chapters 4 and 5 
numerical experiments were employed. Since we wished to examine 
the choice variable of a well defined maximisation problem it was 
possible to use existing NAG routines in a simple program to 
provide results.
The
NAG routines called are E04EBF, E04CGF, details of which are 
contained in NAG documentation. These are straightforward 
maximisation routines.
Again, whilst an exponential distribution was used to provide 
illustrative results any analytic distribution could be handled.
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